The Post-Heroic General: military command in the 21st century
Lead Research Organisation:
University of Warwick
Department Name: Politics and International Studies
Abstract
Many academics, journalists and senior officers have claimed that the Iraq and Afghan campaigns were characterized by flawed military command at the strategic and operational levels. The armed forces have themselves recognized the issue and are currently renovating command structures to overcome the problems experienced on recent operations. Specifically, western armed forces, led by the United States and supported by the UK and France, are re-investing in and reforming command at the divisional level (a formation of some 20,000 soldiers) which they have identified as decisive for future campaigns. This research aims to analyse and assess the reformation of military command at the divisional level in the 21st century.
Emerging during the First World War and enduring for most of the 20th century, the modern 'combined armed' division was a large but simple organisation designed primarily for conventional inter-state land warfare. It consisted of combat troops supported by artillery and typically defended or attacked a small front of some ten miles against a similar opponent. The twenty-first century division is different. It is a multi-functional organization commanding diverse land, air and informational assets against hybrid enemies over a huge area. While the division remains the decisive tactical formation, it has expanded and diversified. It has consequently required a radical reformation of command.
Analysing this transformation of divisional command, the proposed project distinctively focuses not on commanders as charismatic individuals but on the social institution of command, which it locates in the relations between commanders and their staff within the headquarters, influenced by the wider chain of command. The research will show how command is collectively constituted by commanders and their staff. Specifically, the research aims to identify how decisions are made and executed by commanders and their staff together.
The research explores and tests a thesis that command has become 'post-heroic'. Precisely because divisional operations are now so complex involving multiple functions over large tracts of space and time, divisional commanders can no longer direct or lead operations personally, as they did - sometimes heroically - in the twentieth century. No single individual can coordinate this intricate organization and its functions. Divisional command has been distributed and shared so that in place of a single commander making rapid individual decisions, command boards consisting of senior officers, who advise the commander, have emerged. Decisions have become collective and even bureaucratised; staff procedures channel and structure the commander's authority. In order to unite the increasingly complex division, generalship is increasingly becoming 'post-heroic'.
The commander is still vital to a division, of course. Precisely because its functions are so complex, there must be a single and ultimate point of authority. Here, personality remains essential to a divisional command but it takes a quite different form from the 20th century. It is no longer directed so much at sustaining the morale of troops as generating partnerships with other agencies and organisations, many of which are not military. Generals are no longer simply warriors but facilitators.
The research will test this thesis through multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork and interviews in the UK, US, France and Germany, supported by archival research. In this way, the research will identify the distinguishing features of 21st military command to identify its capabilities, its requirements and its necessary limitations.
In this way, the research aims to contribute not only to inter-disciplinary debates in the social and political science about defence, the armed forces, war, organizations and leadership but also to contribute to policy discussions about military reform and to assist practitioners in understanding generalship today.
Emerging during the First World War and enduring for most of the 20th century, the modern 'combined armed' division was a large but simple organisation designed primarily for conventional inter-state land warfare. It consisted of combat troops supported by artillery and typically defended or attacked a small front of some ten miles against a similar opponent. The twenty-first century division is different. It is a multi-functional organization commanding diverse land, air and informational assets against hybrid enemies over a huge area. While the division remains the decisive tactical formation, it has expanded and diversified. It has consequently required a radical reformation of command.
Analysing this transformation of divisional command, the proposed project distinctively focuses not on commanders as charismatic individuals but on the social institution of command, which it locates in the relations between commanders and their staff within the headquarters, influenced by the wider chain of command. The research will show how command is collectively constituted by commanders and their staff. Specifically, the research aims to identify how decisions are made and executed by commanders and their staff together.
The research explores and tests a thesis that command has become 'post-heroic'. Precisely because divisional operations are now so complex involving multiple functions over large tracts of space and time, divisional commanders can no longer direct or lead operations personally, as they did - sometimes heroically - in the twentieth century. No single individual can coordinate this intricate organization and its functions. Divisional command has been distributed and shared so that in place of a single commander making rapid individual decisions, command boards consisting of senior officers, who advise the commander, have emerged. Decisions have become collective and even bureaucratised; staff procedures channel and structure the commander's authority. In order to unite the increasingly complex division, generalship is increasingly becoming 'post-heroic'.
