Wittgenstein on Sensations and Subjectivity
Lead Research Organisation:
University of Oxford
Department Name: Philosophy
Abstract
Wittgenstein's treatment of sensations and subjectivity is a central element in his philosophy. His discussion of sensations and 'private language' has long been recognized as a key element in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. It sets the agenda for his extensive late work on philosophy of psychology, and its development can be traced through Wittgenstein's writings of the 1930s. Understanding Wittgenstein's treatment of sensations is crucial for understanding his philosophy as a whole. And understanding its development is central to understanding the development of his views more generally.
The aim of 'Wittgenstein, Sensations, and Subjectivity' is to develop a new account of Wittgenstein's treatment of sensations and subjectivity, and a new account of its development in Wittgenstein's writings of the 1930s. The project will also offer a fresh perspective on the relation between Wittgenstein's view of subjectivity and contemporary views in philosophy of mind. These aims will be pursued through three interrelated lines of research, each leading to a single-authored paper.
The first line of research, 'Sensations and Subjectivity: Philosophical Remarks and The Big Typescript', will consider the treatments of sensations and subjectivity that Wittgenstein offers in Philosophical Remarks (1929-30) and The Big Typescript (1933-37), and explore the place of these writings in the development of Wittgenstein's views. In these early writings, Wittgenstein considers an alternative terminology for ascribing experiences to oneself and others - a terminology in which 'I am in pain' is replaced by 'There is pain', while 'A is in pain' is replaced by 'A is behaving as I behave when there is pain'. The project will examine how best to understand the lessons Wittgenstein draws from this imagined alternative terminology. It will examine the relation between these early discussions of sensations and the treatment of sensations in Wittgenstein's later work. And it will explore the plausibility of an interpretation that brings the treatments of sensations in Philosophical Remarks and The Big Typescript much closer to Wittgenstein's later treatment of the topic than they have generally been seen as being.
The second line of research, 'Wittgenstein, Phenomenal Concepts, and Knowing What It's Like', will develop a new account of Wittgenstein's treatment of sensation concepts - discussing, in particular, the role that is played by a person's own possession of sensations in Wittgenstein's account of her grasp of sensation concepts. Many contemporary writers hold that having sensations of a given kind equips one to grasp a phenomenal concept of those sensations: a way of thinking of such sensations that is available only to those who know what it is like to have them. Advocates of phenomenal concepts have generally held their views to be sharply at odds with Wittgenstein's. The project will demonstrate, through detailed discussion of the texts, that Wittgenstein's view of sensation concepts is in fact compatible with the idea that there are phenomenal concepts, even if Wittgenstein rejects some of the other views of modern proponents of phenomenal concepts.
The third line of research, 'Wittgenstein on Experience and the Behavioural Expression of Experience', will offer an account of Wittgenstein's treatment of the relation between sensations and the behavioural expression of sensation, defending an interpretation on which the relation Wittgenstein proposes is much less extreme than has often been thought. Wittgenstein is often read as holding that it is essential to any kind of sensation or emotion that it has the kind of behavioural expression it does. On this view, a world in which there was no characteristic expression of pain, fear, or joy, say, would be a world in which there was no pain, fear, or joy. It will be shown that Wittgenstein's actual view is much weaker - and much more plausible - than that.
The aim of 'Wittgenstein, Sensations, and Subjectivity' is to develop a new account of Wittgenstein's treatment of sensations and subjectivity, and a new account of its development in Wittgenstein's writings of the 1930s. The project will also offer a fresh perspective on the relation between Wittgenstein's view of subjectivity and contemporary views in philosophy of mind. These aims will be pursued through three interrelated lines of research, each leading to a single-authored paper.
The first line of research, 'Sensations and Subjectivity: Philosophical Remarks and The Big Typescript', will consider the treatments of sensations and subjectivity that Wittgenstein offers in Philosophical Remarks (1929-30) and The Big Typescript (1933-37), and explore the place of these writings in the development of Wittgenstein's views. In these early writings, Wittgenstein considers an alternative terminology for ascribing experiences to oneself and others - a terminology in which 'I am in pain' is replaced by 'There is pain', while 'A is in pain' is replaced by 'A is behaving as I behave when there is pain'. The project will examine how best to understand the lessons Wittgenstein draws from this imagined alternative terminology. It will examine the relation between these early discussions of sensations and the treatment of sensations in Wittgenstein's later work. And it will explore the plausibility of an interpretation that brings the treatments of sensations in Philosophical Remarks and The Big Typescript much closer to Wittgenstein's later treatment of the topic than they have generally been seen as being.
