What is the point of dignity? A re-characterisation of dignity as the basis of (human) rights status

The possession of dignity explains the intuition that everyone should matter in and of themselves. Theoretically, the notion identifies a certain property and subsequently claims that everyone with this property has equal status. Human rights theory is notoriously quiet on the specifics of this (Donnelly, 2013). By presenting a re-characterisation of dignity, I hope to provide an understanding of the intrinsic worth of human and non-human life which is more consistent with our moral convictions and which can help ground theories of rights.

Overview
I present the following re-characterisation of dignity as applicable to both human and non-human animals.
Vital Dignity: The demand that one's vital ends be met. All organisms possess vitality, yet only some have it in a valued sense. The capacity to value is to hold an aim, however simple, and be adversely affected if it is not achieved.
Anthropic Dignity: The demand that one's autonomy be respected. Those with this capacity must be awarded the ability to choose, independent from the domination of others (Pettit, 2014: 46-52).

I explore the issue of non-human animal worth. Recent theory (e.g. Nussbuam (2004) and Reagan (1985)) persuades us that non-human animals have moral significance. Theories of dignity have been silent regarding non-human animals, which contributes to undermining the consistency these ideas achieve. This causes a disjunction in theorisation which either neglects the status of non-human animals or neglects to explain why we intuitively feel humans matter more. This problem is further highlighted where humans lacking certain capacities, such as the severely disabled or infants, are considered. I underline these issues a) to expose the theoretical instability of traditional forms of dignity and b) to later help solve them.

I use the work of Sangiovanni (2017) to identify 2 criteria for a notion of dignity: it must explain both 'the sense in which we are equal in dignity' and 'why and in virtue of what we have dignity' (2017, p.15). The range of current understandings of dignity fail to meet these. I stipulate a final requirement: the account must empirically ground dignity.

I explore the difference in capacities across human and non-human animals. I identify two important factors: the capacity for autonomy due to it delivering us 'independence' from others (Raz, 1986, p.369); and the capacity for empathy, which has particular importance with regards to understanding morality. Vital dignity gains justification from inclusion of the moral importance of empathy while anthropic dignity is justified against the salience of autonomy.

Finally, I reassess the ideas presented against the initial criteria and explore their application to our intuitions.

Positioning of the Research
I hope to produce a notion which can explain 1) in what way we are equal in dignity and 2) in virtue of what we possess dignity while 3) empirically grounding the notion.
Theorisation on human rights uses dignity to motivate human equality (Donnelly, 2013), which has considerable political consequences. Many theories of justice are based on the assumption of humans' fundamental worth, necessitating a well defended understanding of this worth.
If, however, humans are found to have a degree of equivalency in their status with certain other animals, then further pertinence might be awarded to the idea of animal rights within political theory. How would the political relationship humans have with other animals be characterised in such an environment and what state responsibilities would be generated?

Research design and methodology
I will use conceptual analysis of the notion of dignity and operate the conventional tools of reflective equilibrium in my method of research. By exploring the political consequences of my claims, I shall test them for coherence against moral intuitions and previously held premises in order to affirm their conclusions.