The commander is still vital to a division, of course. Precisely because its functions are so complex, there must be a single and ultimate point of authority. Here, personality remains essential to a divisional command but it takes a quite different form from the 20th century. It is no longer directed so much at sustaining the morale of troops as generating partnerships with other agencies and organisations, many of which are not military. Generals are no longer simply warriors but facilitators.
The research will test this thesis through multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork and interviews in the UK, US, France and Germany, supported by archival research. In this way, the research will identify the distinguishing features of 21st military command to identify its capabilities, its requirements and its necessary limitations.
In this way, the research aims to contribute not only to inter-disciplinary debates in the social and political science about defence, the armed forces, war, organizations and leadership but also to contribute to policy discussions about military reform and to assist practitioners in understanding generalship today.
Planned Impact
This research aims to benefit three constituencies: 1) Western armed forces 2) the British defence policy community 3) the British public.
1) Western Armed Forces:
Military command has been a contentious issue in the last decade and the armed forces themselves accept that failures of command have occurred. This research aims to augment current attempts by the armed forces to improve command performance, by educating British, American, French and German armies about contemporary military command. It aims to do this in three ways:
a) Reflexivity:
Professional militaries are often characterised by a very strong work ethic which can, unfortunately, be detrimental to the process of self-analysis. Armies are reforming divisional command through an intense training programme yet have spent far less time considering the question of command itself; there seems to be an assumption that the function of command is self-evident and unchanging. A series of presumptions have been made about the ideal span and function of command with no analysis of the special character of 21st century command. For instance, in many cases, British experiences from Helmand have just been projected onto the future, even though the operating environment in Afghanistan was unique. Consequently, there is a tendency to overwhelm commanders, assigning them too many units and too few deputies. This research aims to improve the military's understanding of command and, therefore, how headquarters and the forces under them might best be structured.
b) Practical Improvements:
The analysis of command necessarily involves an investigation of staff processes. The research aims to improve the divisional headquarters' ability to conduct political analysis. This is an area with which staff officers typically struggle but it is critical to effective command. I have contributed to the refinement of analytical methods in British stabilization doctrine and have used these techniques on operations in Kandahar but these methods are not widely known about or understood in the army. The research will provide an opportunity to communicate these methods to staff in divisional headquarters.
c) Fostering cross-sector co-operation and exchange:
Institutional reform is most likely to be successful by germinating and fostering an international and cross-sector network of experts and practitioners who can together collaborate with the armed forces in re-thinking and reconfiguring command. Through generating such a network, this research will create the opportunity for new intellectual and professional linkages between military professionals, scholars and policy makers.
2. British defence policy community:
The MOD, Whitehall and Parliament are well aware of the failings of military command in the last decade. However, they are less aware of the special difficulties of commanding military forces in the 21st century. If a sustainable defence strategy is to be developed, civilian policy-makers have to understand and have a stake in military command. By engaging with the defence-policy community and fostering new connections with the armed forces, this research aims to facilitate an improvement in command, to enhance civil understanding of the problems of military command, and to influence British defence policy debates.
3. The British public:
The vast majority of the British public are proud of their armed forces. However, they have little understanding of how the armed forces might be used effectively or the limits of their utility. Consequently, they are unable to make informed judgements about military operations and defence policy. This project aims to to inform the British public about the utility of military force (and its limits) and what they can expect from military commanders by communicating the special difficulties of command in the 21st century.
1) Western Armed Forces:
Military command has been a contentious issue in the last decade and the armed forces themselves accept that failures of command have occurred. This research aims to augment current attempts by the armed forces to improve command performance, by educating British, American, French and German armies about contemporary military command. It aims to do this in three ways:
a) Reflexivity:
Professional militaries are often characterised by a very strong work ethic which can, unfortunately, be detrimental to the process of self-analysis. Armies are reforming divisional command through an intense training programme yet have spent far less time considering the question of command itself; there seems to be an assumption that the function of command is self-evident and unchanging. A series of presumptions have been made about the ideal span and function of command with no analysis of the special character of 21st century command. For instance, in many cases, British experiences from Helmand have just been projected onto the future, even though the operating environment in Afghanistan was unique. Consequently, there is a tendency to overwhelm commanders, assigning them too many units and too few deputies. This research aims to improve the military's understanding of command and, therefore, how headquarters and the forces under them might best be structured.
