Intellectual Virtue and the Good Life: Ethical and Epistemic Values

Philosophers typically understand "ethics" as concerned with questions about conduct: what should I do, how should I behave, how should I live? These are questions about our "practical" lives - our lives as people who act, who do things. "Epistemology," by contrast, is understood to concern questions about thought: what I should I believe, how should I reason, what can I know? These are questions about our "intellectual" lives - our lives as people who think, form beliefs and opinions, and acquire knowledge. Philosophers - going back to ancient Greece, and up to the present day - have talked about an idea that seems to belong both to ethics and to epistemology: the idea of "intellectual virtue." A successful discussion of "intellectual virtue" requires bringing these two areas of philosophical inquiry, which are sometimes kept separate, together.

The definition of "intellectual virtue" itself is controversial; philosophers have included, on lists of intellectual virtues, such character traits as humility and openmindedness, skills or abilities such as practical wisdom, and faculties such as perception and intuition. Aristotle devoted a chapter of his Nicomachean Ethics to the intellectual virtues, defending the importance of insight, scientific understanding, and practical wisdom for living a good life. In contemporary epistemology, many have urged an examination of such character traits as openmindedness, humility, and intellectual integrity.

Insight, scientific understanding, practical wisdom, openmindedness, humility, intellectual integrity - these all sound like good things. My research asks: what makes these "intellectual virtues" good, why are they valuable? Why should we want to have these virtues? Is it because these virtues will make us happy? Because it will make us better people? Because it will make us better citizens in a liberal society? Or does the value of these virtues derive -- as some philosophers argue -- from a special "intellectual" or "epistemic" domain of value? Does the idea of such a domain of value, assumed by many philosophers, even make sense?

My approach to these questions combines a variety of philosophical methods. First, there is work to be done getting clear what philosophers mean (and have meant) by "intellectual virtue." Second, there are arguments to be explored in philosophical ethics, challenging the value of such virtues as coherence and intellectual integrity. A case can be made, for example, that there are situations where it is better to be incoherent - as when you are torn between allegiance to diverse values. Third, psychologists have found that there are substantial differences between individuals when it comes to their "intellectual" character traits - e.g. in the extent to which people are biased. My project will explore these differences and potential correlations with personality and mental health, through collaboration with psychologists.

Part of my project aims to disseminate the results of my research to a non-academic audience, and in particular educators and education policymakers. There is an important debate to be had about the function of education (at all levels): whether its primary function is to instill factual or theoretical knowledge (as is sometimes suggests), or whether it has an equally important function of promoting and developing certain valuable character traits, skills, and abilities - in short, the intellectual virtues. The nature and value of the intellectual virtues is relevant to this question: if, for example, intellectual humility is essential for living a good human life, then there might be a responsibility to foster such a virtue in education. I aim to engage with educators and philosophers of education as part of my project, both to inform my research and to provide potentially useful new frameworks and concepts for those working in education outside the academy.

My work can have impact on debates about the value of education and education policy. These issues are of importance for the general public as well as, in particular, for educators and education policymakers. The benefit I see comes primarily from the opportunity for reflection on the value of intellectual virtue vis-à-vis methods in education. To this end, as part of the second part of my research project (2014) I'll be collaborating with educators and philosophers of education to examine some of these questions. One example of how my work connects up with policy in debates comes from questions of how we conceive of the purpose or function of education. Government white papers (see "Pathways to Impact") often suggest that the transfer of bodies of factual and theoretical knowledge is the primary aim of education. My research on the value of intellectual virtue has the potential to upset this assumption as overly narrow, as ignoring the value of abilities, skills, and character traits. Should we thus conceive of the purpose of primary education as that of transferring a common body of theoretical knowledge to students? Or should we in addition, or even instead, conceive of the purpose of primary education as that of developing certain abilities, skills, and character traits? The proposed workshops (see below) will center on such questions as: Are current strategies ignoring the value of intellectual virtue? Do they misconceive of it? Can intellectual virtue be developed through education policy?

There are two main ways in which I plan disseminate my research on intellectual virtue to a broad audience, with the potential for non-academic impact.

First, I will be collaborating with Prof Duncan Pritchard (my mentor for the fellowship) on paper, invited for a special issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Education. Prof Pritchard will also deliver a public lecture at the Royal Society of Edinburgh (of which he is a Fellow); these lectures are typically well-attended by people outside the academy.

Second, I'll be collaborating with Dr John Ravenscroft, Senior Lecturer in Edinburgh's School of Education (http://www.ed.ac.uk/schools-departments/education) and Head of the Institue for Education, Teaching, and Leadership (http://www.ed.ac.uk/schools-departments/education/institutes/etl), to organize a series of four workshops on "Teaching Intellectual Virtue," to take place in 2014. These events will be hosted by the School of Education, which has a history of engaging with teachers and directors of education from outside the university, and whose students are training to become primary and secondary school teachers.
These one-day events will be an opportunity for academics and educators to exchange ideas, centered around the theme of intellectual virtue. Speakers at these workshops will include myself, Dr Ravenscroft, the project's research visitors (see "Case for Support"), Prof Pritchard, and representatives of the Philosophy Foundation (www.philosophy-foundation.org), a charity which organizes the teaching of philosophy in primary schools, which has agreed to send delegates to the workshops.
Other delegates will include BEd Primary and PGDE Primary and Secondary students (training to become primary and secondary school teachers) in the School of Education, MSc students (Education and Education Research) in the School of Education, Primary and secondary school teachers, and directors of education from some of the 32 local authorities in Scotland.