Perceived threats and 'stampedes': a relational model of collective fear responses

Lead Research Organisation: University of Sussex
Department Name: Sch of Psychology

Abstract

This research will address the question of how people respond collectively to acute states of perceived emergency. Both in the UK and globally, the occurrence of terrorist attacks has been associated with an increase in collective flight incidents - often called 'stampedes'. Most have been false alarms. In the case of the incidents in Oxford Street, in 2017, for example, hundreds ran from what they thought was gunshots, and many more joined in when they saw people running, in a cascade of secondary effects. These events are often distressing for those involved. Some of them result in injury and even deaths.

'Stampedes' in response to perceived hostile threats raise the following questions: When and how is a signal perceived as threatening? When and how do people flee? When do they follow (or ignore) others? What is the role of other groups (authorities, emergency services) in communicating threat? When do these incidents become disorderly?

Yet despite their social and psychological significance, these incidents are poorly understood, and an adequate theoretical understanding is currently lacking. Explanations in terms of hypervigilance are necessary but insufficient. They don't explain either how threat perceptions are shared or the collective nature of 'stampedes'. Explanations in terms of 'crowd panic' are also inadequate, despite dominating public discourse. They cannot account for the evidence of discrimination and restraint in these evacuation events.

This project will provide the first systematic evidence on the nature and dynamics of human 'stampedes' in response to perceived hostile threats. We will develop a new model, based on the social identity approach (a theory of our psychological group memberships) and social appraisal theory (which focuses on the social and emotional information we infer from others' responses). We argue that 'who we are' - which can vary across contexts - shapes perceptions of threat, emotional appraisal, and social influence. A distinctive claim is that crowd events such as these are intergroup relationships. Therefore, as well as examining crowd members' perceptions and behaviour, we will examine those of emergency responders, and the relationship between responders' communicative acts and public behaviours.

Previous limitations in understanding 'stampedes' in response to hostile threats are due to a lack of appropriate methodology as much as the paucity of theory. We will address these limitations through a programme of research comprising three strands. First, a case study strand will systematically describe and compare known examples (e.g., Nice fire-cracker 'stampede' of 2018, evacuation at Westfield shopping centre, 2018), as well as provide detailed analysis, using interview and archive data, of a contemporary and a historical incident. Second, experiments using Virtual Reality will allow us to manipulate and control variables, such as group relationships and norms, and to measure direction and speed of flight response, in order to test systematically our hypotheses about the roles of identity and appraisal. Third, given the role of emergency responders and authorities in communicating threat, we will observe their exercises and carry out a field experiment to measure their influence (intended and unintended), including effects of their messages. Together these studies will enable us to determine when and how a signal is perceived as threatening, whether and how people flee, when people follow (or ignore) others, and the role of the emergency services in this.
Understandings of public responses to perceived emergencies have implications for emergency policy and practice and for public debate. Therefore, as well as a new theoretical model, outcomes from this project will include new emergency guidance, and new public discourse on this topic.

Planned Impact

The increased incidence of public flight in response to perceived hostile threats makes this project timely for a number of public services and government bodies responsible for preparedness and response to emergencies. The challenge for the authorities is how to maintain public alertness and build trust in their communications to the public, whilst avoiding acting in ways that amplify risk unnecessarily. Currently, the lack of adequate understanding of public behaviour in these incidents is a problem for the emergency services and the bodies that advise them. This research will significantly enhance the evidence-base on public behaviour in these events. The benefit for the emergency services, the organizations that provide guidance, and the public themselves is more efficient preparedness and response, and ultimately greater public safety.
There are benefits specific to particular sectors and organizations. For the fire and rescue service (FRS), the new research will improve scenario planning and execution, enhancing their training and preparedness for incidents. Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) will benefit through developing understanding of public information needs in the immediate aftermath of a possible incident. Through improving their scenarios, they will be better able to test the credibility of their planning assumptions, planning arrangements and training infrastructure.

Specifically, this research will provide Staffordshire Civil Contingencies Unit (CCU) and Staffordshire FRS with new learnings and better training exercises, which we will help re-design. Exercises cost considerable resources. Our findings will contribute to more veridical exercises, through incorporating more complete information about public behaviour. This will produce better value for money and better preparedness when dealing with actual events. The benefits to Staffordshire CCU and FRS will transfer to LRFs, fire and police services across the country through the national forums these organizations are part of.

The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) is the department of the Cabinet Office responsible for emergency planning. They produce the National Risk Assessment, used by LRFs in their emergency planning. The research will provide information CCS have requested, such as how the public respond to threats in different locations and the role of different sources of information. This will help the CCS with recommendations on communication with the public.
Public Health England design and commission exercises and provide guidance on likely public behaviour in the event of an emergency. As well as benefiting from the enhanced evidence-base, they will benefit from the improvements in terms of psychological realism we will be able to provide to their exercise planning.

The research will be beneficial to those who manage crowd safety, including at music events, transport hubs and shopping centres, in the UK and internationally. Professionals involved in engineering and design for evacuations will also benefit; they will be able to develop more effective and accurate evacuation models. The research will also benefit regulatory frameworks, and will inform discussion about new guidance on safety at sports grounds.