b) Practical Improvements:
The analysis of command necessarily involves an investigation of staff processes. The research aims to improve the divisional headquarters' ability to conduct political analysis. This is an area with which staff officers typically struggle but it is critical to effective command. I have contributed to the refinement of analytical methods in British stabilization doctrine and have used these techniques on operations in Kandahar but these methods are not widely known about or understood in the army. The research will provide an opportunity to communicate these methods to staff in divisional headquarters.
c) Fostering cross-sector co-operation and exchange:
Institutional reform is most likely to be successful by germinating and fostering an international and cross-sector network of experts and practitioners who can together collaborate with the armed forces in re-thinking and reconfiguring command. Through generating such a network, this research will create the opportunity for new intellectual and professional linkages between military professionals, scholars and policy makers.
2. British defence policy community:
The MOD, Whitehall and Parliament are well aware of the failings of military command in the last decade. However, they are less aware of the special difficulties of commanding military forces in the 21st century. If a sustainable defence strategy is to be developed, civilian policy-makers have to understand and have a stake in military command. By engaging with the defence-policy community and fostering new connections with the armed forces, this research aims to facilitate an improvement in command, to enhance civil understanding of the problems of military command, and to influence British defence policy debates.
3. The British public:
The vast majority of the British public are proud of their armed forces. However, they have little understanding of how the armed forces might be used effectively or the limits of their utility. Consequently, they are unable to make informed judgements about military operations and defence policy. This project aims to to inform the British public about the utility of military force (and its limits) and what they can expect from military commanders by communicating the special difficulties of command in the 21st century.
Organisations
People |
ORCID iD |
| Anthony King (Principal Investigator) |
Publications
King A
(2018)
The Jack Wills crowd: towards a sociology of an elite subculture.
in The British journal of sociology
King A
(2016)
Sport, war and commemoration: football and remembrance in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
in European Journal for Sport and Society
King A
(2019)
Operation Moshtarak: Counter-insurgency command in Kandahar 2009-10
in Journal of Strategic Studies
King A
(2017)
The Deputy Enhancing Command in the Twenty-First Century
in The RUSI Journal
King A
(2019)
Command - The Twenty-First-Century General
King A C
(2018)
Vanishing Massed Ranks
King A C
(2017)
Homeward Bound
King A C
(2018)
Afghan War
King A C
(2018)
Special Operations Forces in the Twenty-first century
King A C
(2017)
Re-Remembering Dunkirk: art, commemoration and memory
King A C
(2017)
The Very British Affair of Marine A
King A C
(2017)
Afghan Passions
King A C
(2018)
Military Command in the 21st Century
King A.C.
(2017)
'Why did the 51st Highland Division fail? A case-study in command and combat effectiveness'
in British Journal of Military History
King A.C.
(2017)
Palgrave International Handbook of Gender and the Military
KING A.C.
