Self-Legitimation by International Organizations

Recent crises in Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine, as well as the current refugee crisis in Europe have highlighted the difficulties national governments have in working collaboratively with international organizations (IOs). Governments and other policymakers often view IOs as inefficient and overly bureaucratic, and therefore engage with them only selectively and superficially (Malloch-Brown 2015, Gowan 2008). However, these interactions are partly unproductive because of a misunderstanding of the conflicting obligations IOs face, how they take decisions, and how they gain and maintain legitimacy in the international system (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, Zaum 2013, Allison & Zelikow 1999, Hanrieder 2010, Rittberger, Zangl, & Kruck 2012).

Indeed, across the social sciences, legitimacy is increasingly conceived of as sought-after and instrumental, as not only a static attribute but also a resource that actors seek and draw upon for strategic reasons. Within International Relations specifically, interest in how actors generate, maintain, and use legitimacy has grown in tandem with the rise of authority that exists beyond or in opposition to the state, among non-state actors, transnational movements, and IOs. However, to date most analyses of legitimacy and legitimation in International Relations focus on perceptions of the legitimacy of one actor by another (Coleman 2007, Hurd 1999). In so doing, they fail to account for self-legitimation, where an actor undertakes practices of legitimation not for external audiences, but internally, as a way of developing and reinforcing its identity (Barker 2001). Moreover, many understandings of legitimacy neglect the fact that identities are rarely uniform and instead are multiple and conflicting, and thus that legitimacy cannot be treated as a binary characteristic, but must instead be conceived of as variable, inconsistent, and contested.

This project addresses these two omissions by examining self-legitimation by IOs, and looking in particular at how self-legitimation affects IO behaviour for organizations with multiple institutional identities that may conflict. Indeed, many IOs are at once operational actors that participate actively in combat, peacekeeping, development, and global political and economic processes and normative actors that develop and promote international norms. These different identities sometimes dictate contradictory goals and practices, forcing the institutions to violate the principles and activities considered appropriate to one of their identities, thus complicating legitimation. Accordingly, IO self-legitimation often entails the use of discourse and symbolic acts to convey or 'package' actions a certain way in a bid to affirm a coherent institutional identity. However, this implies that IOs often 'say one thing and do another,' and these contradictory discursive and operational practices have negative implications for perceptions of legitimacy, both internal and external.

The project will undertake a comparative analysis of the self-legitimation practices of three IOs-the UN, the World Bank, and NATO. It will make a two-fold contribution, one theoretical and one practical. First, it will add to existing theories of IO behaviour and of legitimacy in International Relations, which focus primarily on external assessments of IO legitimacy and neglect the multiple and at times contradictory identities of IOs. Second, it will lead to a greater understanding among policymakers of how and why such bodies take certain decisions, how they interact with other actors in the international system, and how they can be effective actors in international affairs. While it is unlikely that the contradictions they face can be eliminated, a greater understanding of why these contradictory behaviours exist and how IOs seek to overcome them will enable more constructive and efficient cooperation, avoiding the inconsistency that has plagued recent interaction with IOs.

In addition to the academic beneficiaries outlined above, this research has important and timely dividends for two broad groups of non-academic users: staff of international organizations (IOs) and those who work with IOs, including governments and civil society. Indeed, the transnational nature of many recent crises relating to migration, terrorism, and conflict in places including Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine might suggest that IOs, with their inclusive or universal membership, are the perfect fora for addressing them; instead, these crises have laid bare the difficulties national governments and others have in interacting and cooperating with and through IOs. Because it addresses IO behaviour, this research will help in increasing understanding both within IOs and among their key interlocutors, thus facilitating their cooperation and communication.

First, because it touches upon the decision-making processes and practices of IOs, it is directly relevant to the staff of the three IOs selected as case studies - the UN, the World Bank, and NATO. The research will provide increased clarity about how the staff of these IOs make decisions in the face of contradictory operational and normative obligations in their work. It will map the self-legitimation practices they engage in aimed at balancing between these conflicting responsibilities and the importance of internal legitimacy in the execution of their duties.

Second, a better understanding of the perceptions IO staff have of their organizations and their work and of contradictions that they must overcome will in turn have a 'cascade effect' for those who interact with these bodies. As mentioned, national governments and NGOs often bemoan the bureaucracy and cumbersome procedures of IOs, claiming that they are ineffective partners. However, a better understanding of the conflicting obligations IOs face internally can help to explain what appears to be contradictory or inefficient behaviour and will enable policymakers to have more realistic expectations of IOs. This in turn will enable IOs and their interlocutors to communicate and collaborate in a more constructive way, thus forestalling the inefficiency and contention that often characterizes their relationships.

To ensure that my findings reach these two broad groups of users, I propose to both include them in the research design and planning stages and to share findings with them at the conclusion of the project with a view to generating policy recommendations. First, I have contacted individuals within the UN, the World Bank, NATO, and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to obtain their input into my research plans. Their insights into the structure and functioning of these IOs have helped to inform - though not determine - my research design, enabling me to identify the most appropriate cases, ask more nuanced questions, and deliver more nuanced findings. Second, I will hold a number of roundtables with the staff of the selected organizations to share both interim and final results with them. These workshops will also include staff from other key stakeholders, such as government officials from national delegations to the three IOs, civil society members from organizations that work with and lobby the IOs, and think tank staff or other analysts focused on IOs. The ultimate goal of these workshops will be to collaboratively draft policy recommendations that can then be more widely shared. I will also host a meeting with UK government officials from bodies that second staff to these organizations, including the FCO and the Department for International Development, again to share findings and enhance staff knowledge in advance of deployment or interaction. Finally, I will publish one policy article and several smaller briefs and blog entries aimed at policymakers. UN staff have already informally expressed interest in such workshops, and FCO staff have agreed to advise on the project.