Digital Knowledge: A New Framework for Digital Epistemic Virtues
Lead Research Organisation:
University of Glasgow
Department Name: School of Humanities
Abstract
We are increasingly in the grips of an information epidemic, which the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic - and the spread of health misinformation online along with rising distrust of experts - has only served to highlight with tragic emphasis. Our project takes as a starting point that addressing the infodemic requires serious engagement not only with its symptoms but also with its fundamental causes - which fall within the remit of social epistemology, which studies how knowledge is shared, and how individuals can become more responsible consumers of information. Those who share fake news online often present themselves as trustworthy and well-informed, in a way that might easily deceive not only dedicated conspiracy theorists, but also those unskilled at distinguishing reliable from unreliable sources. The problem is amplified even further by what science has shown about the spread rate of online misinformation. For example, a 2018 study of Twitter retweets showed that false rumours circulated significantly 'farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information'. Most academic research and policy initiatives have focused on treating symptoms of this infodemic rather than the causes. One prominent political strategy aimed at combatting the spread of disinformation has taken the form of deleting content (Facebook) and censoring posters who violate social media terms of policy (Twitter). Such strategies have important shortcomings, as there is evidence that simply hiding content or banning users in cases where the media consumer is not privileged to the rationale for doing so can itself exacerbate conspiratorial thinking patterns, thus, furthering the problem. Even more, content removal policies effectively only sanction violations of existing norms online; such policies neither identify the source of the problem, nor clearly outline positive norms.
The project team will use the latest tools of social epistemology and virtue epistemology (the area of philosophy that studies intellectual character traits and cognitive faculties) in order to put our understanding of online inquiry and information sharing on an entirely new footing, to better understand the sources of online epistemic risk, and to better train ourselves to navigate them skilfully. One limitation to previous epistemological approaches to the online infodemic is that they have placed the theoretical focus on brainbound cognition, in isolation from the technologies in which we are deeply and inextricably scaffolded. This kind of focus is unsurprising, given that traditional epistemology has only in the past decade or so - and driven by work by the PI and Co-I - begun to theorise about knowledge and intellectual virtues in a way that appreciates how good thinking is not clearly separable in many cases from good cognitive scaffolding, that is, from good and responsible ways of relying on our environments and on technology to further our intellectual goals. The present project develops a new and innovative framework for theorizing about digital epistemic virtues, and vices - traits of thinkers that can enable them to better navigate information online, better assess online epistemic risk, and more efficiently convert digital information into digital knowledge. In addition to academic outputs, the project has a practical objective, which is to work with educationalists and policy makers in order to propose new and innovative ways we can educate for digital virtues, and in this way, to put our theory into practice.
The project team will use the latest tools of social epistemology and virtue epistemology (the area of philosophy that studies intellectual character traits and cognitive faculties) in order to put our understanding of online inquiry and information sharing on an entirely new footing, to better understand the sources of online epistemic risk, and to better train ourselves to navigate them skilfully. One limitation to previous epistemological approaches to the online infodemic is that they have placed the theoretical focus on brainbound cognition, in isolation from the technologies in which we are deeply and inextricably scaffolded. This kind of focus is unsurprising, given that traditional epistemology has only in the past decade or so - and driven by work by the PI and Co-I - begun to theorise about knowledge and intellectual virtues in a way that appreciates how good thinking is not clearly separable in many cases from good cognitive scaffolding, that is, from good and responsible ways of relying on our environments and on technology to further our intellectual goals. The present project develops a new and innovative framework for theorizing about digital epistemic virtues, and vices - traits of thinkers that can enable them to better navigate information online, better assess online epistemic risk, and more efficiently convert digital information into digital knowledge. In addition to academic outputs, the project has a practical objective, which is to work with educationalists and policy makers in order to propose new and innovative ways we can educate for digital virtues, and in this way, to put our theory into practice.
