Dirty Assets: Experiences, reflections, and lessons learnt from a decade of legislation on criminal money laundering and terrorism financing

Contemporary, public, images of organised crime are influenced by media and/ or Hollywood representations of 'organised crime' in, eg, The Godfather, The Sopranos, and The Wire. This depiction has created a popular imagery of what 'organised' crime is. Public opinion naturally reflects this picture, reinforced by politicians/ policy discourse that organised crime is a hierarchical structure requiring significant new policing powers to effectively combat it. Organised crime is now a central feature of policy discourse in the crime debate. Similarly, terrorism is depicted as a Tier 1 national security threat, and debates about the threat and counter-measures have been prominent for a decade or more.

Yet, policy discourse on organised crime and terrorism is inadequately informed by evidence-led research. This is especially apparent in 'follow the money' approaches to tackling such crime, which are presumed: to operate as a deterrent; to disrupt criminal networks/ markets; to improve detection rates; and to result in increased intelligence flows to policing agencies. Yet, criminological research has proved that this is not necessarily so. Moreover, despite extensive lawmaking in this field (eg the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, the Terrorism Act 2000, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, and the Terrorist Asset Freezing etc Act 2010), there is little evidence that 'follow the money' approaches are impacting upon organised crime or terrorist activities. There is a need for evaluation of the 'impact' of these pieces of legislation. A decade on from the enactment of the anti-money laundering/ proceeds of crime/ anti-terrorist financing legislation provides an opportune time to step back and evaluate 'follow the money' approaches, and to identify future directions in policy, practice and research.

'Following the money' represents an alternative approach to conventional policing stratagems to tackling organised crime and/ or terrorism. This network will bring together policymakers, practitioners, and researchers to explore emerging issues, including:
- How do we measure the success of the responsive regime?
- What impacts does an anti-assets strategy have on disrupting criminal or terrorism activity and reducing harm to society?
- Is it possible to quantify the impact of disrupting organised criminal activity, as compared to more conventional 'ordinary' crime?
- What are the main difficulties in institutional or operational forms facing law enforcement agencies when putting into operation an anti-assets strategy?
- How does the anti-asset strategy impact on online currencies (eg Bitcoin)?
- Are there further institutional or operational tools or opportunities which might improve the anti-assets strategy?
- What are the costs of the anti-assets strategy (especially in terms of monetary costs and cost to individual rights)?
- What experiences can be learned as between anti-criminal and anti-terrorist sectors and from other jurisdictions?

This network will draw upon experiences from other jurisdictions, including the United States, Australia, Canada, Italy, and Bulgaria. International action (eg FATF Recommendations; UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism) and actors (eg FATF; MONEYVAL; GRECO) will further inform discussion. The network will engage different academic disciplines (eg law, business, political science, sociology, criminology) as well as key stakeholders from policy and practice.

This network will be of interest to policymakers and practitioners working in the area of financial crimes, proceeds of crime, money laundering, and terrorist finances measures. These stakeholders include: the Home Office, Serious Organised Crime Agency (soon to be replaced by the National Crime Agency), the Civil Recovery Unit, the Association of Chief Police Officers, to name but a few. Leading practitioners in private practice will also be interested in the work of this network. The work of this network is especially relevant to legal, taxation and accounting practitioners who constantly encounter difficulties in complying with requirements of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, including 'know your customer' and disclosure obligations.

Beyond the UK, key stakeholders include the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), the European Criminal Assets Bureau, and the Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network (CARIN). These institutions are driving asset recovery as a transnational response to transnational organised crime and/ or terrorism.

This network will focus on a number of under-explored issues - which have been identified in consultation with stakeholders from the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Criminal Assets Bureau, and the Civil Recovery Unit. Discussion will focus on:

1. How do we measure the success of the responsive regime?

2. What impacts does an anti-assets strategy have on disrupting criminal or terrorism activity and reducing harm to society?

3. Is it possible to quantify the impact of disrupting organised criminal activity, as compared to more conventional 'ordinary' crime?

4. What are the main difficulties in institutional or operational forms facing law enforcement agencies when putting into operation an anti-assets strategy?

5. How does the anti-asset strategy impact on online currencies (eg Bitcoin)?

6. Are there further institutional or operational tools or opportunities which might improve the anti-assets strategy?

7. What are the costs of the anti-assets strategy (especially in terms of monetary costs and cost to individual rights)?

8. What experiences can be learned as between anti-criminal and anti-terrorist sectors and from other jurisdictions?