The public will benefit, both in terms of their safety, but also in terms of public discourse. In criticizing the notion of 'stampedes' and irrational 'panic', and in disseminating knowledge of the conditions under which public flight occurs, we will provide a space for new language to emerge. Our work will therefore contribute towards a more informed public discussion of threats and collective flight responses. What is the balance between withholding information on threat and practices that might encourage public flight? Public discourse will therefore benefit through stimulating an informed public discussion. In this way, our work is of importance both at the level of individual understanding and of societal wellbeing.
 
Description 1. We reviewed incidents in the UK over ten years involving a 'false alarm' to a perceived terrorist threat. In the period, we identified 496 genuine attacks (36 in England, 4 in Scotland and 456 in Northern Ireland) and 112 false alarms. 25 of the false alarms involved urgent evacuations of the type that have been called 'stampedes'. When correlating the false alarms and urgent responses with real attacks, we found that it wasn't simply the number of attacks that drove the false alarms, but the psychological relevance of the attacks: Islamist-inspired attacks and attacks with large numbers of casualties were the ones most likely to be associated with subsequent false alarms. In addition, the official threat level was also associated with false alarms. Most of the false alarms took place in transport hubs and shopping centres. We also found that even in urgent responses in which many people ran, there was a variety of public behaviour including many incidents of cooperation, and relatively few injuries.
2. We have developed an immersive virtual reality app recreating a realistic crowded urban environment and capturing spontaneous behavioural responses such as trajectories, speed and gaze patterns. Additionally, in the face of the pandemic and the difficulties associated with in-person data collection, we have also developed a light version of the app, currently hosted online, that can be accessed and run from any desktop computer or laptop. This methodology allows us to manipulate key variables such as signals of danger, how others respond to the danger, and the relationships amongst the members of the crowd, including the participant. Combined with self-reports and protocol analyses, we obtain a complete picture of how people behave in the presence of a potential threat and why. Consonant with the social identity approach, our first results suggest that perceived threat brings people together through the emergence of a sense of common group membership. Moreover, they suggest that people are more influenced by those with whom they share a sense of common identity (or "we-ness") both when assessing the extent of the threat and when deciding how to act (e.g., ignoring the danger vs. running away from the danger).
3. Using CCTV footage of the Leytonstone knife attack on 5 Dec 2017, we conducted a behavioural micro-analysis of how members of public reacted to a marauding attacker at a tube station. We reconstructed the sequences of actions of individuals during the attack by mapping their behavioural acts chronologically and topographically. The results shows that facing the attack members of public did not simply panic as predicted by classical crowd theory. As an identity of 'us' emerged in them when the perpetrator showed signs of indiscriminate attack, brave individuals improvised and performed different roles to rescue and protect the injured victim and others. This understanding of how these 'zero-responders' behave when facing perceived threats will contribute to the development of more resilient emergency preparedness.
4. We re-analysed witness statements from the 1943 Bethnal Green disaster, showing that public fears of German bombs were realistic rather than unreasonable, and that flight behaviour was socially structured rather than uncontrolled.
5. We are part way through analysing the 2017 Oxford Street false alarm. It was a combination of factors - context, others' behaviour, communications - that led people to flee. A false alarm tends not to be sudden or impulsive, and often follows an initial phase of discounting threat - as with many genuine emergencies. As well as running there was a variety of behaviour and camaraderie only existed in pockets.
Exploitation Route We have been in discussion with the following organizations on how they can use our findings to assist with public communication policies and practices in the event of possible terrorist attacks: Resilience Directorate, Dstl, and Transport for London. We have made seven recommendations:
Embed the psychology of public behaviour in emergencies in your training and guidance.
• Continue to inform the public and promote public awareness where there is an increased threat.
• Build long-term relations with the public to achieve trust and influence in emergency preparedness.
• Use a unifying language and supportive forms of communication to enhance unity both within the crowd and between the crowd and the authorities.
• Authorities and responders should take a reflexive approach to their responses to possible hostile threats, by reflecting upon how their actions might be perceived by the public and impact (positively and negatively) on public behaviour.
• To give emotional support, prioritize informative and actionable risk and crisis communication over emotional reassurances.
• Provide first aid kits in transport infrastructures to enable some members of the public more effectively to act as zero responders.
Sectors Government, Democracy and Justice,Security and Diplomacy,Transport

URL https://www.sussex.ac.uk/research/projects/stampedes/research-outputs
 
Description We created a project website for academics, the public and end-users: https://www.sussex.ac.uk/research/projects/stampedes/ 681 page views in the first two months since launch (June 2021). 177 page views in the last 2 months. Co-production: Many of the specific research questions that shaped the project were developed in a discussion we held with the UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat (now the Resilience Directorate) in 2019. We are in discussion with the following organizations on how they can use our findings to assist with public communication policies and practices in the event of possible terrorist attacks: Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Home Office, Dstl, CPNI, Transport for London. We organised a knowledge exchange event with Transport for London to discuss our findings and their translation, in January 2023. This was attended by civil servants and responders from a range of departments, including the Home Office, Cabinet Office, Department for Transport, Dstl, London Underground, and British Transport Police. We produced an accessible briefing document / guide to public behaviour for the Resilience Directorate and others and are currently circulating this: https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=stampedes-accessible-report-v751-final.pdf&site=636
First Year Of Impact 2022
Impact Types Societal,Policy & public services

