Analyticity and Truth-making
Lead Research Organisation:
University of Manchester
Department Name: Social Sciences
Abstract
My proposed research is about the relationship between analyticity and truth-making. My main claim is that both theories of analyticity and truthmakers adopt the notion of explanation which is shown in the comparison of the following two views:
(1) Some sentences are true just in virtue of their meaning.
(2) Some propositions are true in virtue of their truthmakers.
It is trivial that any true sentence or proposition is partly true in virtue of its meaning, since the truth value will be different if they do not mean what they mean. Analytic truths are those solely true in virtue of their meanings, while some other propositions are true in virtue of both their meanings and
truthmakers. Whether the 'in virtue of' expresses supervenience, dependence or determination is not my point. Rather, I take it as an intuitive idea that the meaning of an analytic sentence should explain why the sentence is true, while truthmakers play the same role to the propositions they make true. For example, in one characterisation of analyticity, the sentence 'all bachelors are unmarried men' is true because the meaning of 'unmarried man' is contained in the meaning of 'bachelor'; the proposition 'snow is white' is true because snow is red.
There are two general assumptions needed for this claim:
a) there are analytic truths and truthmakers and
b) theories of analyticity and truth-making can be understood in terms of explanation.
I argue that both assumptions are plausible. a) requires a defence of analyticity and the motivation for truthmakers. b) asks what exactly the role of the notion of explanation in both kinds of theory is. Meanwhile, I intend to discuss how analyticity affects the debate of truth-making principles and how considering the problem of explanation can help us deal with the problem of analytic truths.
(1) Some sentences are true just in virtue of their meaning.
(2) Some propositions are true in virtue of their truthmakers.
It is trivial that any true sentence or proposition is partly true in virtue of its meaning, since the truth value will be different if they do not mean what they mean. Analytic truths are those solely true in virtue of their meanings, while some other propositions are true in virtue of both their meanings and
truthmakers. Whether the 'in virtue of' expresses supervenience, dependence or determination is not my point. Rather, I take it as an intuitive idea that the meaning of an analytic sentence should explain why the sentence is true, while truthmakers play the same role to the propositions they make true. For example, in one characterisation of analyticity, the sentence 'all bachelors are unmarried men' is true because the meaning of 'unmarried man' is contained in the meaning of 'bachelor'; the proposition 'snow is white' is true because snow is red.
There are two general assumptions needed for this claim:
a) there are analytic truths and truthmakers and
b) theories of analyticity and truth-making can be understood in terms of explanation.
I argue that both assumptions are plausible. a) requires a defence of analyticity and the motivation for truthmakers. b) asks what exactly the role of the notion of explanation in both kinds of theory is. Meanwhile, I intend to discuss how analyticity affects the debate of truth-making principles and how considering the problem of explanation can help us deal with the problem of analytic truths.
Organisations
People |
ORCID iD |
| Fraser MacBride (Primary Supervisor) | |
| Danni Zhu (Student) |