Care Robots in Residential Homes for the Elderly: An ethical examination of deception, care and consent
Lead Research Organisation:
University of Nottingham
Department Name: Philosophy
Abstract
We are on the brink of a robotic revolution: futurologist Dr Ian Pearson predicts that by 2050 people will have more sex with lifelike robots than with other people (Telegraph 29.9.15). Robots are set to infiltrate our workplaces, homes, and beds over the next decade or two; the impact of such a revolution cannot be overestimated.
In 1859 J.S. Mill put forward his harm principle, stating that the only reason a State can intervene in the actions of citizens is to prevent harm to others. My PhD will be a critique of Mill's harm principle in light of some poignant ethical questions arising from the creation of lifelike robots.
I will examine ethical questions surrounding sexbots made to resemble particular people, sexbots for the elderly, robot nannies, and violence against robots. I will reject recent definitions of harm (Stewart 2010, Turner 2014), and advance my own, broader definition of what harm should encompass with regard to the rise of robots in our lives. Crucially, I argue that Mill's harm principle should expand to include psychological harm which can arise from these four scenarios, and we must be mindful that permitting violence towards robots could lead to the harm of people.
This project builds on my MA dissertation, in which I argue that it is wrong to create a sexbot to resemble a particular person, even if there are no harmful consequences, because doing so amounts to objectification (Nussbaum 1995, Gutiu 2012, Richardson 2016). My MA modules in Ethics, Value Theory and Political Philosophy provide an excellent grounding in the social, political, legal and ethical minefield I intend to explore, and I am set to achieve a Distinction overall.
I've taught A-Level Philosophy / Sociology for 14 years, during which time I've been an examiner and published three academic works. This wealth of experience has developed transferable skills such as dedication, working to deadlines, research, and familiarity with philosophical arguments and concepts.
In 1859 J.S. Mill put forward his harm principle, stating that the only reason a State can intervene in the actions of citizens is to prevent harm to others. My PhD will be a critique of Mill's harm principle in light of some poignant ethical questions arising from the creation of lifelike robots.
I will examine ethical questions surrounding sexbots made to resemble particular people, sexbots for the elderly, robot nannies, and violence against robots. I will reject recent definitions of harm (Stewart 2010, Turner 2014), and advance my own, broader definition of what harm should encompass with regard to the rise of robots in our lives. Crucially, I argue that Mill's harm principle should expand to include psychological harm which can arise from these four scenarios, and we must be mindful that permitting violence towards robots could lead to the harm of people.
This project builds on my MA dissertation, in which I argue that it is wrong to create a sexbot to resemble a particular person, even if there are no harmful consequences, because doing so amounts to objectification (Nussbaum 1995, Gutiu 2012, Richardson 2016). My MA modules in Ethics, Value Theory and Political Philosophy provide an excellent grounding in the social, political, legal and ethical minefield I intend to explore, and I am set to achieve a Distinction overall.
I've taught A-Level Philosophy / Sociology for 14 years, during which time I've been an examiner and published three academic works. This wealth of experience has developed transferable skills such as dedication, working to deadlines, research, and familiarity with philosophical arguments and concepts.
Organisations
People |
ORCID iD |
| Zachary Hoskins (Primary Supervisor) | |
| Karen Lancaster (Student) |