Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind
Lead Research Organisation:
University of Oxford
Department Name: Philosophy
Abstract
The project will investigate four, linked topics in Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind. The immediate aim is to increase our understanding of some important areas of Wittgenstein's philosophy and to use his work to make progress on questions of current interest in the philosophy of mind. A subsidiary aim is to challenge the view that Wittgenstein's work is completely opposed to contemporary philosophy of mind (a view which is shared by many admirers of Wittgenstein and by his detractors). The areas for research are as follows:
1. 'Remembering Intentions'.
We normally know what we believe, desire, mean and intend. And we know it immediately (without inference) and authoritatively. Philosophical accounts of self-knowledge have generally focused entirely on our knowledge of our present mental states. But Wittgenstein observes that we often have a similarly immediate and authoritative knowledge of our past mental states. We can often directly remember what we believed or intended at some past time - even in cases where we never acted on that belief or intention: as, for example, when I remember what I was going to say when I was interrupted; or when I remember that, for a moment, I was going to deceive you, but then thought better of it. I shall discuss Wittgenstein's account of what is involved in remembering one's past mental states and defend a broadly Wittgensteinian account as a contribution to the contemporary philosophical debate.
2. 'Expression, Criteria, and the Methodology of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind'.
Wittgenstein emphasizes that the ascription and self-ascription of sensations and mental states is built on a foundation of natural, prelinguistic expressions of sensations and attitudes. And he seems to give a central role to the idea that the meanings of words for mental states must be explained by reference to the behavioural criteria on the basis of which we ascribe such states to others. These ideas persistently prompt the charge that Wittgenstein is really a behaviourist, and that his view of the meanings of mental words is thoroughly implausible. That in turn leads many contemporary philosophers to conclude that his views are outdated and have little to contribute. Supporters of Wittgenstein regard these criticisms as mistaken: but they rarely respond properly to the substance of the complaints. I shall argue that Wittgenstein's actual views about 'behavioural criteria' differ from the views defended by 'Wittgensteinians' and attacked by critics; and, I shall argue, that interpretation is supported by a proper account of Wittgenstein's appeal to natural prelinguistic expression.
3. The Tractatus and the private language argument.
Wittgenstein famously argues, in Philosophical Investigations, that there could not be a purely private sensation language, a language whose words got their meanings by standing for 'immediate, private sensations'. How far back can we trace the 'private language argument' in Wittgenstein's philosophy? It has recently been claimed that key elements of the argument are already implicit in Wittgenstein's early book, the Tractatus. I shall argue against that claim: partly on internal grounds; and partly by comparing the Tractatus with the discussions of sensation language in Wittgenstein's immediate post-Tractatus writings.
4. Wittgenstein's response to William James and Wolfgang Köhler.
Many of Wittgenstein's discussions of mental phenomena start with reaction to claims made by psychologists - notably in the writings of James and Köhler. The literature on Wittgenstein makes occasional references to those writings. But it rarely sets out James's and Köhler's views in their own right or develops the overall contrast between their views and Wittgenstein's. I shall offer a study of Wittgenstein's relation to James and Köhler, designed to promote a better, historically-informed understanding of the context and development of Wittgenstein's views.
1. 'Remembering Intentions'.
We normally know what we believe, desire, mean and intend. And we know it immediately (without inference) and authoritatively. Philosophical accounts of self-knowledge have generally focused entirely on our knowledge of our present mental states. But Wittgenstein observes that we often have a similarly immediate and authoritative knowledge of our past mental states. We can often directly remember what we believed or intended at some past time - even in cases where we never acted on that belief or intention: as, for example, when I remember what I was going to say when I was interrupted; or when I remember that, for a moment, I was going to deceive you, but then thought better of it. I shall discuss Wittgenstein's account of what is involved in remembering one's past mental states and defend a broadly Wittgensteinian account as a contribution to the contemporary philosophical debate.
2. 'Expression, Criteria, and the Methodology of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind'.
Wittgenstein emphasizes that the ascription and self-ascription of sensations and mental states is built on a foundation of natural, prelinguistic expressions of sensations and attitudes. And he seems to give a central role to the idea that the meanings of words for mental states must be explained by reference to the behavioural criteria on the basis of which we ascribe such states to others. These ideas persistently prompt the charge that Wittgenstein is really a behaviourist, and that his view of the meanings of mental words is thoroughly implausible. That in turn leads many contemporary philosophers to conclude that his views are outdated and have little to contribute. Supporters of Wittgenstein regard these criticisms as mistaken: but they rarely respond properly to the substance of the complaints. I shall argue that Wittgenstein's actual views about 'behavioural criteria' differ from the views defended by 'Wittgensteinians' and attacked by critics; and, I shall argue, that interpretation is supported by a proper account of Wittgenstein's appeal to natural prelinguistic expression.
3. The Tractatus and the private language argument.
Wittgenstein famously argues, in Philosophical Investigations, that there could not be a purely private sensation language, a language whose words got their meanings by standing for 'immediate, private sensations'. How far back can we trace the 'private language argument' in Wittgenstein's philosophy? It has recently been claimed that key elements of the argument are already implicit in Wittgenstein's early book, the Tractatus. I shall argue against that claim: partly on internal grounds; and partly by comparing the Tractatus with the discussions of sensation language in Wittgenstein's immediate post-Tractatus writings.
4. Wittgenstein's response to William James and Wolfgang Köhler.
Many of Wittgenstein's discussions of mental phenomena start with reaction to claims made by psychologists - notably in the writings of James and Köhler. The literature on Wittgenstein makes occasional references to those writings. But it rarely sets out James's and Köhler's views in their own right or develops the overall contrast between their views and Wittgenstein's. I shall offer a study of Wittgenstein's relation to James and Köhler, designed to promote a better, historically-informed understanding of the context and development of Wittgenstein's views.