(2017)
'Mission Command 2.0: from an individualist to collectivist model'
in Parameters
KING AC
(2017)
Corroding the Iron Division: personnel problems
in British Army Review
| Description | The research for this project is now complete and the publications, including a major monograph, are currently completed or in process. The research has made four central findings: 1.Command Regimes: Military command consists of three elements: mission definition, mission management and leadership (motivation). Commanders have to decide what is to be done, how to do it and how to motivate their troops. In any era, these three functions form a distinct morphology. However, although command is variable, broadly stable systems of command, adapted to the operational and organizational conditions, are observable in any historical era; distinct regimes of command exist. This research identifies two regimes of command; an individualist regime from 1914 to 1991 and a collective regime from 1992 to the present, especially obvious since 2000. 2. The Army Division: This research focused on command at the level of the army division, a force of 20,000 soldiers. The research revealed that the modern combined arms division was institutionalised in the First World War as a response to mass, industrial warfare. The division was organised to integrate infantry brigades (later armoured brigades too) with artillery. In the twenty-first century, the basic structure of the division has remained the same. The divisions of the major western powers still consist of three infantry or armoured brigades and artillery. However, in the last twenty years, the division has become a more complex, heterogeneous organization. In addition to its traditional ground units, the division now coordinates aircraft, helicopters and drones, while simultaneously engaging in cyber, electronic, information and political operations. At the same time, force must be applied with precision and discretion. All of these factors have transformed the division and complicated the problem of command. Decision-making has multiplied and diversified; commanders must make numerous, simultaneous decisions about long-term and immediate actions involving a great variety of activities. 3.The New Divisional Headquarters: In the twentieth century, the divisional headquarters was small and was typically located close to its frontline units; in the Second World War, a headquarters consisted of about 40 personnel and commanders could walk or make a short drive to the front. Today, because of the multiplication of functions, divisional headquarters are enormous, normally consisting of 400 staff officers but, often, many more. As a result of this enlargement and facilitated by digital technologies, headquarters are now located many miles from combat troops to protect themselves from attack. Headquarters now train to operate hundreds of miles from their troops. Indeed, the US and UK are currently establishing the main divisional headquarters back in the homeland from whence small advanced headquarters are deployed forward. In this case, headquarters are distributed intercontinentally. Paralleling the commercial sector, command has become truly global. 4.From Individualist to Collective Command Divisional operations in the twentieth century were demanding mass enterprises. 20,000 soldiers had to be coordinated. However, operations were unidimensional and mechanical. Divisions operated on simple military objectives on very small fronts with homogenous forces, which belonged to the division. The critical requirement was rapid, coherent decision-making. Consequently, from 1914 to 1991, the First World War to the End of the Cold War, decision-making was monopolised by a single divisional commander, assisted by a very small staff. The situation has now changed. Divisional operations have become complex and dispersed; land, air and sometimes maritime forces now operate over a large area, coordinated by a distributed headquarters, hundreds, perhaps, thousands of miles away. Command has become increasingly challenging. It has been increasingly difficult to ensure organizational cohesion across the contemporary division and to manage the proliferation of decision-making. Generals now have to make many more decisions about a far greater range of activities over an expanded area of operations. In order to address the new challenges, western forces have introduced several innovations. Firstly, Generals have distributed decision-making authority to empowered deputies who act as a commander's agents in specified areas of jurisdiction. These deputies supervise aspects of the operation where the commander cannot be. Secondly, a number of new staff procedures have been introduced to delegate, accelerate and refine decision-making. In this way, the commander's decisions are augmented by the expertise of the staff which increasingly appropriates a decision-making function. Command has become a professionalised, collective activity. However, the research has also made one final important discovery. Although commanders have increasingly shared decision-making authority in relation to the management of missions, they have not devolved any of their responsibility. Commanders are still solely responsible for their divisions and ultimately for all decisions made by their deputies, subordinates and staff. Indeed, as operations have become more expansive, divisional commanders' responsibilities have grown. Precisely because operations have diversified, they have far greater latitude to define the mission than their predecessors. In the twentieth century, divisional commanders occupied a singular location in an army hierarchy. Today, they are situated in a unique location in a politico-military nexus. |
| Exploitation Route | 1) User Dialogue: I am in increasingly regular dialogue with military users internationally who are finding my perspective on command useful. I have developed particularly close relations with the British Army and with 3 UK Division and the Land Warfare Centre. 2) Monograph: I have published five articles in defence-policy or military journals since last year, ensuring a wide professional readership for my work. I have just completed a monograph on command entitled, 'Command: the twenty-first century general', which will be published by Cambridge University Press later this. The aim is to ensure that this book is established on the reading list of staff colleges in all Anglophone countries and, if possible, in other non-English speaking NATO countries. As a dissemination strategy, Cambridge University Press will be bringing the book out in paperback simultaneously with the hardback publication to increase the chances of it being taken up by military colleges and bought by officers independently. Because the monograph was based on extensive research with the British Army including potentially sensitive material, it was published under an MOD contract and the final draft required clearance. When the MOD granted clearance, the official responsible suggested that the book 'will be on the reading list for Officer Cadets at Sandhurst and those at Staff College in no time at all'. I am currently in discussions with my publisher about how to ensure the book is taken up by staff colleges internationally. 