Publications
Carter
(2024)
Digital Knowledge: A Philosophical Investigation
Carter J
(2023)
Simion and Kelp on trustworthy AI
in Asian Journal of Philosophy
Carter J
(2023)
Intentional action and knowledge-centered theories of control
in Philosophical Studies
Carter J
(2024)
Fake knowledge-How
in The Philosophical Quarterly
Carter J
(2024)
Abduction, Skepticism, and Indirect Realism
in Philosophical Studies
Carter J
(2024)
Safety and dream scepticism in Sosa's epistemology
in Synthese
Carter J
(2022)
On some intracranialist dogmas in epistemology
in Asian Journal of Philosophy
Carter J
(2024)
Intentional action, knowledge, and cognitive extension
in Synthese
Carter J
(2023)
Stratified Virtue Epistemology - A Defence
Carter, J A
(2023)
The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd Edition
| Description | Collaboration with Learning Innovation Office at Glasgow University |
| Organisation | University of Glasgow |
| Country | United Kingdom |
| Sector | Academic/University |
| PI Contribution | Collaboration with Learning Innovation Office to create a Massive Online Open Course with Coursera. As part of this collaboration, my colleagues and I have developed a Course Map of a 4 week online course on "An Introduction to Digital Knowledge". This was a necessary step that has been developed under the guidance of members of the Learning Innovation Office. |
| Collaborator Contribution | Our partners at the Learning Innovation Office have provided us with the specialist and technical support to develop a MOOC. This included supervision and advice at the content writing process. This collaboration will continue over the next months. The partners will provide us with the technical support required for the production stage of this project. |
| Impact | Course Map WEEK 1) Introduction to Digital Epistemology: it introduces learners to the main issues that will be addressed in the course, e.g., fake news, conspiracy theories, echo chambers, trust and mistrust in the digital domain, online storage. Section 1.1. Intro and motivation of the course (video) Adam and Jesper. [Video description: Adam and Jesper can potentially attempt to do the following in, e.g., 10-12 minutes or so:] (2 min): Introduce the staff (include pictures) (5 minutes): Contextualise the MOOC by orienting it around the general themes (captured in our book project) of (i) promise of epistemic growth; leading naturally to the (ii) problem of epistemic pollution. (5 minutes): Introduce the general themes that will be the focus of each of the four weeks: Week 2: Challenges of being a digital epistemic subject Week 3: Epistemic Virtues and Epistemic Vices Week 4: Towards a Digital Virtue Epistemology Week 1: For the rest of this (Week 1), we will focus on two kinds of digital 'epistemic pollution' and their epistemological import: these will be (i) deep fake videos (Section 2.1); and (ii) epistemic echo chambers (Section 2.1). Overview of the course (reading): Different material will be our focus during each week of the course. That said, some general open-access background reading that online learners might benefit from (though which isn't strictly necessary for participating in the course) are (Reading these will take about 1 hour each): Goldman, Alvin and Cailin O'Connor, "Social Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Gunn, H. and M.P. Lynch. "Google Epistemology". Forthcoming: The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. D. Coady (Ed.) (Routledge: London) 2018. Carter, J.A. On some intracranialist dogmas in epistemology. Asian Journal of Philosophy 1, 44 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-022-00045-z Activity (15 min): Just as viruses can spread, so can information. In a notable study of over 126,000 stories shared on Twitter over 4.5 million times between 2016-2017, the authors discovered that: (take your best guess!) True and false stories spread equally. False stories spread significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information True stories spread significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than falsehood in all categories of information Answer: (b) Source: Vosoughi S, Roy D, Aral S. The spread of true and false news online. Science. 