Constraints on the Design of Security Policy: Insights from Audience Costs Theory and Security and Defence Elites in the United Kingdom

This project seeks to explain how security policy is developed in the UK, and suggest how relationships between different security and defence agencies can be improved. Security policies protect the borders of a nation-state and the security of its citizens and include military, economic, environmental and cybersecurity policies. These policies are designed and implemented by different agencies including military organizations, the intelligence community, and government departments such as the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Defence. We live in a fast-paced world where security threats may unexpectedly emerge from state actors such as the Syrian government, or non-state actors such as terrorist organizations. In this rapidly changing security environment it is paramount that national security policies be designed with enough flexibility so as to increase the likelihood of success. Important constraints can hinder this need for flexibility.

One such constraint is that members of the security and defence community might fear losing support, appearing as incompetent, or harming the reputation of their agency if they fail to implement a security policy they had previously committed to implementing. This can make them wary of significantly modifying a security policy, even in the face of important environmental changes such as budget cuts or the emergence of new information regarding the predicted effectiveness of its implementation. Such fear of domestic backlash likely played a role in American forces continuing to build up Iraqi security forces, even in the face of compelling evidence that suggested these forces were in fact fuelling sectarian conflict.

The first part of this study combines theories of foreign policy decision-making with the real-life experiences of high-level practitioners developed during residencies in key government departments and military organizations. The applicant will interviews elite members of the security and defence community in the UK involved in the design and implementation of security policies. Although the interviews will be carried out with members of the security and defence communities from the UK, the theory will be pertinent to describe the development of security policy globally.

In the second part of this study this theory will be tested using innovative experimental techniques to allow a detailed and empirically grounded exploration of the formation of security policy in democracies. Members of the security and defence community will be invited to participate in the online survey experiment. They will read about a hypothetical international security crisis, a policy that was initially proposed by a Whitehall agency, and whether the agency acted consistently or inconsistently regarding its implementation. They will then answer questions about their willingness to support the behaviour of the agency they read about. The answers of all participants will be analysed to determine if inconsistent behaviour is punished when it comes to the design and implementation of security policies.

Knowledge will be exchanged with members of the security and defence community during the entire study. This will culminate in the third and final part of this study. Findings will be presented at agencies that design and implement security policy in the UK, so each agency can learn more about how other agencies operate and how they view each other. Also, the applicant will organize a two-day practitioner workshop. Here members of the security and defence community, members of the broader civil society such as non-governmental organizations, and representatives of the media and pressure groups will discuss how actors not directly involved security policy play a role in shaping it indirectly.

Policy makers often highlight the role democratic institutions play in constraining the security policies of states. Democratic societies have institutional systems of checks and balances in place to ensure that the will of the many overpower the will of few. However, the constraints inherent to this system of checks and balances might also produce negative externalities like inhibiting flexibility in the design and implementation of security policies. This can significantly limit options in times of international crises like the one we currently face in Syria and the Middle East more generally. This research will bring together theoretical knowledge and the observable experience of representatives of the security and defence elite to assess the benefits and costs associated with the present way security policy is designed and implemented in democracies like the UK. During this project the PI will actively co-produce knowledge with the users of this research, and invite them to discuss findings at the end of the project through different activities. Ultimately, it is anticipated that this research will benefit the Whitehall security community because agencies with specific roles in the security policy process will learn more about intra and inter-agency relationships and their effect on the process of security policy in the UK.

Direct beneficiaries of this research include representatives of the security and defence elites in the UK such as the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC). Other beneficiaries include members of the broader civil society such NGOs, the media, and pressure groups.

Impact activities are embedded throughout the project. During visits to FCO and the MoD and residential periods at the Cabinet Office, ARRC and the JSCSC the PI will offer workplace workshop/seminars. These will encourage participants to reflect on their organization's internal processes and behaviours, as well as external relations with other security agencies. Subsequent phases include engagement activities such as carrying out interviews with high-level security and defence elites where themes such as policy decision-making in the UK and policy flexibility will be discussed. Additionally, research findings will be presented at different security agencies. The final activity of this project is a practitioner workshop hosted at RUSI in London to engage research consumers and as well as other beneficiaries such as the broader civil society. The broader public can play a vital role in the design of security policies. They can either constrain or compel state leaders to employ coercive foreign policies. The public can demand the imposition of tough economic sanctions like they effectively did against apartheid-era South Africa. In periods of elections, public preferences can promote escalating existing sanctions like what was observed in America's policies towards Iran before the 2012 Presidential elections. Bringing together security and defence elites with members of the broader civil society will no doubt prove enlightening for both sides.

Other outputs include the creation (and circulation) of a policy brief outlining general trends found during the study's interview phase and providing policy recommendations and regularly updates to the project section on the Strategy and Security Institute's (SSI) website. The implications of the project findings for the design and implementation of security policy in the UK will be published in a policy-facing journal such as International Security, and possibly in a process-oriented journal such as Political Psychology.