The second line of research, 'Wittgenstein, Phenomenal Concepts, and Knowing What It's Like', will develop a new account of Wittgenstein's treatment of sensation concepts - discussing, in particular, the role that is played by a person's own possession of sensations in Wittgenstein's account of her grasp of sensation concepts. Many contemporary writers hold that having sensations of a given kind equips one to grasp a phenomenal concept of those sensations: a way of thinking of such sensations that is available only to those who know what it is like to have them. Advocates of phenomenal concepts have generally held their views to be sharply at odds with Wittgenstein's. The project will demonstrate, through detailed discussion of the texts, that Wittgenstein's view of sensation concepts is in fact compatible with the idea that there are phenomenal concepts, even if Wittgenstein rejects some of the other views of modern proponents of phenomenal concepts.
The third line of research, 'Wittgenstein on Experience and the Behavioural Expression of Experience', will offer an account of Wittgenstein's treatment of the relation between sensations and the behavioural expression of sensation, defending an interpretation on which the relation Wittgenstein proposes is much less extreme than has often been thought. Wittgenstein is often read as holding that it is essential to any kind of sensation or emotion that it has the kind of behavioural expression it does. On this view, a world in which there was no characteristic expression of pain, fear, or joy, say, would be a world in which there was no pain, fear, or joy. It will be shown that Wittgenstein's actual view is much weaker - and much more plausible - than that.
Planned Impact
Wittgenstein and his philosophy, perhaps uniquely for a 20th Century philosopher in the analytic tradition, are a focus of great interest to a general public that extends far beyond academics and those who have studied philosophy at university. Wittgenstein's views on sensations and private language have attracted particular attention: the 'private language argument' of Philosophical Investigations, the beetle-in-the-box passage, the suggestion that pain is not a something but not a nothing either, are among the most familiar of his ideas to the wider public.
That background of general, non-academic interest in Wittgenstein mean that the advances in our understanding of Wittgenstein's thought promised by the current project have potential impacts well beyond academic philosophy. (a) The project has a potential impact on the wider public who have a general interest in Wittgenstein. (b) It has a potential impact in schools - where the private language argument, the beetle-in-the-box discussion, and the idea that 'an "inner process" stands in need of outward criteria' are studied as parts of the philosophy of mind syllabus in A-level Philosophy. (c) It has a potential impact on academics beyond philosophy - where Wittgenstein's thought is influential in a range of disciplines, including Theology, Anthropology, Sociology, and Literary Theory. (d) Less directly, it has a potential impact on the creative arts, where Wittgenstein's ideas - and his discussion of private language in particular - have exerted a powerful fascination.
How might these different groups benefit from the current research?
For the interested wider public, philosophical research on thinkers and topics that fascinate them have the power to enrich their lives. Like the creative and performing arts, philosophy speaks to fundamental human needs. It speaks to those needs not by meeting our physical requirements, but by satisfying our natural human tendency to ask questions about the most basic and puzzling features of our existence, and by giving us a way to think systematically about those puzzles. Amongst these puzzling features, the topics of the current project rank high: How far is our understanding of others' minds dependent on our own subjectivity? What exactly do we mean when we say that someone else is in pain, or afraid? Could we understand the thought that someone is in pain, or afraid, if we had never felt pain or fear ourselves? There is a huge appetite for systematic, intelligent discussion of these and related questions. And there is a huge appetite for discussion of Wittgenstein's contributions to these questions.
The potential impact on school students and their teachers is quite direct. A new interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas about sensations, communicated in ways outlined in the Pathways to Impact attachment, has the power to change students' and teachers' perception of those ideas and to strengthen and deepen their understanding of Wittgenstein's views.
