We consider a setting where a consumer would like to elicit independent but costly reports from third-party experts about the reliability of a number of service providers. These reports can be of variable accuracy, but more accurate reports will be more costly to produce. The consumer can fuse reports from several experts to choose the provider with the highest probability of success. The goal in this paper is to find a mechanism which incentivises the experts to truthfully reveal the accuracy o
Attributed to:
EUROCORES LogiCCC (collaboration led by Dr. Edith Elkind): Computational Foundations of Social Choice.
funded by
ESRC
Abstract
No abstract provided
Bibliographic Information
Type: Book Chapter
Book Title: Agent-mediated Electronic Commerce: Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets: AAMAS Workshop, AMEC 2009, Budapest, Hungary, May 12, 2009, and IJCAI Workshop, Tada 2009, Pasadena, CA, USA, July 13, 2009, Selected and Revised Papers (2010)
Page Reference: 29-43
ISBN: 9783642151163