Conceptualizing Individual Moral Obligation: A Case for Collectively Insignificant Outcomes
Lead Research Organisation:
University of Manchester
Department Name: Social Sciences
Abstract
In this thesis, I argue, contra Julia Nefsky, that the 'problem of collective harm' goes beyond a mistaken assumption to reveal a poor conceptualization of individual obligation to act in morally relevant ways, regardless of collectively
insignificant outcomes. I aim to establish among other things, why the overriding principle for collectively insignificant actions can best be motivated by individual moral obligation - hereafter 'IMO' - conceptualized as a 'non-collective
fundamental duty' necessary for the common good. There are various accounts of collective harm cases (Parfit 1984; Nefsky 2017, 2019, 2012a, 2012b; Kutz 2000; Cripps 2011), as well as collective and individual-obligation/responsibility cases (Held 1970; Collins and de Haan 2021; Collins 2017, 2020). Nefsky (2017: 2744) articulates an insightful case of collectively insignificant actions as 'the problem of collective harm' and the cases of collectively insignificant actions as "collective impact cases. According to Nefsky (2019: 1), 'collective harm' arises in cases where "when enough people act in a certain sort of way serious harm results, and yet no individual act of the relevant sort seems to itself make a difference." The issue in collective harm cases captures "the risk of our together bringing about avoidable harm" (Nefsky 2019: 10) by taking a morally harmful course of action or refusing to act in a morally relevant way because of the belief that collectively, our singular good acts will make no difference. This, in some way, absolves our singular harmful actions of moral responsibility as we have no 'morally relevant reason' to act otherwise. This view can also be referred to as the no-effect view (see Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). Nefsky thinks this way of thinking about the problem is mistaken. For Nefsky (2019: 10), our singular actions "[b]eing too small to change the outcome by itself does not mean being unable to make a non-superfluous move toward a different outcome." Consequently, Nefsky takes a position that affirms the relevance of singular acts in bringing about an outcome, even if it fails to make a difference collectively.
However, what is wrong with this way of thinking about collective harm cases? Is there a reason for acting in a morally relevant way as individuals, regardless of collectively insignificant outcomes? If yes, what is the best
justification for acting anyway? Is there anything wrong with consciously acting in a way that contributes to a morally harmful outcome? Also, if we do our part to contribute to collective harm, then what makes doing our part to
contribute to a collective solution morally insignificant? Most importantly and central to this research, what is the place of IMO in collective impact cases? Can IMO provide a better motivation or grounding for collectively
insignificant outcomes? This research will attempt to engage and provide defensible answers to these relevant questions.
insignificant outcomes. I aim to establish among other things, why the overriding principle for collectively insignificant actions can best be motivated by individual moral obligation - hereafter 'IMO' - conceptualized as a 'non-collective
fundamental duty' necessary for the common good. There are various accounts of collective harm cases (Parfit 1984; Nefsky 2017, 2019, 2012a, 2012b; Kutz 2000; Cripps 2011), as well as collective and individual-obligation/responsibility cases (Held 1970; Collins and de Haan 2021; Collins 2017, 2020). Nefsky (2017: 2744) articulates an insightful case of collectively insignificant actions as 'the problem of collective harm' and the cases of collectively insignificant actions as "collective impact cases. According to Nefsky (2019: 1), 'collective harm' arises in cases where "when enough people act in a certain sort of way serious harm results, and yet no individual act of the relevant sort seems to itself make a difference." The issue in collective harm cases captures "the risk of our together bringing about avoidable harm" (Nefsky 2019: 10) by taking a morally harmful course of action or refusing to act in a morally relevant way because of the belief that collectively, our singular good acts will make no difference. This, in some way, absolves our singular harmful actions of moral responsibility as we have no 'morally relevant reason' to act otherwise. This view can also be referred to as the no-effect view (see Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). Nefsky thinks this way of thinking about the problem is mistaken. For Nefsky (2019: 10), our singular actions "[b]eing too small to change the outcome by itself does not mean being unable to make a non-superfluous move toward a different outcome." Consequently, Nefsky takes a position that affirms the relevance of singular acts in bringing about an outcome, even if it fails to make a difference collectively.
However, what is wrong with this way of thinking about collective harm cases? Is there a reason for acting in a morally relevant way as individuals, regardless of collectively insignificant outcomes? If yes, what is the best
justification for acting anyway? Is there anything wrong with consciously acting in a way that contributes to a morally harmful outcome? Also, if we do our part to contribute to collective harm, then what makes doing our part to
contribute to a collective solution morally insignificant? Most importantly and central to this research, what is the place of IMO in collective impact cases? Can IMO provide a better motivation or grounding for collectively
insignificant outcomes? This research will attempt to engage and provide defensible answers to these relevant questions.
Organisations
People |
ORCID iD |
| Patrick Ben (Student) |