The impact on academics in other disciplines, and on the creative arts, comes from the project's potential to help shape our understanding of Wittgenstein's ideas on topics of central importance in his philosophy. Academics outside philosophy, and creative artists, have their own approaches to the texts. But they do not read Wittgenstein in a vacuum: their understanding of his ideas is influenced and shaped by philosophers' discussions and debates. By advancing new interpretations of important elements in Wittgenstein, the current project will help to develop philosophers' understanding of Wittgenstein - and thereby to shape the appreciation of his work in disciplines beyond philosophy.
That background of general, non-academic interest in Wittgenstein mean that the advances in our understanding of Wittgenstein's thought promised by the current project have potential impacts well beyond academic philosophy. (a) The project has a potential impact on the wider public who have a general interest in Wittgenstein. (b) It has a potential impact in schools - where the private language argument, the beetle-in-the-box discussion, and the idea that 'an "inner process" stands in need of outward criteria' are studied as parts of the philosophy of mind syllabus in A-level Philosophy. (c) It has a potential impact on academics beyond philosophy - where Wittgenstein's thought is influential in a range of disciplines, including Theology, Anthropology, Sociology, and Literary Theory. (d) Less directly, it has a potential impact on the creative arts, where Wittgenstein's ideas - and his discussion of private language in particular - have exerted a powerful fascination.
How might these different groups benefit from the current research?
For the interested wider public, philosophical research on thinkers and topics that fascinate them have the power to enrich their lives. Like the creative and performing arts, philosophy speaks to fundamental human needs. It speaks to those needs not by meeting our physical requirements, but by satisfying our natural human tendency to ask questions about the most basic and puzzling features of our existence, and by giving us a way to think systematically about those puzzles. Amongst these puzzling features, the topics of the current project rank high: How far is our understanding of others' minds dependent on our own subjectivity? What exactly do we mean when we say that someone else is in pain, or afraid? Could we understand the thought that someone is in pain, or afraid, if we had never felt pain or fear ourselves? There is a huge appetite for systematic, intelligent discussion of these and related questions. And there is a huge appetite for discussion of Wittgenstein's contributions to these questions.
The potential impact on school students and their teachers is quite direct. A new interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas about sensations, communicated in ways outlined in the Pathways to Impact attachment, has the power to change students' and teachers' perception of those ideas and to strengthen and deepen their understanding of Wittgenstein's views.
The impact on academics in other disciplines, and on the creative arts, comes from the project's potential to help shape our understanding of Wittgenstein's ideas on topics of central importance in his philosophy. Academics outside philosophy, and creative artists, have their own approaches to the texts. But they do not read Wittgenstein in a vacuum: their understanding of his ideas is influenced and shaped by philosophers' discussions and debates. By advancing new interpretations of important elements in Wittgenstein, the current project will help to develop philosophers' understanding of Wittgenstein - and thereby to shape the appreciation of his work in disciplines beyond philosophy.
People |
ORCID iD |
| Timothy Child (Principal Investigator / Fellow) |
Publications
Child W
(2017)
Wittgenstein and Scientism
Child W
(2016)
A Companion to Wittgenstein
Child W
(2015)
Wittgenstein and Perception
Child W
(2017)
Aspect Perception after Wittgenstein: Seeing-As and Novelty
Child W
(2017)
Wittgenstein and Davidson on Thought, Language, and Action
| Description | 1. 'Wittgenstein and Phenomenal Concepts' The paper argues for the unorthodox claim that Wittgenstein's views about experience and sensations are compatible with the idea that there are phenomenal concepts: distinctive ways of thinking of kinds of sensations that are available only to those who know what it is like to have those sensations. And it demonstrates the plausibility of ascribing that view to Wittgenstein. 2. 'Wittgenstein, Scientism and Anti-Scientism in Philosophy of Mind' This paper develops an account of Wittgenstein's general opposition to scientism, and of his particular opposition to two kinds of scientism in philosophy of mind: the scientism of pursuing philosophy of mind as though it is a science; and the scientism of treating common-sense psychology as though it is a rudimentary science of behaviour. 3. 'The Inner and the Outer' This paper offers a new account of Wittgenstein's critique of the 'inner-outer' picture of the relation between mind and behaviour. It discusses his account of avowals and self-ascriptions of sensations and attitudes, focusing in particular on the significance of the idea that such self-ascriptions are often expressions of the sensations and attitudes they self-ascribe. And it offers a sophisticated treatment of his dictum that 'the inner is tied up with the outer not only empirically but also logically'. 