Illicit Drug Economies, Governance and Security-Development in the Global South: a Case Study of State-Narco Networks in Post-Transition Bolivia

Conventional policy and academic discourse holds illicit drug economies in the Global South as necessarily violent, and both a cause and consequence of weak institutions, stunted development and general instability. This thinking has been evident in the repressive counterdrug measures that have dominated the international response to the drug trade in developing nations. These broad assumptions, though, fail to account for the complex ways in which drug economies become intertwined with local social, political and economic structures. The nature of these relationships has wide implications, determining, for example: whether or not the drug trade is associated with high-levels of violence; the local political (dis)order and the function of state institutions; and the effects of the drug trade on economic growth and development indicators. In many cases, the failure to grasp these underlying dynamics has led to damaging unintended policy consequences. From both a policy and development perspective, then, a more contextualised analysis is needed to improve understanding of the interplay between illicit economies, governance and the security-development nexus in the Global South. My research adopts such an approach; moving beyond the mainstream orthodoxy to examine a crucial historical case, which continues to hold great contemporary relevance: post-transition Bolivia (1982-1993).

This approach reveals the influence of state-narco networks across different spheres of Bolivian life. These effects confound the typical expectations of the mainstream discourse on drugs. First, local trafficking organisations were absorbed into existing political structures, which acted to manage and mediate the violent excesses of the coca-cocaine economy. While its Andean neighbours descended into various forms of drug-related violence, Bolivia's illicit trade thus remained relatively peaceful. Second, tacit-acceptance of drug links running through the military and police was bound to the maintenance of fragile political equilibrium. As Bolivia made its long-promised transition from authoritarian government, toleration of such practices ensured the continued support of these major political actors for democratisation. In this sense, the illicit economy was interwoven with Bolivia's uneven democratic governance. Third, the booming drug trade helped to stabilise the national economy during crisis and harsh structural reforms. The coca-cocaine economy acted as a social safety net, providing employment and inward investment, while also bolstering the banking system. For many Bolivian farmers, coca-cocaine offered the most viable route out of poverty. Taken together, these factors created ambivalence toward the illicit economy and resistance to the escalation of 'destabilising' US counterdrug efforts.

These research findings raise important questions around security, institution building and development in the context of illicit economies. Such issues remain salient within Bolivia. The country continues to be a major producer of coca-cocaine and, increasingly, a transit point for the international cocaine trade. Many rural communities are still reliant on the illicit economy for their income; organised crime and corruption inhibit the function of democratic institutions and the rule of law, with sporadic outbreaks of drug violence in the east of the country. Looking beyond Bolivia, similar (often, more severe) problems are encountered elsewhere around the globe, from the heightened violence of the Mexican Cartels to the opium fuelled conflict of Afghanistan. My own research speaks to these cases, providing strong insights into the development challenges posed by illicit economies. Analysis of these processes is crucial to the formulation of better policy responses; decoupling the drug trade from these countries while avoiding widespread violence, institutional decay and damage to precarious livelihoods.