2018 Mar 9;359(6380):1146-1151. doi: 10.1126/science.aap9559. PMID: 29590045. Section 2.1. Video: Fake News and Deep Fakes [Video description: Adam and Jesper can potentially attempt to do the following in, e.g., 10-12 minutes or so, with 5-7 min from Adam and 5-7 min from Jesper] [Insert initial discursive activity:] have online learners read two sample news clips (5 minutes each) and see if they can detect which is fake news and which is not. (Fake News and Deep Fakes Video 1 of 2: 5-7 minutes - Adam) Discuss the concept of fake news by going over Gelfert's (2018) account of fake news, followed by Habgood-Coote's (2019) critical response that the very concept of 'fake news' is unhelpful. Quiz Section (over material from 2.1 video 1 of 2) Question (15 min): According to Gelfert (2018), fake news is: Any intentional lie that is communicated by a socially recognised news authority. Any news that is either false or misleading, regardless of the intent of the individual or individuals who communicated the news. The deliberate presentation of (typically) false or misleading claims as news, where these are misleading by design. Answer: (c) Question (15 min): Habgood-Coote offers three independent arguments for thinking that we should stop using the terms 'fake news' and 'post truth'. Which of the following is one of those three 'Fake news' and 'post-truth' do not have stable public meanings, entailing that they are either nonsense, context-sensitive, or contested. The widespread use of 'fake news' and 'post-truth' could lead to a dangerous kind of 'epistemic relativism'. 'Fake news' and 'post-truth' are too often used to refer to opinions we simply don't agree with, and so overuse of them can make discourse unnecessarily combative. Answer: (a) (Fake News and Deep Fakes Video 2 of 2: 5-7 minutes - Jesper ) Discuss the epistemological challenges of deep fake videos, by covering both (i) Matthews (2023) attempt to assimilate deep fakes to 'fake barns', and then (ii) discussing Habgood-Coote's line on deep fakes, which is that this is really nothing 'new' that hasn't been around before. [Insert initial discursive activity:] have online learners watch two clips (1 minute each) and see if they can detect which is a deep fake, and which is not. Second discursive activity: Listen to two audio recordings (1 minutes each) - a recent fake recording of Joe Biden, and a genuine one, and see if they can spot the fake. Quiz Section (over material from 2.1 video 2 of 2) Question (15 min): According to Matthews: Deep fakes generate an analogous degree of epistemic risk to that which is found in traditional 'fake barn' cases in epistemology. Real barns can be 'deep fakes' if you are in virtual reality, and what you expect to see is a simulated barn. While, given current technology, deep fakes are more like fake barns, in the future as technology progresses, we can expect that deep fakes will be much more like real barns. Answer: (a) Question: According to Habgood-Coote, deep fake videos are: More concerning, epistemically, than epistemologists have appreciated thus far. Less concerning, epistemically, than epistemologists have appreciated thus far. Not realistic enough to fool anyone with 20-20 vision and suitable background knowledge. Answer: (b) Section 2.2. Reading (about 1 hour each) Gelfert, A. (2018). Fake news: A definition. Informal logic, 38(1), 84-117. Habgood-Coote, J. (2019). Stop talking about fake news!. Inquiry, 62(9-10), 1033-1065. Matthews, T. (2023). Deepfakes, Fake Barns, and Knowledge from Videos. Synthese, 201(2), 41. Habgood-Coote, J. (2023). Deepfakes and the epistemic apocalypse. Synthese, 201(3), 103. Section 3.1. Video: Echo chambers [Video description: Adam and Jesper can potentially attempt to do the following in, e.g., 10-12 minutes or so, with 5-7 min from Adam and 5-7 min from Jesper] (Epistemic Bubbles and Echo Chambers 1 of 2: 5-7 minutes - Adam) Discuss the epistemic bubble/echo chamber distinction given by Nguyen, with some potential further discussion on the project team paper clarifying weaker/stronger bubbles and echo chambers. Quiz Section 3.1: (over material from 3.1 video 2 of 2) Question (15 min): Which, according to Nguyen, is a way that an echo chamber differs from an epistemic bubble. Echo chambers, unlike bubbles, are not exposed to views that contradict the received view in the echo chamber. Bubbles are not exposed to views that contradict the received view in the bubble, while echo chambers are exposed to such views. Epistemic bubbles tend to be epistemically good, while echo chambers tend to be epistemically bad. Answer: (b) Question (15 min): What is one way, for Nguyen, for an echo chamber