 
Description Faculty of Natural Sciences capital expenditure call
Amount £26,836 (GBP)
Organisation Keele University 
Sector Academic/University
Country United Kingdom
Start 03/2021 
 
Description Academic Confidentiality Agreement for Sharing CCTV Footage of Actual and False Perceived-Threat Incidents 
Organisation Transport for London
Department London Underground
Country United Kingdom 
Sector Public 
PI Contribution The collaboration with TfL is proposed to have three focuses: 1) An ethnographic study of selected evacuation events composed of video analysis of the granular social process of the events. Incidents have been selected and a total of 13 events will be shared with Keele University. 2) A review of the internal communication process designed for those events. 3) An online experiment testing the public response to different designs of evacuation message.
Collaborator Contribution To conduct these analyses, TfLwill provideKeele University with access to: a) the statistics and reports of evacuation incidents in the past two decades b) internal protocol and evacuation route plan regarding perceived threat situations, which will include station layout map and emergency plan c) samples of signals (verbal and visual) used to evacuate passengers in case of perceived threat d) CCTV footageof 13selected evacuation incidents e) 2 connect radio recordings relating to 2 of the 13 incidents f) InterviewswithTfL staff involved in the incidents conducted by KU. These interviews may be recorded, and informed consent will be acquired
Impact Collaboration in Progress.
Start Year 2021
 
Description Participation of Dr Anne Templeton in the fusion panel "Enhancing Security Culture at Publicly Accessible Locations" at Security & Policing Home Office Event 2021 
Form Of Engagement Activity A formal working group, expert panel or dialogue
Part Of Official Scheme? No
Geographic Reach National
Primary Audience Professional Practitioners
Results and Impact Dr Anne Templeton was a member of the fusion panel "Enhancing Security Culture at Publicly Accessible Locations" at the Security & Policing Home Office Event 2021. This panel brought together members of Government and Industry to discuss how fostering a good security culture in businesses and the wider public can make staff and customers safer. It included a focus on how small changes can deliver significant improvements in public protection.
Year(s) Of Engagement Activity 2021
URL https://www.securityandpolicing.co.uk/event-features/the-fusion-forum/
 
Description Presentation and discussion meeting with Civil Contingencies Secretariat 
Form Of Engagement Activity Participation in an activity, workshop or similar
Part Of Official Scheme? No
Geographic Reach National
Primary Audience Policymakers/politicians
Results and Impact Presentation of initial findings of our review of false alarm incidents. Dialogue with government departments on these findings and their implications for policy and practice (e.g. communications with the public).
Year(s) Of Engagement Activity 2021
URL https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/crowdsidentities/2020/12/03/understanding-collective-fear-responses-to-pe...
 
Description Presentation and discussion meeting with Transport for London--Risk & M(T)As: lessons from a TFL station 
Form Of Engagement Activity A formal working group, expert panel or dialogue
Part Of Official Scheme? No
Geographic Reach Regional
Primary Audience Professional Practitioners
Results and Impact Prof Clifford Stott presented to the TfL's about the project progress and preliminary observations. The presentation is titled "Risk & M(T)As: lessons from a TFL station" reporting Keele's strand observation on an actual marauding knife attack that took place in a Tube station in 2015. TfL participants reflected on their policy environment according to the observations and express positive feedback toward the project progress.
Year(s) Of Engagement Activity 2021
 
Description Public behaviour and perceived hostile threats: New research evidence A workshop to explore implications for policy and practice 
Form Of Engagement Activity Participation in an activity, workshop or similar
Part Of Official Scheme? No
Geographic Reach National
Primary Audience Professional Practitioners
Results and Impact The workshop will be delivered by a team of academics at the forefront of developing new scientific understandings in the domain of public behaviour in mass emergencies, who will deliver facilitated discussions on new studies of public behaviours, including:
• The Oxford Circus false alarm incident, Black Friday 2017
• Experimental examination of flight responses to ambiguous potential hostile threats
• Public behaviour in the Tower Hill tube train evacuation, 2017
• Public and staff responses to the marauding knife attack at Leytonstone tube station, 2015
Year(s) Of Engagement Activity 2023
URL https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=tfl-event-flyer-v23.pdf&site=636
 
Description Public behaviour in response to perceived hostile threats: An evidence base and guide for practitioners and policymakers. 
Form Of Engagement Activity A magazine, newsletter or online publication
Part Of Official Scheme? No
Geographic Reach International
Primary Audience Professional Practitioners
Results and Impact An evidence base and guide for practitioners and policymakers. So far circulated to 20 civil service, emergency services, and event safety contacts. We expect impact to follow.
Year(s) Of Engagement Activity 2023
URL https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=stampedes-accessible-report-v751-final.pdf&si...