Optimal Persuasion with Imitating Receivers

The European Commission has long established Geographical Indications (GIs) for agricultural commodities and foodstuff. This scheme aims to attribute distinctive marks to products of exceptional quality, whose unique characteristics are due to their place of origin. As the best expression of a healthy and nutritious diet, GIs should provide buyers with persuasive cues that ultimately affect their daily shopping. This would be true if consumers chose foods rationally to
maximise their chances of survival. However, since malnutrition is on the rise and consumers' awareness of EU quality labels remains low, I ask the following: are GIs truly valuable if buyers are not rational? If not, how can current policies be adapted to promote it? In this case, I consider a specific form of non-rationality: imitation. I choose this psychological phenomenon because of its importance in consumer research. Throughout, I use tools of theoretical economics to define
imitation and understand its impact on optimal persuasion theory.

This study is policy-relevant for i) increasing consumers' awareness of EU Quality Schemes and for ii) steering system-wide changes in front-of-pack labelling proposals. Such a contribution would come at
a critical time for promoting a transition to more sustainable food choices.