Informal Taxation in Myanmar: Equity, Efficiency and Tax Morale.

Public revenue mobilisation in developing countries is hampered by a wide range of economic and administrative constraints, resulting in low fiscal yields and the under provision of essential public goods and services. Formal taxation, however, is only one of the instruments through which households finance public expenditure. In several countries across the world, communities have developed a number of institutions designed to finance development projects. Myanmar is a fascinating example, with non-state and religious organizations mobilizing development funds that significantly exceed tax revenues. In addition, non-state actors and local authorities engage in different forms of bargaining to secure complementary public funds. This is especially evident for road building, which is mostly community-led but thoroughly detailed within townships' records.
The functioning of these institutions, which has been largely unexplored, is both policy relevant and of research interest. First and foremost, understanding how communities achieve such high levels of revenue mobilisation without legal enforcement will inform the design of tax instruments and shed light on the behavioural determinants of tax compliance. Moreover, informal taxation and community-led development can be seen as a form of decentralisation that is often ignored when designing fiscal and expenditure assignments. From this perspective, it is worth investigating whether these mechanisms can be leveraged to collect revenues that will otherwise elude fiscal authorities, for example in the agricultural and informal sector, and ensure that public expenditure reflects communities' preferences. Answering these questions requires a rigorous analysis of the effectiveness and fairness of informal taxation, as well as community decision-making.