3) Lectures: I have given twelve lectures since March 2016 to international military audiences. These talks are an excellent way to inform debate and increase reflexivity. In February 2018, I gave a lecture on to the British Army's annual Agile Warrior conference, an international military meeting on future warfare. I have been invited to give a lecture at RUSI Land Warfare Conference in June 2018. This is the British Army's major annual conference, with an international delegate list from all the world's major armed forces. 4) Future research: urban combat In September 2017, I organised a major international scholarly-practitioner conference attended by leading military and academic figures (see above). This conference has enhanced my profile with the armed forces internationally and has deepened by engagement with the British Army, in particular. Through publications and a report, I am currently trying to augment that impact through continued international engagement around the area of command. On the basis of the project on command, I am currently developing a new project with the British Army on urban combat. This project grows immediately out of my work on command - and the previous research on cohesion before it. My planned project on urban warfare will strengthen my engagement with the British Army. Appreciative of my previous work, the British Army are enthusiastic about my new research in this area, as it is a central concern for them; the urban environment represents both the most challenging and most likely theatre in which the Army will operate. Consequently, we are currently constructing a research programme which will retain the highest level of academic integrity while also maximising policy impact on the armed force both here in the UK and internationally. The research programme will involve access to the British Army and to its major NATO allies, America, France and Germany. It will also aim to involve other global powers including the Israeli Defence Force, Brazil, China, Russia and India. In order to initiate this research programme, I am currently planning a new research hub at Warwick University, called the Warwick Urban Warfare Seminar. This seminar series aims to bring an international, interdisciplinary panel of scholars from disciplines as diverse as history, politics, sociology, anthropology, law, architecture, geography and classics together with the armed forces and humanitarian agencies to discuss the special challenges of urban warfare in the twenty-first century. The seminar will be an annual or biennial event. The British Army and the International Committee of the Red Cross have already expressed enthusiasm for this programme. In order to maximise the impact from the current project, the inaugural seminar in this series will deal with the question of command on urban operations. It will explore recent experiences in Syria and Iraq, putting them in a historical context. |
| Sectors | Aerospace, Defence and Marine,Security and Diplomacy |
| Description | My research continues to be used to inform the armed forces understanding of command. I have lectured to staff colleges and my work continues to be read and debated by military personnel. On the basis of it, I wrote a major audit of British Army Culture in 2022. |
| First Year Of Impact | 2019 |
| Sector | Aerospace, Defence and Marine,Security and Diplomacy |
| Impact Types | Policy & public services |
| Description | 'Collective Command', lecture given to staff course at Swedish Defence College |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | This lecture was the second of a series of two on command to the course. It was intended to analysis the special character of command in the 21s century. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2017 |
| Description | 'Command and Combat Effectiveness' |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | A guest lecture at Academia Militar Workshop Command and Combat Effectiveness, Portuguese Army, Military Academy, Amadora, Lisbon, Portugal. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2018 |
| Description | 'Command: a decisive factor', presentation, Human Factors bearing on 21st Century Maneouvre Panel, RUSI Land Warfare Conference 2018 Manoeuvre in the 21st Century, London. |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A formal working group, expert panel or dialogue |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | This activity involved a short lecture followed by a panel discussion |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2018 |
| URL | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PN0kFFUVX-I |
| Description | 'Future Command' Keynote Lecture, British Army Agile Warrior Conference, Larkhill UK. |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Policymakers/politicians |
| Results and Impact | Keynote Lecture to British Army's Agile Warrior Conference |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2019 |
| URL | http://www.warfare.today/2019/01/15/british-armys-future-land-challenges-conference-aw_flc19/ |
| Description | 'Future Small Units and the Urban' |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | Lecture, Agile Warrior Future 18.1 Land Warfare Conference, Winterbourne Gunner, UK. Agile Warrior is the British Army's annual conference to explore future capabilities. It is an important meeting attended by representatives from all of the UK's major allies. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2018 |
| Description | 'Mission Command' |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | I was invited to give the keynote lecture as part of the Portuguese Army's preparations for their annual major NATO exercise ORiON 18. The lecture was attended by the Commander Land Forces and by a large selection of all the most senior officers in the Portuguese Army. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2018 |
| Description | 'Operational Command' lecture to the staff course at the Swedish Defence College |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | This talk was given to the staff course at the Swedish staff college. It was intended to communicate the special problems of command in the 21s century. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2017 |
| Description | 'The Urban: strategy, operations, tactics' |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | National |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | Keynote Lecture to 1 Armoured Infantry Brigade Exercise Urban Dawn, Copehill Down, UK. Exercise Urban Dawn is the army's flagship exercise in developing and advancing it urban warfare capability. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2018 |
