Consciousness and thought: cognitive phenomenology

The received view in the philosophy of mind has been that mental states can be divided into two distinct kinds: some are representational or intentional, they represent the world; while others are qualitative or experiential. Research in philosophy of mind accordingly pursued these two tracks of study in isolation. Representation came first, as it was thought to be the more tractable problem, often called 'the easy problem'. Then one turned to the more difficult problem of consciousness or experience, often called 'the hard problem'.

One of the conclusions of my project is that this general approach to studying the mind is unsustainable. Thinking, or cognition in general, is every bit as experiential as feeling pain or seeing the bright blue sky, and the experiential aspect of cognition possesses its own distinctive non-sensory kind of experiential phenomenology, what is now widely called 'cognitive phenomenology'.

The central question of my project is, What is thinking, and I argue that cognitive phenomenology is essential for answering this question.

I begin by offering a constraint on what counts as an adequate answer to this question. An adequate theory of thinking must account for the understanding that typically accompanies our thought. We typically understand what we think when we think thoughts such as grass is green, the moon has a cratered surface, and so on. I first argue that other theories of understanding, such as 'meta-cognition', 'abilities' and 'computational' theories, fail to account for the kind of understanding that accompanies thought. I then argue that explaining what understanding is requires the postulation of an 'understanding experience'. Every conscious cognitive state has a distinctive kind of cognitive phenomenology, a distinctive kind of phenomenal character, and it is in virtue of one's conscious experience of that phenomenal character that one understands what one is thinking.

The received view in the philosophy of mind has been that mental states can be divided into two distinct kinds: some are representational or intentional, they represent the world; while others are qualitative or experiential. Research in philosophy of mind accordingly pursued these two tracks of study in isolation. Representation came first, as it was thought to be the more tractable problem, often called 'the easy problem'. Then one turned to the more difficult problem of (conscious) experience, often called 'the hard problem'.

One of the conclusions of my project is that this general approach to studying the mind is unsustainable. Thinking, or cognition in general, is every bit as experiential as feeling pain or seeing the bright blue sky, and the experiential aspect of cognition possesses its own distinctive non-sensory kind of phenomenology, what is now widely called 'cognitive phenomenology'.

My project, therefore, will impact several different research programmes into the nature of thought:

[1] Research programmes such as artificial intelligence, robotics, dynamic systems, and connectionism have all tended to treat the study of cognition on the model that it can be done in isolation from studying experiential or phenomenological aspects of the mind. Although important insights have been gained from these programmes, a full picture of what understanding is must take cognitive phenomenology into account.

[2] With the introduction of cognitive phenomenology, phenomenological approaches to the mind will have secured a central place in the study of the mind. Since cognition plays a central role in reasoning, action, and perception, the phenomenological approach will potentially play a very important role in constraining theorizing in these areas.

[3] The question of where to look for consciousness, the 'location' of consciousness, has become an increasingly interesting question in the last couple of decades. Andy Clark and David Chalmers 1998, for example, argued convincingly for the extended mind thesis: cognition and mental states can depend on mechanisms that extend beyond the brain, such as the rest of the body, notebooks, gestures, and so on. Although others (e.g. Hurley 1998, Noe 2004, Thompson 2004) have argued that consciousness also extends beyond the brain, their arguments have been less widely accepted. That is, consciousness does not seem to extend beyond the neural. If I am right that cognitive states such as occurrently thinking that grass is green require cognitive phenomenology, an essential element of cognition, its conscious element, will be located right back in the brain.

Through public presentations and workshops incorporating researchers from other fields, I hope to widen the impact of my research beyond my own field, not only to A.I. and Robotics, but to how we understand the very nature of interpersonal interaction. My research shows that cognitive phenomenology is essential for thinking, and in so far as thinking is an essential element of emotions, it immediately impacts the study of emotions. This in turn further impacts Robotics and theories in psychology. One of the current projects in Robotics is to develop a robot that responds to an interlocuter based on emotional cues. The interlocuter in turn takes the robot to be responding emotionally to him. However, if the robot is not experiencing cognitive phenomenology, the kind of interaction one is having with the robot is fundamentally misconceived if one takes that robot to be having emotions.