Addressing Non-State Actor Proliferation of Chemical Weapons in a Rapidly Changing Global Security Context: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Independe

The international community has recently borne witness to an unprecedented nexus, of overwhelming support and innumerable contraventions, of the international norm against the use of chemical weapons. A stark observation has been the reported use and manufacture of traditional chemical weapons by non-state actors, once considered highly improbable. The defined scope of actors and contextual security risks of those involved in the use and proliferation of chemical weapons has expanded beyond what was envisioned when the Chemical Weapons Convention was adopted. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) intended to tackle the expanding scope of non-state actors under Resolution 1540. However, notwithstanding state efforts to implement both legal and enforcement measures, the non-proliferation regime continues to falter a step behind emerging risks. The identifiable gaps within the legal framework are paralleled by the political reality and restrictions of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), prompting the question of how the international community can act effectively to address the proliferation of chemical weapons by non-state actors.

This thesis will examine the normative and institutional framework that governs the chemical non-proliferation regime, specific to non-state actors. The limitations of existing legal instruments will be explored in view of the new challenges posed by emerging technological and scientific advancements. Providing a clear exposition of the non-proliferation regime governing chemical weapons will also require an examination of the institutions and initiatives that tackle proliferation outside the international legal order. This is central to my thesis, as I seek to substantiate the proposition that the ongoing issues of adaptability to new risks seen within the core regime are suitably overcome by initiatives and organisations that exist outside this system. I will explore comparatively, the role, efforts, and cooperation of multiple stakeholders when tackling scientific and technological advancements. This will be supported by an original qualitative data set, collated from elite interviews of several key actors, ranging from those within the top-line core organisations, to the private industry bodies at the forefront of scientific and technological advancements. This will also be assisted by empirical qualitative data sourced from communications between organisations such as those provided during the OPCW Conference of the States Parties. The data gathered will be used to support an exposition of best practices that can adapt to the rapidly changing global security context that subsumes non-state actors.

Essential to my thesis will be the inclusion of an interdisciplinary approach that combines legal doctrinal analysis alongside theoretical lenses seated in international relations. Pursuant to this approach, is the contextual examination of how in practice and policy can a multi-stakeholder forum contribute and function effectively to support the non-proliferation regime. A wide range of policy and practical non-proliferation efforts will be highlighted from 'soft and hard' legal instruments to industry codes of conduct, exploring whether they reinforce the regime. I will seek to substantiate the proposition that divergence from normative expectations within international law towards a greater focus on informal instruments has the potential to become best practice and policy when tackling, with pace, emerging proliferation risks.