4. 'Wittgenstein and Davidson on First-Person Authority and the Univocality of Mental Terms'. Donald Davidson has pressed an objection to the view - which he associates with Wittgenstein - that it is just 'an essential aspect of our use of certain mental predicates that we apply them to others on the basis of behavioural evidence but to ourselves without benefit of such aid'. Davidson objects that this view invites scepticism about whether mental terms have the same meaning in their first-person and third-person applications; and it leaves the asymmetry between first-person and third-person ascriptions unexplained. I demonstrate that: • Davidson's demand for explanation in this case is legitimate, even from a Wittgensteinian point of view. • Davidson himself doesn't offer a convincing general response to his own challenge. And he must in the end accept a version of the view he attributes to Wittgenstein. • Wittgenstein explicitly considers Davidson's question, to which he offers an interesting and plausible answer. 5. 'Wittgenstein, Seeing-as, and Novelty' The paper considers three issues about seeing-as and novelty, with special relation to Wittgenstein's writings on aspect-perception. • First, is there any special connection between seeing as and novelty or creativity? It is argued that there is a general connection between gasping concepts or theories and seeing things in a particular way; but there is also a range of phenomena in the area that are specific to the case of novelty. • Second, is there any explanatory relation between seeing as and novelty? It is argued that we cannot in general appeal to seeing as to explain conceptual or theoretical innovation - though some exceptions are identified. • Third, whatever association there is between seeing as and novelty, is it important? The paper draws on Wittgenstein's discussion of aspect-blindness in exploring that question. 6. 'The Middle Wittgenstein on Personal Experience and the Use of "I"' This paper explores Wittgenstein's work from the early 1930s on the topic of 'personal experience' (that is to say, the ascription of sensations and experiences to oneself and others), in the light especially of the recently-published complete edition of G. E. Moore's notes on Wittgenstein's 1930-33 Lectures in Cambridge. (i) It demonstrates that Wittgenstein's 1933 treatment of sensation language continues to pursue the new approach to philosophy that was developed in 1929. (ii) It explores Wittgenstein's 1933 distinction between 'two utterly different' uses of the word "I". (iii) In the light of (ii), it reevaluates Wittgenstein's influential Blue Book writings on the first-person pronoun. |
| Exploitation Route | • The findings from this research project relate partly to the philosophy of Wittgenstein, and partly to topics in the philosophy of mind in their own right. I expect these findings to be discussed and reacted to in the literature in the relevant parts of academic philosophy over the coming years - in ways that will contribute to our understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy, and to our understanding of important issues in philosophy of mind, respectively. • Wittgenstein's work is a focus of interest in a wide variety of academic disciplines beyond philosophy (including e.g. Law, Theology, Anthropology, Sociology, and Literary Theory). I would therefore anticipate that my findings about Wittgenstein's work - some of which are deliberately presented in books intended to attract a readership beyond academic philosophy - will reach academics in other disciplines and will stimulate their work in various ways. Of course, it is not easy to anticipate in advance the kinds of use they will make of it. • Wittgenstein's work also attracts enduring interest from a general public that extends far beyond academics and those who have studied philosophy at university. And his views about sensations and subjectivity in particular have attracted much attention: the discussion of sensations and private language in Philosophical Investigations is among the most familiar of his writings. So some of the outcomes from this research project will reach a wider audience - who will respond to them in various ways. In particular, the publication reported in 3 above will appear in a Blackwell Companion that is intended to be accessible to undergraduates and non-specialists, and to become a standard reference work on Wittgenstein. (Other Companions in the same series are held in public libraries.) I anticipate its reaching teachers in secondary and post-16 education by that route, as well as their students. |
| Sectors | Education,Other |
| URL | http://oxford.academia.edu/WilliamChild |
| Description | Specific use of this research beyond academia will take time to happen. Wittgenstein's views on sensations and subjectivity attract a lot of attention from a wide audience, including people working in Cultural Studies, Anthropology, Law, Sociology, Politics and Psychiatry, amongst other subjects - as well as teachers and students in secondary education, where Wittgenstein's private language argument figures on the A-level syllabus. The contribution of my work in shaping our understanding of Wittgenstein's work in this area will over time have an impact wherever Wittgenstein's views are discussed and employed - in these fields and more widely. |