An Error Theory about all Normative Judgements

Many people, especially non-religious people, are sceptical about the objectivity of morality, but at the same time continue to treat at least some of their own moral judgements as if they are about objective facts. For example, when asked whether morality is objective, many people would answer that it is not. But these same people will defend some of their own moral judgements with a seriousness that suggests, at least at first sight, that they do take there to be at least some objective moral facts.

There are different philosophical theories about the nature of moral judgements. One of these is the error theory, which says that moral judgements are beliefs about objective moral facts, but that such facts do not exist. More precisely, the error theory says that moral judgements are beliefs that ascribe moral properties to objects, but that such properties do not exist. For example, according to the error theory, the judgement that murder is wrong is a belief that ascribes the moral property of being wrong to murder, but this property does not exist. Since beliefs that ascribe non-existent properties are untrue, the error theory entails that all moral judgements are untrue, including not only the judgement that murder is wrong but also all other moral judgements.

Since there are serious philosophical doubts about the existence of objective moral facts, the error theory has gained support among academic philosophers in recent years. But the theory also faces many objections. Perhaps the most important objection it faces is that the philosophical arguments for the error theory apply not just to moral judgements but also to all other judgements that philosophers call 'normative'. These judgements include, for example, judgements about practical and epistemic rationality, such as the judgement that it is rational to take the most efficient means to your ends, and the judgement that you should not believe falsehoods. Since it is extremely hard to believe that all normative judgements are untrue, the arguments for the error theory thus seem to support a view that is too incredible to be taken seriously.

The aim of my proposed research is to write a book that gives new philosophical arguments for the error theory, that answers the most important objection to the error theory in a completely new way, and that shows that, if we answer this objection in this way, we can answer all other objections to the error theory as well. The book will be aimed at an academic audience, and its arguments will be abstract and philosophical. But I believe that the view I will defend has wider relevance, and when I have completed the book I aim to make my ideas accessible to a general audience. I think these ideas should be of interest to many people outside academia, since they allow us to embrace a limited amount of scepticism about the objectivity of morality, which many people are inclined to do, while at the same time continuing to regard our moral judgements as being about objective matters of fact.

This project does not involve the production of work that immediately aims at having impact outside academia. However, I do think that my research has the potential, over the long-term, to have such broader impact. In so far as people have thoughts about the nature of their own moral judgements, these thoughts often seem to be less than fully coherent. As I said in the Summary, many people are sceptical about the objectivity of morality, but at the same time continue to treat at least some of their own moral judgements as if they are about objective moral facts. A view that allows us to embrace a certain amount of scepticism about the objectivity of morality while at the same time continuing to make moral judgements and to regard these judgements as being about objective matters of fact should therefore be of interest not only to academic philosophers, but also to many people outside academia.