AutoPaSS: Automatic Verification of Complex Privacy Requirements in Unbounded-Size Secure Systems

Lead Research Organisation: University of Surrey
Department Name: Computing Science

Abstract

Today's secure-systems --with hyper-connected devices-- span arbitrarily-many concurrent executions. So, we need reliable verification techniques that can capture their unbounded sizes. Such powerful methods have been perfected to verify security properties. But these well-established methods (e.g., based on process-algebra) fall short of robustly checking rich privacy properties, such as anonymity and un-linkability of users to actions, in arbitrarily-large systems. As privacy concerns escalate around us, this problem becomes more acute and it is felt by industry. For instance, in the automotive domain, private authentication of connected cars and well-founded tools to check its robustness is paramount. Our industrial advisor, Vector GB Ltd, in their support letter, states: "A formal methods-based approach addressing these [...] has the possibility to be a "game changer" for our customers."

To deliver its step-change in privacy-analysis, AutoPaSS "thinks outside the box". AutoPaSS will create new techniques for verifying secure-systems, by levering logics which are traditional in AI and in the analysis autonomous systems. Moreover, these AI-inspired logics have recently shown promise in security/privacy verification as well. So, our new methodologies will hinge upon these logics' expressivity and allow us to check rich privacy requirements such as anonymity and non-traceability during the automatic verification of unbounded-size secure systems.

In brief, AutoPaSS will investigate and develop new, robust foundational methodologies and software-tools for the automatic, formal analysis of security and, especially, privacy in modern computer and communication systems of arbitrary size. And, AutoPaSS will be a game-changer in these, in that it will:
(I) be able to automatically check richer, "real-life" expressions of privacy properties;
(II) do this in unbounded-size systems;
(III) formalise and use enhanced threat models, that go beyond the normally-used, system-level attacks and account faithfully for network/communications' specifics,
all these in ways less restrictive than currently possible.
AutoPaSS will build on well-established system-verification methodologies and, as foundations, it will use applied, non-classical logics.

Let us address some more questions relevant to AutoPaSS.

-- The UK's strategies underline significant support for the 5G development. But, do the different 5G communication-primitives or the changing 5G-network topologies impact the security and privacy of 5G systems, or their analysis?

Current approaches to security-verification generally abstract away the networking aspects, using models that only consider application-layer attackers who hijack abstract connections.

In contrast, by leveraging techniques from logic-based analysis (i.e, parameterised model checking), AutoPaSS will develop models of adversaries which faithfully account not just for application threats, but also for varied communication settings, including the new, emerging ones in 5G.

This would deliver transformational methodologies for the tool-assisted analysis of security and privacy requirements in modern communication systems, notably in 5G, IoT and V2X (vehicle-to-vehicle + vehicle-to-infrastructure communication) systems, in which AutoPaSS has its industry-backed use-cases.


-- Finally, how can AutoPaSS implement the necessary security changes as soon as possible?

We formed strategic, multi-disciplinary partnerships. AutoPaSS unites GCHQ-recognised Surrey Centre for Cyber Security and Surrey's 5G Innovation Centre, and it is actively advised by senior academics in the UK and abroad, as well as two engineering giants, Thales and Vector GB. Our partners also provide and support our real-life use-cases in 5G, IoT and V2X. AutoPass will make recommendations to our advisors' affiliates and relevant standardisation bodies: 3GPP for 5G, LoraAlliance for IoT, and ISO groups for V

Planned Impact

Concerns around non-trivial privacy properties, which subsume anonymity, non-traceability of users/actions, un-linkability of users to their actions or "digital footprint", are frequent today, as personal-details in different shapes and contexts are used by a plethora of devices and applications.

AutoPaSS investigates, develops, and demonstrates new, transformational techniques and software-tools for the automatic, systematic and formal analysis of security and complex privacy requirements in ICT systems of arbitrarily-large size. To do this, it relies on applied, non-classical logics. AutoPaSS will be a game-changer in the landscape of automatic privacy-verification, in two ways: (a) by opening for robust analysis of "real-life", rich-expressions of privacy properties; (b) by doing this, in unbounded-size systems, in ways less restrictive than currently possible.

Moreover, the techniques intrinsic to AutoPaSS will open for transformational paradigms in threat-modelling for ICT systems. AutoPaSS will develop enhanced models of cyber-adversaries which faithfully account not just for the application-levels threats, but also the new and varied communication/network settings, e.g., reconfigurable networks as the upcoming 5G (5th generation networks) promises.

So, AutoPass will ultimately improve the dependability and privacy-preservation guarantees of rising and upcoming ICT. This will have direct benefit to the end users, resulting in better cyber-protection, as well as in increased confidence in the trustworthiness of these systems.

