Rethinking reality's structure: An investigation of fundamentality and a defence of interdependence
Lead Research Organisation:
University of Nottingham
Department Name: Philosophy
Abstract
My thesis will critique metaphysical foundationalism, developing a coherentist alternative. Foundationalism is the view that the foundations of reality are the smallest possible objects: what is fundamental is what cannot be divided further. Foundationalism has dominated Western metaphysical enquiry. I will explore its cultural contingency, using insight from Indian philosophy to develop a novel account of fundamentality with far-reaching consequences for Western metaphysics.
Traditional Buddhist philosophy takes 'interdependence' to be fundamental, prioritizing relations over objects. Nagarjuna's argument for metaphysical emptiness develops such a picture, where reality is an integrated network within which fundamental parts cannot be separated. On the resulting model, either the integrated network as a whole must be fundamental (monism), or the integrated network is self-dependent, without the need for a fundamental level (coherentism).
My project involves developing an account of coherentist interdependence, drawing upon Western and Indian Philosophical traditions to locate and combine the most successful arguments for:
a. The existence of a metaphysical dependence relation. When we say (e.g.) that 'the whole depends upon its parts', we appear to invoke a kind of 'exists because of' relation-a metaphysical dependence relation. Developing work by Schaffer (2010), I'll argue that such a relation is essential to any successful model of the structure of reality.
b. The possibility of a two-way directional dependence relation. The conventional view is that dependence is asymmetric: if x depends upon y, y does not depend upon x. Recent work by Thompson(2018) undermines this claim, making space for a symmetrical relation of dependence. I will develop Thompson's work, showing not only that we have space for a two-way relation, but that we should posit one.
c. The absence of a fundamental level. I'll consider work by Bliss (2015) and Tallant (2017) that argues on pain of infinite regress, some entity must be fundamental. I'll explore resources from the Buddhist tradition to help circumvent arguments of this sort in order to defend a coherentist picture against its monistic rival.
My proposed thesis builds directly upon my MA dissertation on interdependent monism and coherentism(Distinction). I achieved firsts in undergraduate modules in Asian philosophy, Buddhist metaphysics and Metametaphysics. I will be a teaching affiliate on a module in Asian philosophy in Spring 2020.Nottingham's Philosophy department is an ideal base for this project. I will greatly benefit from Professor Tallant's expertise in dependence and fundamentality, as well as Dr Barker's interest in Indianmetaphysics.
Traditional Buddhist philosophy takes 'interdependence' to be fundamental, prioritizing relations over objects. Nagarjuna's argument for metaphysical emptiness develops such a picture, where reality is an integrated network within which fundamental parts cannot be separated. On the resulting model, either the integrated network as a whole must be fundamental (monism), or the integrated network is self-dependent, without the need for a fundamental level (coherentism).
My project involves developing an account of coherentist interdependence, drawing upon Western and Indian Philosophical traditions to locate and combine the most successful arguments for:
a. The existence of a metaphysical dependence relation. When we say (e.g.) that 'the whole depends upon its parts', we appear to invoke a kind of 'exists because of' relation-a metaphysical dependence relation. Developing work by Schaffer (2010), I'll argue that such a relation is essential to any successful model of the structure of reality.
b. The possibility of a two-way directional dependence relation. The conventional view is that dependence is asymmetric: if x depends upon y, y does not depend upon x. Recent work by Thompson(2018) undermines this claim, making space for a symmetrical relation of dependence. I will develop Thompson's work, showing not only that we have space for a two-way relation, but that we should posit one.
c. The absence of a fundamental level. I'll consider work by Bliss (2015) and Tallant (2017) that argues on pain of infinite regress, some entity must be fundamental. I'll explore resources from the Buddhist tradition to help circumvent arguments of this sort in order to defend a coherentist picture against its monistic rival.
My proposed thesis builds directly upon my MA dissertation on interdependent monism and coherentism(Distinction). I achieved firsts in undergraduate modules in Asian philosophy, Buddhist metaphysics and Metametaphysics. I will be a teaching affiliate on a module in Asian philosophy in Spring 2020.Nottingham's Philosophy department is an ideal base for this project. I will greatly benefit from Professor Tallant's expertise in dependence and fundamentality, as well as Dr Barker's interest in Indianmetaphysics.
