On the Genealogy of Universals: A case Study 1899-1925

The concepts of particular and universal have become so familiar that their significance has become difficult to discern: like coins that have been passed back and forth too many times, worn smooth by grasping hands and fingers so their values can no longer be read. The introduction of these concepts is owed to the Ancient Greeks, who distinguished the many just acts (particulars) from justice itself (the 'one-over-many', the universal). Whilst there are family connections-our concepts are the descendants of theirs-the use they made of them differs from our own. But even during recent history the concepts of particular and universal have undergone substantial transformations.
On the Genealogy of Universals seeks to overcome our sense of over-familiarity with these concepts by developing a case study of their evolution during the period 1899 to 1925, a study that shows how the concepts of particular and universal were initially countenanced, transfigured and subsequently given up by the early analytic philosophers. Once it is recognised that their employment of these concepts arose out of the specific theoretical situation in which they found themselves-as opposed to being an atemporal, context independent given-we can raise the question whether the concepts of particular and universal serve the needs of analytic metaphysics now.
Why a study of this exact period? It is one of profound philosophico-historical significance, a period bounded at one end by the birthdate of analytic metaphysics itself, the year in which Moore's "The Nature of Judgement" and Russell's The Philosophy of Leibniz were published. It is a remarkable fact about these works that despite their realism and identification of "sound philosophy" with "the analysis of concepts", the particular-universal distinction, part of the ABC of contemporary analytic metaphysics, is absent from them. It is also this period that is bounded at the other end by Ramsey's "Universals", a beguiling work in which Ramsey came to the conclusion that there was no particular-universal distinction, the theory of universals being merely "a great muddle". But between these dates the concepts of particular and universal enjoyed another heyday, perhaps in this respect upon a level with Ancient Greece, press-ganged by Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein to provide, roughly speaking, the organs and connecting tissues of propositions (understood as unified metaphysical bodies); and because of this perceived link between them, the concepts of particular and universal transformed as our heroes' conceptions of propositions and truth advanced ventre à terre.
On the Genealogy of Universals aims to liberate our thinking about particulars and universals by providing a historical reconstruction of the debate about universals that blazed during this period of intense philosophical activity. Doing so requires us not only to pay heed to the famous writings of Russell, Wittgenstein and Ramsey but also to the intriguing works of a number of metaphysically minded philosophers whose contributions, received as important at the time, have subsequently been neglected: Stout, Johnson, Moore, McTaggart and Whitehead. It is especially glaring that Whitehead's contribution is left unsung. For Whitehead, the particular-universal distinction was just a piece of Weltanschauung, a fragment of a Newtonian mindset that prevents our developing a metaphysics of science adequate to the diversity nature exhibits, instead of seeking to straitjacket what exists into a too simple-minded division between particulars and universals. Once we have understood the contributions made by these different interlocutors we are better placed to understand the rise and fall of the particular-universal distinction, and better equipped to understand the great works of our early analytic heroes, and determine whether these concepts we have inherited are still of use to us.

I do not envisage that the research I propose to conduct will impact directly upon users and beneficiaries outside the academic research community. Nonetheless I do envisage that the work I undertake, alongside the works of other contemporary philosophers, will impact indirectly upon the wider community. In his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, David Hume, the great enlightenment philosopher, wrote, "though a philosopher may live remote from business, the genius of philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and calling.' (Sect. 1, 5). What Hume said in the eighteenth century is no less true in the twenty-first. Theoretical philosophy impacts upon science and mathematics, practical philosophy upon politics and applied ethics, and thence upon society more generally. But one should not loose sight of the fact, that individuals outside academia also often benefit more immediately from the sheer intellectual delight of engaging with the ideas of philosophers and thereby satisfying their native desire to understand. In this way, philosophy contributes to the intellectual well-being of society.