Of its broad applicability, we selected prominent ICT verticals for our use-cases: 5G, IoT (Internet-of-Things) and V2X (vehicle-to-vehicle + vehicle-to-infrastructure communication) systems. Thus, AutoPass analyses will contribute to faster and wider adoption of these emerging ICT, benefiting hardware manufacturers, service providers and many other businesses around these growing markets.

AutoPaSS ensures relevance and impact of technology through continuous engagement with industrial partners (Vector and Thales), spanning co-creation of use cases and exploitation. For instance, the verification-tool to be built in AutoPaSS will support technologies widely employed by Vector: the Communication Access Programming Language for V2X, and "AUTOSAR" - a standardisation initiative by leading automotive manufacturers and suppliers.

The avenues for industrial engagement is facilitated by our Advisory Board (AB), a stakeholders' consultation and dissemination workshop (which we will hold in Month 28), and our partners' networks. For instance, we will engage with: SAE's J30611 and ISO's working group 21432 - standardisation efforts addressing (automotive) cybersecurity; LoRa Alliance, -- owner of specifications for IoT; 3GPP - organisation standardising 5G. As such, planned outcomes of the project include the development of standardisation recommendations, to push the state of the art and the industry-standards in the areas of 5G, IoT and V2X.

For further commercial exploitation and technology-transfer, AutoPaSS will be active within the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) network, of which Surrey is a member.

We are also committed to public engagement. To this end, in Month 33, we will hold an outreach event to engage the public in AutoPaSS' findings. And, we will partake in public and corporate events devoted (among others) to cybersecurity, automotive technologies and smart networked things. Through Surrey's participation in the network of UK's Academic Centres of Excellence in Cyber Security Research and through our liaisons facilitated by the AB, AutoPass will deliver vertical impact to the 5G, V2X, IoT and cybersecurity sectors.

Academic impact will be delivered through targeting top-tier international journal and conferences in: cybersecurity (e.g., IEEE S&P), networks (e.g, IEEE IoT, INFOCOM), and distributed computing (e.g., DISC).
 
Description We have identified a new class of ICT homogeneous systems (i.e., where all parties of one type behave in the same manner) for which we can verify privacy properties. We will detail more as the project progresses.

We are bulidng tools for privacy verification. Some papers are under review
Exploitation Route I have already applied for further funding on related topics.

Others will use our papers and tools and (dis)prove security/privacy of systems. Equally they may apply for funding to build on what we did here.
Sectors Digital/Communication/Information Technologies (including Software),Electronics,Security and Diplomacy,Other

 
Description -- We contribute to improvement in LoRaWAN specifications. -- We have shown problems in 5G specifications and we are in talks with the right stakeholders about it.
First Year Of Impact 2021
Sector Digital/Communication/Information Technologies (including Software),Electronics,Other
Impact Types Economic

 
Description PrivAs -- Privacy Analyser Using Applied Logics
Amount £12,144 (GBP)
Funding ID SRF\R1\21000135 
Organisation The Royal Society 
Sector Charity/Non Profit
Country United Kingdom
Start 10/2021 
End 05/2022
 
Title Tamarin models of different 5G protocols 
Description These are used to formally verify the security of 5G protocols in different trust models. You can now find these here https://bit.ly/3w4qgQt 
Type Of Material Computer model/algorithm 
Year Produced 2021 
Provided To Others? No  
Impact It will become available to the wider public soon. 
URL https://fmsec.github.io/5gtechsec.github.io/
 
Title Tamarin models of the privacy of IoT LoRa protocols 
Description These models are used to formally verify the privacy of LoRa protocols 
Type Of Material Computer model/algorithm 
Year Produced 2021 
Provided To Others? No  
Impact These are discussed at the LoRa Alliance Technical Committe and Security Working Group meetings and will/may impact future specifications 
URL https://bit.ly/3w5MNN0
 
Title Tamarin models of the security of IoT LoRa protocols 
Description These models have been used for the formal analysis of security and privacy of LoRa protocols. 
Type Of Material Computer model/algorithm 
Year Produced 2020 
Provided To Others? Yes  
Impact These models have lead to improvement in the LoRa specifications. 
URL http://people.itcarlson.com/ioana
 
Title data collection; IoT (LoRaWAN) and 5G data 
Description we collected data to analyse w.r.t. privacy 
Type Of Material Database/Collection of data 
Year Produced 2021 
Provided To Others? No  
Impact not yet clear; needs to become available to others, which it will in 2022 as a paper is published; for now we have to keep it anonymysed. 
URL https://bit.ly/3I2gbFV
 
Description Partnership with Thales 
Organisation Thales Group
Department Thales UK Limited
Country United Kingdom 
Sector Private 
PI Contribution We are having meetings to align our research to a need they have and have a use-case linked to what they do.
Collaborator Contribution We are having meetings to align our research to a need they have and have a use-case linked to what they do.
Impact No outputs to disclose yet. I would need to double-check with Thales
Start Year 2019
 
