Exploring Metacognition in Typically Developing Children and Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder

ccording to one influential (but contested) theory, the ability to understand one's own thoughts and feelings (an ability known as "metacognition") depends on the same underlying psychological processes as the ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of other people (an ability known as "mindreading"). The proposed PhD research will test this theory with the aim not only of making a significant theoretical contribution to the field, but also a practical contribution via the study of a developmental disorder of mindreading, namely autism spectrum disorder (ASD).
It is well established that mindreading is diminished in ASD, yet only very recently have studies begun to investigate metacognition in this disorder, despite the potential importance of such research. If metacognition is diminished in ASD, then this might explain (at least, in part) why children with ASD under-achieve in education, relative to their level of intelligence. We know that metacognition plays a significant role in academic success over and above the role played by intelligence. Therefore, poor metacognition could contribute to educational under-achievement in ASD. If I find that metacognition is impaired in ASD, then this will pave the way to develop intervention techniques to improve metacognition and, thus, educational achievement in ASD. If metacognition is not impaired in ASD, then this will be just as important. It would tell us the "one-system" theory, which implies metacognition and mindreading rely on the same psychological processes, must be false (because mindreading is impaired in ASD). Also, it would suggest that strengths in metacognition should be tapped by teachers more frequently to maximise academic performance in children with this disorder. The project will also explore if individuals with ASD rely on the same mechanisms when performing metacognitive tasks as typically developing (TD) individuals. Previous research has shown that performance on metacognitive tasks for TD individuals can vary according to the information presented; if the performance of individuals with ASD is affected by the same changes in sources of information as TD individuals, then this would suggest they rely on the same mechanisms.