The Politics of Bioterrorism
Lead Research Organisation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
Department Name: Ctr for Study of Bios Biom Biot & Medici
Abstract
Abstracts are not currently available in GtR for all funded research. This is normally because the abstract was not required at the time of proposal submission, but may be because it included sensitive information such as personal details.
People |
ORCID iD |
| Filippa Lentzos (Principal Investigator / Fellow) |
Publications
Jefferson C
(2014)
Synthetic biology and biosecurity: challenging the "myths".
in Frontiers in public health
Lentzos F
(2011)
HARD TO PROVE The Verification Quandary of the Biological Weapons Convention
in The Nonproliferation Review
Lentzos F
(2012)
Synthetic biology, security and governance.
in BioSocieties
Lentzos F
(2014)
The risk of bioweapons use: Considering the evidence base
in BioSocieties
Lentzos F
(2014)
The Performativity of Constructed Uncertainty: Military Money and Secrecy in Biology
in Science as Culture
Lentzos, F
(2012)
Synthesis of viral genomes
Lentzos, F
(2014)
The myths (and realities) of synthetic bioweapons
in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
Lentzos, F
(2012)
The societal impact of synthetic biology
Lentzos, F
(2013)
Syria and bioweapons: The need for transparency
in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
Rappert, B
(2013)
Biosecurity and bio-terror: Reflections on a decade
| Description | This project focused on socio-political aspects of biosecurity. It developed an understanding of the particular way in which 'bioterrorism' has emerged and been framed in the Anglo-American context, emphasising the evidence drawn upon and the role played by different groups of individuals and institutions. The main objective of the fellowship was to provide a temporary pause from my regular contract research so that I could consolidate the large body of empirical material I had accumulated on the politics of bioterrorism through my links with the policy community, and to work through it systematically and theoretically. In addition to analysing my original depository of documents, the fellowship allowed me to collect further material through participant observation, interviews and documents that came out during the lifetime of the grant. I carried out one research trip to the United Nations in New York during the General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security meeting in October 2010 and six research trips to the United Nations in Geneva during the biannual meetings of the Biological Weapons Convention meetings (December 2013, August 2013, December 2012, December 2011, December 2010, August 2010). I also attended two meetings of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and its biological security sub-working group, specifically for data collection purposes (11 December 2013, at the Canadian Mission in Geneva; 22-23 October 2013 at Lancaster House, London). I conducted around 30 interviews with key policymakers and disarmament and non-proliferation experts; most of these were informal and off-the-record due to the sensitive nature of the research. Through my research, I found that the initial framing of bioterrorism, conceived and pushed by Washington as high consequence 'superterrorism', was spread in the first decade of the 21st Century to international security forums and back to capitals around the world. In the last few years, however, security concerns about bioterrorism have become increasingly linked with health concerns. Bioterrorism, or the deliberate spread of disease, is no longer thought of as a stand-alone threat, but has instead come to be understood as one element of a spectrum of disease outbreak threats that also encompass natural outbreaks, unintended consequences, accidental releases, negligence and sabotage. Framing bioterrorism as a 'catastrophic health event' has opened up alternate responses and intervention strategies, with their own 'path dependent' possibilities and consequences, to keep us secure from the threat of disease in the second decade of the 21st Century. The project paid particular attention to the links between bioterrorism and synthetic biology, as this field is often identified as the most susceptible area of the life sciences to bioterrorism. Synthetic biology's aim to make biology easier to engineer has raised concerns that it could 'deskill' biology and thereby increase the risk of misuse for bioterrorism. The project explored whether concerns about these misuse risks are realistic or exaggerated in the light of current scientific realities by bringing together two dozen synthetic biologists, policy experts, science journalists and social scientists in dialogue at King's College London on 28 February 2014. Analysing the workshop discussion, and drawing on complementary research from our respective projects, my workshop co-organisers - Dr Catherine Jefferson and Dr Claire Marris - and I found that the link between synthetic biology and heightened biosecurity threats is often exaggerated in the media and in policy arenas. In order to produce more refined assessments of the biosecurity threat, we need to understand more clearly what would be achieved by synthetic biology's goal to 'make biology easier to engineer', and to recognise the complex skills and equipment that would still be required to 'engineer' biology. |