Description Partnership with the LoRaAlliance 
Organisation LoRa Alliance
Country United States 
Sector Charity/Non Profit 
PI Contribution We work part of the LoRa Alliance Technical committee (TC) and Security Working Group (SWG) on the privacy and security of LoRa devices
Collaborator Contribution They discuss with us our findings in regular TC and SWG meetings and these findings are taken into account in their specs.
Impact one of the work-in-progress input in here (the one where the lead authors is Budykho K.) + the EuroS&P 2020 paper mentioned in the award has already been input into this collaboration
Start Year 2020
 
Description Royal Society International Exchange Award 
Organisation Chennai Mathematical Institute
Country India 
Sector Academic/University 
PI Contribution The work on AutoPaSS is somewhat related to a Royal-Society International Award I have had, since 2019, extended due to CV19. In this work, myself and the Co-I in IMSc Chennai we are working on theoretical aspects underpinning AutoPaSS.
Collaborator Contribution One of the work-in-progress outputs in here and another one not added in here yet, both linked to AutoPaSS, were influenced by this Royal-Society collaboration, hence my partner herein -- Prof Jam Ramanujam in IMSc.
Impact One of the work-in-progress outputs in here and another one not added in here yet, both linked to AutoPaSS, were influenced by this Royal-Society collaboration, hence my partner herein -- Prof Jam Ramanujam in IMSc.
Start Year 2019
 
Description Visiting position in Univ Clermont-Auvergne 
Organisation University of Clermont Auvergne
Country France 
Sector Academic/University 
PI Contribution The PI is a visiting academic there working on aspects related to the project.
Collaborator Contribution PI applied for this position and got it and we are working on these project together as well
Impact none yet, but to follow
Start Year 2020
 
Title 5G handovers emulator 
Description This is an emulator of 5G registration and 5G handovers to use for purposes of complexity-communication evaluations. 
Type Of Technology Software 
Year Produced 2021 
Open Source License? Yes  
Impact no impacts so far; it is has to be out there for longer. 
URL https://bit.ly/36biSbh
 
Title PHOBE -- a privacy analyser for cryptographic protocols 
Description This tool implements a new way of formally verifying the privacy of cryptographic protocols. 
Type Of Technology Software 
Year Produced 2021 
Open Source License? Yes  
Impact no clear impacts yet; we need to wait for it to be more used. 
URL https://bit.ly/3vVJUOr
 
Description Academic Visit to India 
Form Of Engagement Activity Participation in an open day or visit at my research institution
Part Of Official Scheme? No
Geographic Reach International
Primary Audience Other audiences
Results and Impact As part of the work in Deliverable 1, the PI made a visit to India to collaborate with Prof. Ramanujam from IMSc Chennai. This was not paid under AutoPaSS, but aligned to it. They are now working on a paper together.
Year(s) Of Engagement Activity 2019
 
Description Bi-weekly mtgs with the LoRa Alliance Technical Committee or Security Working group 
Form Of Engagement Activity A formal working group, expert panel or dialogue
Part Of Official Scheme? No
Geographic Reach International
Primary Audience Industry/Business
Results and Impact PI active member of the LoRa Alliance technical committee and security working group, on matters linked to the project
Year(s) Of Engagement Activity 2020,2021
 
Description New Formal Methods for Security Netwrok 
Form Of Engagement Activity A formal working group, expert panel or dialogue
Part Of Official Scheme? No
Geographic Reach International
Primary Audience Other audiences
Results and Impact PI set up a network in the UK and abroad on formal methods for security and she is running it. We meet monthly and discuss reasearch and ideas on this topic. We = academia + industry + researchers/enthousiasts of all sorts.
Year(s) Of Engagement Activity 2021
 
Description Project Meeting -- engagement with the Strategic Advisory Board 
Form Of Engagement Activity Participation in an activity, workshop or similar
Part Of Official Scheme? No
Geographic Reach International
Primary Audience Industry/Business
Results and Impact We organised a project meeting and invited the industrial partners (Vector and Thales), as well as some affiliates .
The academic advisors on the project ( from France, Germany, India) also took part.
My PhD students (2 -- not on this project) and 1 postdoc (on this project) also took part.
Year(s) Of Engagement Activity 2022
 
Description Strategic Advisory Board Meeting 
Form Of Engagement Activity Participation in an activity, workshop or similar
Part Of Official Scheme? No
Geographic Reach Local
Primary Audience Other audiences
Results and Impact This was the first mtg with industrial and academic advisors for AutoPaSS. PhD students of the PI, not funded by this, also took part.
Year(s) Of Engagement Activity 2019
 
Description Talk at the FM-SEC -- formal methods in security network 
Form Of Engagement Activity A talk or presentation
Part Of Official Scheme? No
Geographic Reach National
Primary Audience Professional Practitioners
Results and Impact I gave two talks in 2021 at the fm-sec network, which I also run
Year(s) Of Engagement Activity 2021
URL https://fmsec.github.io/fmsec