Dirty Rules Dilemmas: Justice in a Corrupt Political World
Lead Research Organisation:
King's College London
Department Name: Political Economy
Abstract
What should politicians do when the only feasible way to
achieve just outcomes is to "play dirty"-to work with political
processes and tactics that are themselves morally
defective? In today's democracies, the procedures for
political decision-making are often unfair and undemocratic.
Gerrymandering, anachronistic political institutions from a
less democratic age, unjust campaign finance laws,
unrepresentative electoral systems, the power of lobbyists-
these familiar elements of contemporary democratic
practice present morally conscientious politicians with a
serious dilemma. Only by operating within existing unjust
rules and norms do politicians stand a reasonable prospect
of winning power and thereby enacting just policies; the
alternative is surrendering and allowing the victory of those
who seek injustice. Yet by marshalling these defective
procedures and tactics, albeit for substantively just ends,
politicians are wrongfully complicit with significant procedural
wrongs, and indeed enable their perpetuation. So what is a
morally-minded politician to do? This thesis will constitute the
first systematic normative analysis of this question,
identifying the moral requirements, permissions, and
prohibitions that apply.
Using the dirty hands framework as the most promising
starting point for my project, I identify 'dirty rules' dilemmas,
a distinct new subset of dirty hands dilemmas. Michael
Walzer's seminal 'The Problem of Dirty Hands' (1973) laid out
the dirty hands dilemma. Walzer argued, first, that politicians
should be willing to commit intrinsically immoral acts for the
sake of certain outcomes. Secondly, he argued that, even
when we make the morally correct choice in such dilemmas,
we still incur some moral residue from, and are responsible
for, the wrongdoing we commit. In other words, a moral rule
retains its normative weight, even when broken justifiably.
Converted to the terms of contemporary moral philosophy,
Walzer's central insight was that we must sometimes do
something genuinely pro tanto wrong in order to do what is
all-things-considered right. I critique and build upon this
insight.
achieve just outcomes is to "play dirty"-to work with political
processes and tactics that are themselves morally
defective? In today's democracies, the procedures for
political decision-making are often unfair and undemocratic.
Gerrymandering, anachronistic political institutions from a
less democratic age, unjust campaign finance laws,
unrepresentative electoral systems, the power of lobbyists-
these familiar elements of contemporary democratic
practice present morally conscientious politicians with a
serious dilemma. Only by operating within existing unjust
rules and norms do politicians stand a reasonable prospect
of winning power and thereby enacting just policies; the
alternative is surrendering and allowing the victory of those
who seek injustice. Yet by marshalling these defective
procedures and tactics, albeit for substantively just ends,
politicians are wrongfully complicit with significant procedural
wrongs, and indeed enable their perpetuation. So what is a
morally-minded politician to do? This thesis will constitute the
first systematic normative analysis of this question,
identifying the moral requirements, permissions, and
prohibitions that apply.
Using the dirty hands framework as the most promising
starting point for my project, I identify 'dirty rules' dilemmas,
a distinct new subset of dirty hands dilemmas. Michael
Walzer's seminal 'The Problem of Dirty Hands' (1973) laid out
the dirty hands dilemma. Walzer argued, first, that politicians
should be willing to commit intrinsically immoral acts for the
sake of certain outcomes. Secondly, he argued that, even
when we make the morally correct choice in such dilemmas,
we still incur some moral residue from, and are responsible
for, the wrongdoing we commit. In other words, a moral rule
retains its normative weight, even when broken justifiably.
Converted to the terms of contemporary moral philosophy,
Walzer's central insight was that we must sometimes do
something genuinely pro tanto wrong in order to do what is
all-things-considered right. I critique and build upon this
insight.
Organisations
People |
ORCID iD |
| Gianni Sarra (Student) |
 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6803-013X
|
Studentship Projects
| Project Reference | Relationship | Related To | Start | End | Student Name |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ES/P000703/1 | 01/10/2017 | 30/09/2027 | |||
| 2287393 | Studentship | ES/P000703/1 | 01/10/2019 | 30/12/2022 | Gianni Sarra |
| Description | What should politicians do when important moral goals require wrongful acts? The Dirty Hands framework posits that there will be decisions, mostly of a political nature, where an agent must do wrong in order to do right; in other words, that in some situations the best course of action requires committing a tangible wrong. Such a framework has been criticised for failing to capture quotidian acts of permissible wrongdoing and character formation; for treating the given dilemmas as fixed and immutable, and for presenting an unhelpfully episodic and melodramatic depiction of moral conflicts in politics. I agree with these criticisms, but think that the DH framework can be reformed to accommodate them, by moving away from a one-size-fits-all monolithic portrayal of political conflict. In this thesis, I focus on the underlying concept of justifiable dirt, detached from any specific framework of how it might come about. I argue that this notion is able to explain much of what is troublesome about political ethics, including the above issues that the orthodox DH framework struggles with. I define dirt as being instances where there is an 1) uncancelled moral ought that 2) grounds legitimate criticism of both the act and the agent and 3) leaves behind a tangible moral remainder. The thesis defends the concept of dirt, showing that it is an important and useful framework through which to think about many (though not all) cases of political ethics. A key contribution of the thesis is to break the concept of dirt down. In addition to endorsing attempts to distinguish cases of dirt based on severity, I also argue that there should be an additional qualitative distinction based on the source of what makes a dirtying action justifiable. As a result of this, I argue that there are three (distinct but not necessarily exclusive) ways in which dirt can be all-things-considered justifiable. Firstly, there are Dirty Episodes (DE). These most resemble the orthodox DH view, covering cases where there are discrete or delineable decisions, representing some pathological break from ordinary politics, in which a determinate wrongdoing can be justified. Secondly, Dirty Careers (DC). This is the familiar notion that, in seriously pursuing the profession of politics, one has to accept the self-justified norms and dispositions of politics, and that this process can be dirtying. Finally, I propose the novel category of Dirty Rules (DR). This covers instances where the reason agents feel they must get their hands dirty is institutional. There is something remedially and contingently wrong about a political climate or ruleset, a structural failure that is dirtying for those who engage with it. Examples include redistricting systems that incentivise gerrymandering, campaign finance systems that require corrupt dealing, and polarised political climates that legitimise more aggressive tactics. By providing this normative framework, this thesis provides a comprehensive and novel way of viewing dirt within politics and of the different forms of dirt that can arise for political actors. |
| Exploitation Route | Further exploration of ethical dilemmas, institutional design, and issues of how to navigate corrupt systems and nonideal political environments. |
| Sectors | Agriculture, Food and Drink,Government, Democracy and Justice |