Understanding individual differences in trait perception and theory of mind

Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to represent the mental states of oneself and others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). It has long been proposed that neurotypical individuals possess a neural module dedicated to these representations, and that this module is missing or defective in the case of autism (Baron-Cohen, 2000; Frith, 1994). However, Theory of Mind deficits in autistic adults have proven difficult to demonstrate experimentally (e.g., Dziobek et al., 2006; Happé, 1995), calling into question the all-or-nothing modular approach. My project seeks to build a comprehensive theoretical model of mental state inference supported by empirical data. Building upon previous work, which has demonstrated a relationship between trait judgements and mental state inferences (Conway et al., 2020), I will conduct a series of experiments to elucidate the cognitive processes involved in making accurate trait judgements and translating them into mental state inferences. With this framework established, I will determine whether proposed Theory of Mind deficits do indeed exist in autism and, if so, which specific cognitive mechanisms underlie them. Similarly, I will explore social-cognitive difficulties in mental health conditions, such as depression, examining how Theory of Mind deficits may explain certain patterns of thinking and resultant symptomology.