'Supreme National Interests': The Official History of Britain's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent and the Chevaline Programme, 1962-1982

In the late 1960s, it became apparent to Britain's most senior defence planners that the ability of the United Kingdom's Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles to reach their targets in the Soviet Union was threatened by the deployment of a new Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system around Moscow. After prolonged debate, it was decided in 1970 by the new Conservative Government to begin a feasibility and project definition study for a highly-secret Polaris improvement programme which was designed to give the missiles the capability to penetrate Soviet ABM defences. Having rejected other alternative options, in late 1973 full development of the improved system was approved by ministers. Despite intense budgetary pressures, growing technical problems with the project (leading to major escalation), and anti-nuclear sentiment within the Labour Party, the Labour Government that assumed office in 1974 continued with the project, restricting knowledge of what was now called the Chevaline programme to only a small group of ministers and top officials. When its existence was revealed to the House of Commons in January 1980, immediate attention was drawn to the high costs of the programme (then amounting to about £1 billion), the technical problems it had apparently encountered, and the consequent slips in timescale. In 1982, just a few months before Chevaline was finally deployed, the Public Accounts Committee issued a report which heavily criticised the Ministry of Defence's management of the whole programme, and the way it had been hidden from any form of parliamentary scrutiny since instigation of feasibility and project definition. The Chevaline programme has since become renowned as one of the most controversial aspects of post-war British defence policy.
The proposed research will examine the history of the Polaris improvement programme in the context of the development of the British strategic nuclear deterrent from the decision to acquire the Polaris system at the Nassau Conference in December 1962, to the final deployment of Chevaline two decades later. The focus of the research will be on the policymaking of successive British governments as they sought to maintain the credibility of the deterrent, and the problems that were faced by the improvement programme during the 1970s, as timescales slipped and costs escalated. The research will result in the production of a volume in the Cabinet Office's official history series, and will constitute a comprehensive and standard work of reference on the subject, of interest to academics, policymakers, and a more general audience interested in modern British history, defence policy, and the topical issues surrounding Britain's continued possession of a strategic nuclear deterrent.

The connections and parallels that can be drawn between the issues raised by the current debate over the future of Britain's strategic nuclear weapons programme with previous periods of policy toward the deterrent, are the key areas where the proposed research has the capacity to produce impact. In December 2006, the Ministry of Defence published a White Paper ('The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent', Cmnd 6994) which argued the case for retention of a nuclear deterrent capability, and outlined the Government's intention to replace the current force of four Vanguard class Trident submarines when they reached the end of their service life in the 2020s, with a new class of ballistic missile carrying submarines. The formation of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition Government in May 2010 brought into office two parties with starkly contrasting approaches to the issue of Trident renewal. This was given graphic illustration by the production in May 2011 of a further document by the Ministry of Defence ('The United Kingdom's Future Nuclear Deterrent: The Submarine: Initial Gate Parliamentary Report'), which explained that around £900 million had been spent since 2007 on initial submarine design work, and other investment in the successor system programme, and that before a final Main Gate decision point was reached in 2016 (when contracts for building the submarines would actually need to be placed) a further £3 billion was to be committed to certain long lead items and design services with contractors. Although total programme costs were still estimated at £15-20 billion, the delay of the Main Gate decision to 2016 means that the first new submarine would not be available until the late 2020s. However, along with his announcement of the Initial Gate investment and in recognition of the Coalition Government Agreement, the Secretary of State for Defence also established a Cabinet Office-led study to review the costs, feasibility and credibility of alternative deterrent systems and postures. The approach of the next general election in 2015 is likely to feature a renewed debate over Britain's strategic nuclear weapons policy, in view of the differing stance of the main political parties over the issue of Trident renewal.

Discussion and debate concerning the past, present and future of British strategic nuclear weapons policy has arguably never been more topical and is of major political and policymaking importance. One example of current interest is the recent formation of the UK Project on Nuclear Issues under the auspices of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), which has been formed as a forum to foster debate over nuclear policy, and transfer knowledge from current specialists to a new generation of nuclear specialists in the military, academic, industry, and policy communities. Within the context outlined above, and outside academia, the research conducted in compiling the official history, and its final publication, will therefore benefit:

1. Officials in central government engaged in policy debates concerning the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent. Relevant departments here include the Ministry of Defence, who initially suggested the project for treatment as an official history, the Cabinet Office, who sponsor and support the whole official history programme, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Volumes in the official history series are expressly commissioned with the idea of 'learning from history' in an effort to inform current policymakers.

2. Professional groups and opinion-formers, such as those at RUSI, ready to engage with Britain's past nuclear history and apply this knowledge to current issues and concerns.

3. Informed members of the public and media commentators keen to learn more about the history and background to current UK strategic nuclear policy.