SILENT: Side channels---theory and implications for society

Cryptology has developed out of mathematics and theoretical computer science and is often discussed in purely theoretical and abstract terms. However cryptographic algorithms are a vital part of all modern communication systems. Clearly, this demands additional practical considerations. This realisation has come slowly but steadily over the last decade and lead to a whole new field in cryptography called side channel analysis. Side channels silently leak information about confidential data (e.g. cryptographic keys, user data, etc.) and are hence a serious threat to the trustworthiness of information systems. This fellowship intends to establish a centre of excellence, in which we aim to scrutinize the theory of side channels, the methods used to analyse and exploit them, and the impact of such information leakage on systems used by the wider public.

An emerging trend in research into side channel analysis is that of finding formal description for side channel attacks. As argued in the case of support, some of the less well investigated side channels will become increasingly important because they directly impact on all people who use the Internet. Clearly, side channel expertise is becoming a 'must have' for industries, and side channel awareness is important also for end user. The novel centre of excellence (as envisaged in this fellowship) will greatly contribute to building up this expertise here in the UK. Hence it will contribute to strengthening the position of the UK in the global field of cryptographic engineering. Companies developing or evaluating cryptographic devices will benefit from having a better understanding of the fundamental properties of side channel attacks. Further they will benefit from being able to recruit from a larger pool of side channel aware engineers. The support offered by my collaborators (Dr. Danezis from Microsoft, Dr. Mangard from Infineon, and RFI Global) is evidence for the keen interest of some of the major industry players in this area. The wider public who uses cryptographic devices (e.g. bank cards, mobile phones, etc.) and the Internet on a daily basis will too benefit from a greater awareness of information leakage: awareness of a potential danger is a basic prerequisite for protecting oneself. The main tool to ensure that the research outcomes of this fellowship impact on beneficiaries is the establishing of a centre of excellence in side channel research as outlined by aim 1 in the case of support. This centre of excellence capitalises on my ability as a mathematician and cryptographic engineer to work at the interface between these two disciplines. This, coupled with strong interpersonal skills, enable me to cooperate with and coordinate work between researchers from a wide range of backgrounds, as demonstrated in my leadership roles within ECRYPT2, but also via the invitations to deliver consultancy on side channel analysis for the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (T_BITAK), and for the defence industries and ministries of European countries. This work consisted of designing and delivering tailored training in the application of and defence against power analysis attacks.