Britain and the European Community, 1 January 1973 - 5 June 1975: Policy, Party Politics and Public Opinion
Lead Research Organisation:
University of Cambridge
Department Name: Politics and International Studies
Abstract
Britain has been called an awkward, reluctant and even abusive European, an island on the side-lines of the European continent which is at best apathetic, but at worst hostile to the European Union (EU). The referendum on 23 June 2016, in which 51.9% of voters in the UK opted to leave the EU, seems to confirm that characterisation. My forthcoming book explores an earlier moment in the contentious history of Britain and Europe: the period from Britain's entry to what was then called the European Community (EC) on 1 January 1973 to the referendum on 5 June 1975. It is the first study of Britain's policies towards the Community, the party-political and domestic disputes following accession, and the public reaction to the arguments made in the referendum campaigns.
Despite the importance of this early period in UK-EC relations, there has been remarkably little scholarship on the subject. The literature tells us that Heath's government took Britain into the Community with high hopes. Entry to the EC, it was believed, would save the economy and define a clear postwar role for Britain. Yet 1973 was a turbulent year and despite the expectations surrounding membership, the government was disappointed with the results of accession. One year later Heath's successor, Harold Wilson, sought to renegotiate Britain's terms of membership, principally to quell divisions in his Cabinet, government and party. He broke with constitutional principles to suspend the collective responsibility of Cabinet in order for ministers to campaign ahead of the UK's first-ever national referendum. On 5 June 1975, 67% of British voters said 'yes' to Europe, on a turnout of 65%. The decision was described as an 'unequivocal' but 'unenthusiastic...vote for the status quo'.
This narrative raises important points for further enquiry. Given the difficulties experienced by successive British governments in securing membership, it seems unlikely that entry to the Community would have been a smooth process, only to be pushed off-course by challenging circumstances. The renegotiation was undoubtedly a political tactic used by Wilson to manage his party, but it can also be viewed as part of a long-term approach, pursued since the 1950s, whereby Britain tried to change the Community to suit its national interests. Finally, the argument that voters were 'unequivocal' suggests that the referendum overcame previous volatility in public opinion. Thus, my book asks two questions. What are the domestic and international factors that account for the policies towards the EC pursued by Heath and Wilson? And what explains the outcome of the referendum?
The central argument is that between January 1973 and June 1975, Britain's political elite attempted to transform their country's relationship with the Community from one characterised by uncertainty to a politically and publicly legitimised framework in which Britain could operate in the postwar world. For Heath, this was to be accomplished by delivering on the promises his government made about Britain's future in the EC. Over the course of 1973 this proved impossible due to the ways in which the government operated and, as a result, clashed with its Community partners. Given the division in his party, Heath's approach was not open to Wilson. Instead, he decided to hold a formal renegotiation and national referendum in order to end Labour's party-political debate and, by extension, legitimise membership. The campaigns asked voters to think about the Community in terms of everyday issues, like food prices, and bigger questions, such as Britain's sovereignty and postwar role in the world. This was an important national conversation, one which was influenced by the context of crisis in the 1970s and the long-term narrative of decline that had become integral to the British debate about European integration. In the end, voters may have said 'yes' to Europe, but they were left uncertain about whether they made the right choice.
Despite the importance of this early period in UK-EC relations, there has been remarkably little scholarship on the subject. The literature tells us that Heath's government took Britain into the Community with high hopes. Entry to the EC, it was believed, would save the economy and define a clear postwar role for Britain. Yet 1973 was a turbulent year and despite the expectations surrounding membership, the government was disappointed with the results of accession. One year later Heath's successor, Harold Wilson, sought to renegotiate Britain's terms of membership, principally to quell divisions in his Cabinet, government and party. He broke with constitutional principles to suspend the collective responsibility of Cabinet in order for ministers to campaign ahead of the UK's first-ever national referendum. On 5 June 1975, 67% of British voters said 'yes' to Europe, on a turnout of 65%. The decision was described as an 'unequivocal' but 'unenthusiastic...vote for the status quo'.
This narrative raises important points for further enquiry. Given the difficulties experienced by successive British governments in securing membership, it seems unlikely that entry to the Community would have been a smooth process, only to be pushed off-course by challenging circumstances. The renegotiation was undoubtedly a political tactic used by Wilson to manage his party, but it can also be viewed as part of a long-term approach, pursued since the 1950s, whereby Britain tried to change the Community to suit its national interests. Finally, the argument that voters were 'unequivocal' suggests that the referendum overcame previous volatility in public opinion. Thus, my book asks two questions. What are the domestic and international factors that account for the policies towards the EC pursued by Heath and Wilson? And what explains the outcome of the referendum?
The central argument is that between January 1973 and June 1975, Britain's political elite attempted to transform their country's relationship with the Community from one characterised by uncertainty to a politically and publicly legitimised framework in which Britain could operate in the postwar world. For Heath, this was to be accomplished by delivering on the promises his government made about Britain's future in the EC. Over the course of 1973 this proved impossible due to the ways in which the government operated and, as a result, clashed with its Community partners. Given the division in his party, Heath's approach was not open to Wilson. Instead, he decided to hold a formal renegotiation and national referendum in order to end Labour's party-political debate and, by extension, legitimise membership. The campaigns asked voters to think about the Community in terms of everyday issues, like food prices, and bigger questions, such as Britain's sovereignty and postwar role in the world. This was an important national conversation, one which was influenced by the context of crisis in the 1970s and the long-term narrative of decline that had become integral to the British debate about European integration. In the end, voters may have said 'yes' to Europe, but they were left uncertain about whether they made the right choice.
Organisations
People |
ORCID iD |
| Lindsay Aqui (Principal Investigator / Fellow) |
Publications
Aqui L
(2021)
'The Empire of England': Enoch Powell, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of the Nation
in Twentieth Century British History
AQUI L
(2020)
'No' Vote Contingency Planning for the UK's 1975 Referendum
in Journal of European Integration History
Aqui Lindsay
(2020)
The First Referendum: Reassessing Britain's Entry to Europe, 1973-75
| Description | The main outcome of my award was a book entitled The First Referendum: Reassessing Britain's Entry to Europe, 1973-75. The central argument is that between January 1973 and June 1975, Britain's political elite attempted to transform their country's relationship with the Community from one characterised by uncertainty to a politically and publicly legitimised framework in which Britain could operate in the postwar world. For Heath, this was to be accomplished by delivering on the promises his government made about Britain's future in the EC. Over the course of 1973 this proved impossible due to the ways in which the government operated and, as a result, clashed with its Community partners. Given the division in his party, Heath's approach was not open to Wilson. Instead, he decided to hold a formal renegotiation and national referendum in order to end Labour's party-political debate and, by extension, legitimise membership. The campaigns asked voters to think about the Community in terms of everyday issues, like food prices, and bigger questions, such as Britain's sovereignty and postwar role in the world. This was an important national conversation, one which was influenced by the context of crisis in the 1970s and the long-term narrative of decline that had become integral to the British debate about European integration. In the end, voters may have said 'yes' to Europe, but they were left uncertain about whether they made the right choice. |
| Exploitation Route | The findings of my research contribute to historical debates about the UK's relationship with the European Community which future scholars could engage with, and which have relevance to ongoing debates about the UK's relationship with the EUropean Union. |
| Sectors | Government Democracy and Justice Security and Diplomacy |
| Description | As previously reported, this project resulted in a seminar delivered to civil servants at the Department for Exiting the EU. |
| First Year Of Impact | 2019 |
| Sector | Government, Democracy and Justice |
| Impact Types | Policy & public services |