| Exploitation Route | Dissemination of project findings to academics and others concerned with analysing political and security aspects of the life sciences was ensured through personal contact with peers, participation in specialised networks, contributions to subject-relevant meetings, and publication in peer-reviewed journals and edited collections. I also supervised three subject-relevant doctoral students during the fellowship and I secured a publishing contract with Imperial College Press to develop a textbook on "Synthetic biology & bioweapons" targeting undergraduate and postgraduate students of synthetic biology, who form the bulk of researchers in the emerging field. A substantive report from the "Synthetic biology and biosecurity" workshop was produced and launched online together with the KCL public relations office on 2 May 2014, and will be launched in hard copy at a panel debate jointly organised with the US National Academies of Sciences at the United Nations in August 2014. Dissemination of project findings to the biological disarmament and non-proliferation community was on-going for the duration of the project through sustained and informal contact with policymakers, diplomats, and technical experts from a broad range of institutions. Contributions were also made to relevant and appropriate forums such as the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs' study group on the Biological Weapons Convention, where I presented to its invitation-only meetings in December 2010, December 2011 and December 2012. I produced three targeted policy briefs for diplomatic missions to the United Nations (in October 2010, July 2012 and August 2013), and I gave statements to the 170 Biological Weapons Convention members in the NGO session of their biannual meetings (in August 2010, December 2010, December 2011, July 2012, December 2012, August 2013 and December 2013). I published policy-focused articles in outlets widely read by the biological disarmament and non-proliferation community, including in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Nonproliferation Review and Disarmament Times. I also contributed commentary and blog posts to web-based bulletin boards and discussions lists. A dedicated project website was developed, and the online presence of the project was extended through social media, particularly twitter (@FilippaLentzos). During the fellowship, I built up an active expert profile through consistent commentary on news and events related to biological disarmament and non-proliferation, and through interaction with others concerned with the intersection of political and security aspects of the life sciences. |
| Sectors | Security and Diplomacy |
| URL | http://www.filippalentzos.com/?page_id=60 |
| Description | The project was first and foremost about understanding the politics of bioterrorism, and as such is of broad benefit to policymakers, strategists and advisors dealing with contemporary biosecurity concerns. It focused particularly on the policies and policy networks developing around biosecurity, and a substantial part of the research involved direct interaction with policymakers and the non-academic community. User engagement was therefore at the heart of the project, and impact was built in right from the start. Policy engagement took place throughout the project, and government officials have explicitly and publicly commended the project. For example, the most recent policy brief for disarmament diplomats and experts, launched at a side event on the opening day of the week-long August 2013 meeting of the Biological Weapons Convention at the United Nations in Geneva, was referred back to a number of times by national delegations in the formal sessions, and some of the concepts that I introduced figured prominently in the official documentation from the meeting. One of Australia's presentations had a powerpoint slide dedicated to the policy brief, prompting the meeting Chair to allowed me an unprecedented NGO intervention in the formal session of the meeting to provide further details of the brief. The fellowhip led to close collaboration with the Foreign Office and resulted in a £40K one-year project, on which I am the PI. Funded through their Counter Proliferation Programme it aims to shape the way debates about confidence and compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention are framed going into the major Review Conference of the treaty in 2016. Beyond 2016, the project aims to continue contributing conceptually to framing and steering these particular discussions, as well as biological and non-proliferation discussions more generally. I have been invited to present my work at a number of 'high-impact' events in the field of biological disarmament and non-proliferation. Recent invitations to speak include a conference on compliance issues with the Biological Weapons Convention at Wilton Park, a panel discussion on 'Bioterrorism: The threat of dual-use technologies' at Chatham House, and the annual EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmamanet Conference in Brussels. |
| Sector | Security and Diplomacy |
| Impact Types | Policy & public services |