| Description | Advancing the Royal Marines: empowering command |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A formal working group, expert panel or dialogue |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | National |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | I was recruited to participated in the Royal Marines counter-initiation advisory group for which I wrote an expert advisory paper. That paper was read at ministerial level and was implemented completed by the Royal Marines as they sought to alter their professional culture and eliminate abuse. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2016 |
| Description | BBC Radio 4 The Moral Maze, discussion of commemoration and centenary of Armistice |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A press release, press conference or response to a media enquiry/interview |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | National |
| Primary Audience | Public/other audiences |
| Results and Impact | Appearance on the well-known radio show to debate commemoration |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2018 |
| URL | https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/m00010zd |
| Description | BBC Radio 4, 'The Briefing Room', programme about armed forces recruitment crisis. |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A press release, press conference or response to a media enquiry/interview |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | National |
| Primary Audience | Public/other audiences |
| Results and Impact | Discussion about the recruitment crisis in the Army on a flagship news programme. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2018 |
| URL | https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0b48z5q |
| Description | Command Collectivism in the 21st Century |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | A lecture to the Advanced Command and Staff Course, Norwegian Defence College, Oslo. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2017 |
| Description | Command in the 21st Century |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A formal working group, expert panel or dialogue |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | Command in the 21st Century was a major international conference which I organised at Warwick University. It was a military-academic forum in which leaders from both fields attended to discussed the problems of command today. It included the presence of Generals David Petraeus, Nick Carter, Sean McFarland, Ben Hodges and Dickie Davis and Professors Sir Hew Strachan and Lawrence Freedman. Representatives from the Army and prominent defence-think tanks, IISS, RUSI and Chatham House, all attended. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2017 |
| Description | Culture and Strategy |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | A lecture to the Higher Command and Staff Course, Joint Services Command and Staff College. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2018 |
| Description | Leadership and Professionalism |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | National |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | I was asked to give a lecture and participate in a discussion with 26 Royal Artillery Regiment with a view to strengthening professional culture in the regiment and preventing any abuse or bullying. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2017 |
| Description | Lecture on 'Command in the 21st century' to 1 UK Division as part of Higher Staff Formation Training Exercise Rhino Charge |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | National |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | 1 UK Division is one of two British Army divisions. I was invited to give a talk on the basis of my research on command to the headquarters in order to prepare them for their major annual exercise. The lecture discussed the special challenges of command in the 21st century. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2016 |
| Description | Lecture on 'Command in the 21st century' at a conference organised by the British Army's Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research. |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | This conference was a major event which featured many very senior officers from the UK and US with a focus of 3 UK Division. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2016 |
| Description | Lecture to Higher Command and Staff College UK |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | This lecture involved an analysis of the importance of social and political understanding for the conduct of military operations in the 21st century. It was given to the most senior course at staff college in the UK, which includes significant international representation from other NATO countries. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2016,2017 |
| Description | Mentor of 1 UK Division Exercise Rhino Charge, June 2016. |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A formal working group, expert panel or dialogue |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | National |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | I was invited by the command of I UK Division to act as a mentor on this exercise and to advise in the development of the headquarters. On the basis of my observations, I wrote a policy paper for the commander. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2016 |
| Description | Special adviser to General Officer Commanding 3 UK Division |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A formal working group, expert panel or dialogue |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | National |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | As part of their preparation for a major exercises in the US, I was asked to act as one of the advisers to the commander of 3 UK Division. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2017 |
| Description | The Combat Soldier |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | A lecture and discussion with Swedish Army about leadership and combat effectiveness |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2017 |
| Description | The Politics of Strategy |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | National |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | A lecture to the Advanced Command and Staff Course, Joint Services Command and Staff Course. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2017 |
| Description | War in the Global City |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A formal working group, expert panel or dialogue |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Professional Practitioners |
| Results and Impact | This was the inaugural scholarly-practitioner workshop on urban operations which will be run at Warwick annually, involving representatives from academia, the military and humanitarian agencies. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2016,2018 |