Fixed, Crystallising or diverging: Attitude formation and change in the run-up to Brexit

Attitudes towards immigration and the economy were considered to be major drivers of the vote choice in the EU Referendum, as were issues of sovereignty and 'taking back control'. Theresa May has announced that she intends to trigger Article 50 in March 2017, meaning that Britain will be expected to leave the European Union by the summer of 2019. The government has also expressed clear intention to keep faith with the electorate, and will want to ensure that the post-Brexit immigration system and economic strategy meet with public approval.

Yet voter preferences are going to be challenging to translate into policy. Public opinion is highly diverse: as well as varying across different sections of the public, some attitudes may be held more firmly than others and thus represent a real constraint on policy-making. Expectations and consequences are likely to shift as the negotiations proceed or as new information becomes available. Citizens may be willing to allow trade-offs, for example accepting a certain level of immigration as a cost worth paying in order to keep trading options open. On the other hand there may be 'red lines' which sections of the public will not be prepared to cross.

As well as looking at the public's preferences and expectations about outcomes, it is of considerable interest to look at the extent of knowledge about the actual situation. Attitudes towards immigration are largely contingent on perceived threat which in turn relies on perceptions of the number of immigrants. Yet public 'innumeracy' in estimating the number of immigrants has been consistently demonstrated. Knowledge is also likely to be of policy relevance since government might wish to make efforts to improve public understanding of some key issues.

Our research aim is to provide high quality evidence on the aspects of public opinion that policy-makers will want to understand. We focus on three main research objectives. Firstly, we will examine the detailed structure of public attitudes and opinion, including willingness to make trade-offs, the degree to which there is regional variation, and understanding the policy areas in which people will accept supranational governance. Secondly, we seek to understand the dynamics of change in attitudes and expectations. To what extent are individual opinions on Brexit-related matters 'set in stone'? We are interested in patterns of change, whether we find convergence over time or divergence and polarization between different segments of the population. We may find a crystallization of attitudes and identities over time, or a blurring of identity boundaries as the complexities of the negotiations become apparent. Thirdly, we seek to understand the drivers of changing attitudes, and the role played by individual factors (e.g. social class), social identities (e.g. Brexiteer), and contextual factors (e.g. macro-economic changes).

To address these research questions, we will conduct a new survey, in the form of an internet panel. Internet panels have the major advantage of being quick in terms of the data collection process, and we aim to do six rounds of data collection over the 18-month project period. Panel members will be approached every three months with an online questionnaire made up of a mix of new questions (in response to political and economic events) and old (allowing us to measure how attitudes of individuals have changed). Our panel will be refreshed with new respondents in each round in order to keep the sample size at the required levels (around 3,000 per wave).

We will publish short reports every quarter aimed at policy-makers. We also intend to run regular workshops with policy makers at regular intervals throughout the project so that we can have continual expert inputs about what policy makers need to know. We expect our results to be of great interest to policy makers, including bodies such as think tanks, as well as to the general public.

Policy makers will be the main beneficiaries of our proposed research. As Brexit negotiations unfold public opinion will be highly relevant to policy decisions and to the way in which policy decisions will be communicated. The evidence we will provide will enable policy makers to understand where the 'red lines' are that ought not be crossed if the post-Brexit deals on immigration and on the economy are to meet with public approval. Our investigation of the contextual drivers of opinion change (such as migration rates, economic growth) will allow policy makers at the national level, in the devolved administrations, as well as in local authorities, to understand how the local environment matters.

We also see the general public as a beneficiary as our evidence will facilitate post-Brexit policy that is more acceptable having taken into account local needs and the most keenly felt preferences. The general public will also benefit from our high quality but very accessible reports, which are in demand in this time of perceived political division and uncertainty about the future.

Policy institutions will also benefit from our proposed research. Think tanks including IPPR, Bright Blue and Policy Exchange will be interested in the evidence we produce and will be well placed to feed this evidence to policy makers. The larger ESRC project, UK in a Changing Europe, will also benefit from our detailed evidence on Brexit-related opinion that means they can provide a complete picture of required evidence on Brexit to those seeking information.

A final group that will benefit is the social scientific research community where internet panels are increasingly being used, but where there are still gaps in the knowledge of how reliable this method of data collection is.

In order to ensure that we maximise research impact we will take a number of steps:
- Firstly, we will use the existing policy networks of all three participating organisations (Centre for Social Investigation at Nuffield College (CSI), Kantar Public, and the Migration Observatory) to ensure that we open lines of communication about our research with those who are knowledgeable about requirements and influential in policy decisions.
- Secondly, we will run a series of three workshops with our policy stakeholders, with the first being early in the research process so that outputs can be used to maximise the efficacy of the first rounds of data collection. We plan to invite representatives from IPPR, Bright Blue, Policy Exchange, with whom we have ties, and a prominent figure at Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) who sits on the advisory board of CSI. Our contact at DCLG has provided names of interested parties at the Department for Exiting the European Union.
- Third, we will enable greater impact by targeting our research outputs at policy makers. We are experienced in writing short engaging briefing notes, written in non-technical language but without losing accuracy.
- Fourthly, we will make every effort to reach the general public by inviting press coverage and making use of blog posts and Twitter. Our project researcher at the Migration Observatory will collaborate on writing research outputs that will be of interest to the public and to the press.
- Fifth, we will have a dissemination event towards the end of the project to which we will invite policy makers, academics, and journalists. We will also plan an evening session for the general public to attend with engaging speakers. These events will be held at the British Academy, where the CSI team have had experience of running sell-out events in the recent past.
- Sixth, we will also write an academic article on the use of internet panels and plan to disseminate this aspect of our research at academic conferences.