Organisations
People |
ORCID iD |
| Timothy Child (Principal Investigator) |
Publications
Child W
(2013)
Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation
Child W
(2010)
Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy
Child, W
(2011)
Wittgenstein
| Description | The project addresses a linked series of questions concerning Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind: 1. How should we understand a subject's immediate and authoritative knowledge of her past intentions, beliefs, desires, meanings? What can we learn from Wittgenstein's discussion of such knowledge? In work reported in one of the publications from this project ('Remembering Intentions' in Ahmed (ed) *Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide*, it is argued (against some influential interpretations) that Wittgenstein's treatment of past-tense self-knowledge is consistent with the common-sense, realist thought that, when I judge that I meant so-and-so, or intended such-and-such, my judgement is true in virtue of facts about how I was at the time. 2. It has recently been claimed (by Cora Diamond) that Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* contains an early 'private language argument': an argument that private objects in other people's minds can play no role in the language I use for talking about their sensations. Diamond further claims that the Tractatus contains an early version of the later idea that an inner process stands in need of outward criteria. These claims are rejected. In a second publication from this project ('Does the Tractatus Contain a Private Language Argument?' in Sullivan and Potter (eds) *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation*) it is argued that, to find a private language argument in the Tractatus, we would have to read Tractarian doctrines about naming and use in ways that are appropriate to Wittgenstein's later work but which are absent from his early work. Furthermore, Diamond's claims make it hard to offer a convincing account of the development of Wittgenstein's view of sensations and sensation language. 3. Wittgenstein suggests that we can make perfectly good sense of ascriptions of thoughts and sensations that we have no means of verifying: thoughts and feelings that only are not but could not be manifested in behaviour. But such ascriptions, he thinks, make sense only against a background of cases where we can tell what people are thinking and feeling. A third output from the project ('Verificationism and Wittgenstein's View of Mind', in P. Frascolla, D. Marconi & A. Voltolini (eds) *Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy*) discusses how, exactly, Wittgenstein thinks that the intelligibility of cases in which someone will not or cannot manifest her thoughts depends on the existence of cases where thoughts are expressed. And it considers how convincing a case Wittgenstein makes for his view. 4. How should we understand Wittgenstein's responses to empirical psychologists with whose writings he directly engaged: in particular, William James and Wolfgang Köhler? A fourth output (ch 5 sec 2 of my monograph *Wittgenstein*) offers an account of Wittgenstein's critique of James's view of conscious experience - in particular, of James's account of 'feelings of tendency' and 'feelings of relation'. And it discusses Wittgenstein's critique of Köhler and Gestalt Psychology - with particular reference to the phenomenon of seeing an aspect. In each case, it is shown how Wittgenstein's critiques stem from, and illustrate, major strands in his approach to mind and psychology. A broader achievement of the project is to bridge the gap between Wittgenstein scholarship and contemporary philosophy of mind. Wittgenstein's writings on philosophy of mind are a fertile source of acutely-observed insights and suggestive thought-experiments. And many of his ideas point in interesting directions - though they are often not fully developed. But these writings are not as much studied by philosophers in general as they deserve to be - largely because of a perception that his work is completely opposed to contemporary philosophy of mind. The project aims to counter this sharp divide: partly by using material from Wittgenstein in a way that contributes productively to debates about self-knowledge and memory that are of live interest in philosophy of mind; and partly by challenging a conception of Wittgenstein's methodology that is widely shared by critics and defenders of Wittgenstein, and demonstrating that there is much in modern philosophy of mind with which Wittgenstein's own approach is entirely compatible. |
| Exploitation Route | The findings from this research project relate partly to the philosophy of Wittgenstein, and partly to topics in the philosophy of mind in their own right. I expect these findings to be discussed and reacted to in the literature in the relevant parts of academic philosophy over the coming years - in ways that will contribute to our understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy, and to our understanding of important issues in philosophy of mind, respectively. • Wittgenstein's work is a focus of interest in a wide variety of academic disciplines beyond philosophy (including e.g. Law, Theology, Anthropology, Sociology, and Literary Theory). I would therefore anticipate that my findings about Wittgenstein's work - some of which are presented in books intended to attract a readership beyond academic philosophy - will reach academics in other disciplines and will stimulate their work in various ways. Of course, it is not easy to anticipate in advance the kinds of use they will make of it. • Wittgenstein's work also attracts enduring interest from a general public that extends far beyond academics and those who have studied philosophy at university. And his views about sensations and subjectivity in particular have attracted much attention: the discussion of sensations and private language in Philosophical Investigations is among the most familiar of his writings. So some of the findings from this research project (particularly those associated with item 4 in the Key Findings above - which appear in a book that is explicitly intended for, and marketed to, a general readership) will reach a wider audience, who will respond to them in various ways appropriate to their interests and activities. |
| Sectors | Education,Other |
| URL | http://oxford.academia.edu/WilliamChild |
| Description | My book, *Wittgenstein* (London, Routledge: 2011) is written for a general audience. It is used by teachers outside Higher Education (including people teaching Philosophy of Religion in further education). That is one route by which my findings have had an impact on that audience. Further specific uses of this research beyond academia will take time to happen. Wittgenstein's views in the philosophy of mind attract a lot of attention from a wide audience, including people working in Cultural Studies, Anthropology, Law, Sociology, Politics and Psychiatry, amongst other subjects. The contribution of my work in shaping our understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind will over time have an impact wherever Wittgenstein's views are discussed and employed - in these fields and more widely. |
| First Year Of Impact | 2011 |
| Sector | Education |