Nietzsche on Honesty
Lead Research Organisation:
University of Warwick
Department Name: Philosophy
Abstract
Regarding research context, Nietzsche's conception of freedom is a central problem in Nietzsche
scholarship due to three interpretive issues. Firstly, Nietzsche rejects both free will and unfree will, which
means that traditional philosophical labels - such as "determinism" or "in/compatibilism" - are not easily
applicable. Secondly, despite rejecting free will, Nietzsche makes positive use of the concept throughout
his writings, and it is not clear why or in what sense. Thirdly, Nietzsche asks us to "banish" the concept of
free will from our minds, yet he also implies that we are incapable of changing anything about ourselves
through self-reflection. It is therefore unclear how or what sense free will is to be "banished". These are
the problems which I shall address in my research.
My research questions correspond to three gaps in the literature. Firstly, which activities cause freedom? I
will provide an original response to this question, arguing that, for Nietzsche, freedom can be motivated
by the positive illusion of free will. This argument has been only cursorily addressed in the secondary
literature. Secondly, what causes these activities? Here, I aim to resolve the problem of how we can
"banish" the concept of free will from our minds if we are incapable of changing anything about
ourselves through self-reflection. This problem has been raised in the literature but remains unresolved.
Thirdly, what are we to become free from? Here, I will argue that Nietzschean freedom means freedom
from other people and that it shares similarities with Oshana's (2008) theory of relational autonomy.
Answering these three questions will help to answer my central research question.
The potential impact of my research is threefold. Firstly, I will inform several key debates in
contemporary Nietzsche scholarship, especially debates framed by Leiter, Gemes, and Riccardi, because
Nietzsche's conception of freedom underpins many of his central ideas. Secondly, I will bring Nietzsche
into conversation with the contemporary literature on freedom, which is my main claim to research
originality. Additionally, relating Nietzsche to Oshana's theory of relational autonomy, which has been
central to contemporary developments in the sociological and feminist literature on freedom, gives my
research broader interdisciplinary relevance. Thirdly, freedom affects us all; and I will advance a
conception which, in rejecting free will, is arguably truer and hence more meaningful to our lives. My
research could therefore benefit the lives of many, in which respect there is great potential for wide
socio-cultural impact.
scholarship due to three interpretive issues. Firstly, Nietzsche rejects both free will and unfree will, which
means that traditional philosophical labels - such as "determinism" or "in/compatibilism" - are not easily
applicable. Secondly, despite rejecting free will, Nietzsche makes positive use of the concept throughout
his writings, and it is not clear why or in what sense. Thirdly, Nietzsche asks us to "banish" the concept of
free will from our minds, yet he also implies that we are incapable of changing anything about ourselves
through self-reflection. It is therefore unclear how or what sense free will is to be "banished". These are
the problems which I shall address in my research.
My research questions correspond to three gaps in the literature. Firstly, which activities cause freedom? I
will provide an original response to this question, arguing that, for Nietzsche, freedom can be motivated
by the positive illusion of free will. This argument has been only cursorily addressed in the secondary
literature. Secondly, what causes these activities? Here, I aim to resolve the problem of how we can
"banish" the concept of free will from our minds if we are incapable of changing anything about
ourselves through self-reflection. This problem has been raised in the literature but remains unresolved.
Thirdly, what are we to become free from? Here, I will argue that Nietzschean freedom means freedom
from other people and that it shares similarities with Oshana's (2008) theory of relational autonomy.
Answering these three questions will help to answer my central research question.
The potential impact of my research is threefold. Firstly, I will inform several key debates in
contemporary Nietzsche scholarship, especially debates framed by Leiter, Gemes, and Riccardi, because
Nietzsche's conception of freedom underpins many of his central ideas. Secondly, I will bring Nietzsche
into conversation with the contemporary literature on freedom, which is my main claim to research
originality. Additionally, relating Nietzsche to Oshana's theory of relational autonomy, which has been
central to contemporary developments in the sociological and feminist literature on freedom, gives my
research broader interdisciplinary relevance. Thirdly, freedom affects us all; and I will advance a
conception which, in rejecting free will, is arguably truer and hence more meaningful to our lives. My
research could therefore benefit the lives of many, in which respect there is great potential for wide
socio-cultural impact.
Organisations
People |
ORCID iD |
| Keith Ansell-Pearson (Primary Supervisor) | |
| Fraser Logan (Student) |