'Epistemic Value, Luck, and Scepticism'

It is a commonplace in the theory of knowledge (epistemology) that if one genuinely knows then it is not a matter of luck that one's belief is true. A lucky guess, for example, is not knowledge. In our day-to-day lives we often ascribe knowledge to ourselves, and thereby regard ourselves as being able to possess non-lucky true belief. It is this picture of our epistemic standing that is challenged by sceptical arguments.
On the standard construal of them, these arguments purport to show that widespread knowledge is impossible on the grounds that where our beliefs are true this is substantively due to luck, despite our conviction to the contrary. According to the sceptic, then, when we believe truly we are not substantially better off, epistemically speaking, than the person who makes a lucky guess.

We care about resolving the sceptical problem because knowledge is valuable to us; more valuable than simply having beliefs that are only luckily true. Explaining why knowledge is valuable, however, is notoriously difficult. Suppose we grant that all true belief is instrumentally valuable because it enables us to achieve our goals. While contentious, this claim has some plausibility, since even a true belief about something inconsequential, such as the number of sweets in a jar, could potentially be of use (to enable one to win a prize at a village fair perhaps). It is not clear, however, that the value of knowledge is different in either degree or kind from the value of mere true belief. As the charge goes, so long as one's belief is true, then what does it matter what its epistemic pedigree is? A man who merely truly believes that he is in the best pub in town gets to drink at the same bar as the man who knows that he is. But if knowledge is no more valuable than true belief, then why do we care about the sceptical challenge?

The goal of this project is to offer an account of the value of knowledge and in doing so cast light on the sceptical problem. Knowledge, I argue, is indeed of greater value (instrumentally and otherwise) than mere true belief, but this greater degree of value does not account for the importance of resolving sceptical arguments, nor does it captures their enduring appeal. Instead, 1 argue for the provocative thesis that the true focus of scepticism is not on the possibility of knowledge simplifier, as it is usually understood, but rather on the possibility of a particular type of knowledge that is different not only in degree of value from mere true belief, but also different in kind by being of intrinsic value (i.e., its value is not dependent upon something else of value).

Furthermore, I maintain that this distinction between knowledge simplifier and a sub-class of knowledge which is intrinsically valuable is mirrored in a parallel distinction between two varieties of epistemic luck; one variety which is incompatible with knowledge simplifier, and one variety which is only incompatible with that sub-class of knowledge which is intrinsically valuable.

This way of understanding the sceptical problem has important ramifications for the main anti-sceptical proposals in the contemporary literature. Moreover, since many of these proposals are also advanced as theories of knowledge in their own right, the implications of this approach extend right into mainstream epistemology. This research will result in five full-length articles. Three of these articles are already destined for prominent academic journals and publishers. The remaining two articles will be submitted to world-class philosophy journals.