Impassioned Belief: Developing and Defending a New Form of Meta-Normative Expressivism

Whenever one ponders what he or she ought to do, what would be rational to do, what he or she has most reason to do, what it would be good to do, or what he or she must do, where these questions are meant to settle the question of what he or she shall do, one is engaged in what philosophers call 'normative thought.' Such thoughts are ubiquitous in human life, and indeed are a fundamental aspect of human nature which distinguishes us from simpler creatures. A cat may in some loose or weak sense deliberate about what to do, but certainly is not capable of agonizing about the morality of tormenting its prey. On reflection normative thought is, though, as philosophically puzzling as it is familiar and ubiquitous. It is this juxtaposition of the familiar with the philosophically puzzling that makes reflection on the nature of normative thought and discourse so fascinating.

Normative thought and discourse is puzzling in part because it seems rather Janus-faced. On the one hand, normative judgment is classified as true or false, figures in seemingly rational inferences, and is even thought to provide a possible object of knowledge. In all of these ways, normative judgments seem like ordinary beliefs. On the other hand, normative judgment can directly guide action, we doubt the sincerity of someone who says some form of behaviour is (e.g.) morally wrong but shows no compunction about engaging in that behaviour, and we tend to think that someone who really does believe they ought to do something but choose not to do it is irrational. In all of these ways, normative judgment seems more like desire, sentiment or intention rather than belief. Given powerful philosophical arguments that beliefs and desires are what David Hume famously called 'distinct existences', this Janus-faced aspect of moral judgment is deeply philosophically puzzling. For if beliefs are just inert representations of the facts, and nothing but the facts, then it is hard to see how normative judgment qua belief could be motivating in and of itself. If, however, normative judgments are just desires then it is hard to see how normative judgment could have the belief-like features which it manifestly does have.

Traditional attempts to answer these thorny questions tend to emphasize sentiment to the exclusion of reason (e.g., in the work of David Hume and those inspired by his approach) or reason and cognition to the exclusion of sentiment (e.g. in the work of Plato and Kant and those inspired by their work). Since the dawn of the 20th century this long-standing debate has taken the form of a debate between self-styled 'expressivists' and 'cognitivists' in metaethics. Cognitivists try to show how beliefs can play the motivational role more naturally associated with desire, while expressivists try to model belief-like features with desires. Not surprisingly, these efforts can seem like attempts to fit a square peg in a round hole. It is here that my project offers the promise of breaking through this impasse at the heart of contemporary metaethics and meta-normative theory more generally. On my account, moral and other normative sentences express both beliefs and desires, and moral and other normative judgments are constituted by both beliefs and desires. This approach promises to synthesize the best of both the sentimentalist and rationalist traditions without the costs of either.

In developing this theroy, I contrast it with other recent 'hybrid' theories in the literature and argue for its superiority. I also explore its implications for such issues as the context-sensitivity of reasons, the role of principles in moral thought and judgment, and the logical relationships between values and reasons. I also embed the theory in a broader semantic framework which avoids the rampant and implausible ambiguities posited by other semantic theories. Thisprovides a novel perspective on how specifically normative uses of terms like 'ought' are located.

My project addresses fundamental questions about the nature of normative judgment and the meanings of normative claims - claims about what one ought to do, what there is reason to do, what one must do, when these are understood as directly relevant to deciding what to do. It is therefore not straightforward to isolate short-term and specific contributions that it will make to society or the economy. However, the project will shed new light on the role of standards of practical deliberation in individual decision-making and cooperative activity, and the relationship between our acceptance of standards and our affective and emotional nature. The project should also advance our understanding of how the practice of normative thought and discourse can be both understood and reflectively endorsed in the context of a multicultural modern society. This should contribute, in the long run, to our understanding of human nature and the role of standards of practical deliberation and emotions in cooperative activity. It should also help to insulate our specifically moral practices from a range of familiar and powerful sceptical challenges to their authority. These are questions of intrinsic interest to any reflective person, and so should be of interest to the educated lay person.

My theory also provides a new framework for thinking about difficult practical moral questions, such as our obligations to help the distant needy, the moral difficulties raised by climate change, and the morality of assisted suicide. Although my theory will not answer the difficult question of just what we should do in these cases, it does clarify the conceptual framework in which such questions are posed. This should help avoid certain otherwise tempting missteps in these debates. Some aspects of the work could therefore be of interest to policy makers or non-governmental actors working on such issues. In particular, I shall argue that standards should play an essential role in normative thought and discourse. This has implications for how we should think about practical issues, as it rules out a certain 'particularist' form of casuistry. I also argue that, given my meta-normative theory, the idea that a normative standard could be self-effacing (that is, could recommend its own rejection) and yet be objectively 'true' or 'correct' makes no coherent sense. This may put indirect pressure on certain consequentialist approaches to issues of public policy. Given that such consequentialist approaches are dominant in certain public policy circles, this conclusion should be of some interest beyond the academy - at least to those who are interested in reflecting on the deeper presuppositions of their methods for thinking about such practical issues.

As a more pro-active attempt to share my research with a broader audience, I will arrange to give a talk to the Edinburgh Philosophy Society in which I discuss the results of my research. I also am scheduled to take part in the upcoming tricentenary Hume celebrations in Edinburgh, both by giving a talk and by taking part in a panel discussion on Hume's moral psychology. Given that my own research is deeply influenced by Humean ideas about the nature of moral thought, my research during my period of leave would feed into these presentations and substantially enhance their quality. In the past I have also been involved in a variety of forms of knowledge exchange (detailed in my 'Impact Plan' document), and I expect that such opportunities will continue to come my way, albeit I cannot at present with confidence predict just what such opportunities are likely to materialize. As I explain in my 'Impact Plan' document, the work I would do on this book would be very likely to enhance any such consultations, and thereby provide further opportunities for my research in this area to reach a wider audience.