to be positively reinforced? Exposure to viewpoints that align with the received view of the echo chamber. Communication with individuals in the echo chamber. Exposure to viewpoints that do not align with the received view of the echo chamber. Answer: (c) (Epistemic Bubbles and Echo Chambers 2 of 2: 5-7 minutes - Jesper) Discuss the phenomenon of 'defeater reinforcement' of bubbles and perhaps register how this relates to conspiracy theories - e.g., theories that take evidence against the theory to actually support it. Then, perhaps also register the difference between an echo chamber and what Furman calls an epistemic bunker. Quiz Section 3.1: (over material from 3.1 video 2 of 2) Question (15 min): Suppose a group thinks that the government is carefully planting deceptive evidence to make people think that climate change is real. When they see on the news what looks like an icecap melting, the group takes this to be more evidence that the government is busy implementing their deception. Based just on this description, the group described: Accepts a conspiracy theory, but is not an echo chamber. Is an echo chamber, but does not accept a conspiracy theory. Has features consistent with both being an echo chamber and endorsing a conspiracy theory. Answer: (c) Question (15 min): According to Furman, an epistemic bunker is: A social-epistemic structure designed to 'rewire' the thinking of those who have been indoctrinated into conspiracy theories. A social-epistemic structure that is designed to keep its members safe (sometimes emotionally, sometimes physically). A social-epistemic structure that is designed to support foundational, 'ground-level' thinking, from which those outside of the bunker can gain knowledge by inference from the claims developed in the epistemic bunker. Answer: (b) Section 3.2. Reading (about 1 hour each) Nguyen, C. T. (2020). Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Episteme, 17(2), 141-161. Nguyen, C. T. (2020). Cognitive islands and runaway echo chambers: Problems for epistemic dependence on experts. Synthese, 197(7), 2803-2821. Carter et al. "Bubbles, Echoes and Epistemic Structure" (ms.) Furman, K. (2023). Epistemic Bunkers. Social Epistemology, 37(2), 197-207. Section 4.1. Activity for Discussion Board: Wikipedia defines 'cult' as a pejorative term for a relatively small group which is typically led by a charismatic and self-appointed leader, who tightly controls its members, requiring unwavering devotion to a set of beliefs and practices which are considered deviant (outside the norms of society). Discuss what an epistemic cult would look like, in comparison with echo chambers, epistemic bubbles and epistemic bunkers? Section 5. Glossary Echo Chambers: Epistemic Bubbles: Epistemic Bunkers: Epistemology: Deep fakes videos: Fake News: Virtue Epistemology: WEEK 2) The challenges of being a "digital epistemic subject": it discusses two challenges in more depth. Examples of such issues include i) the dilemma of cognitive offloading: on the one hand, offloading allows us to easily and quickly gain a lot of information; on the other hand, it risks reducing our epistemic autonomy; ii) the problem of digital scepticism: if conspiracy theories widespread on the internet are akin to traditional sceptical scenarios, then they can represent a serious threat to all of our knowledge. - 1 minute Adam and Josh Week 2, Section 1: Cognitive Offloading, Autonomy, and Agency Week 2, Section 1.1. Leave it to the Machines? (This section discusses the "Kasparov Approach" to offloading - which is the idea that we should offload as much of the menial tasks in organising our lives to intelligent machines, in order to free up our cognition to do valuable things that machines can't do. [Insert initial discursive activity:] have online learners reflect on what they would choose for themselves in a world where nearly all menial cognitive tasks could be outsourced to intelligent machines; what kind of thinking if any is important not to outsource? Discuss amongst themselves] Adam Video: 7 minutes Associated Reading: Open access: https://blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/openfordebate/leave-it-to-the-machines-re-evaluating-the-kasparov-reply/ Carter, "Digital Knowledge", Chapter 5, Section 5.3. Week 2, Section 1.2. Offloading and Paternalism? (This section discusses a further way we might consider 'offloading' aspects of our cognition - where we put our trust in paternalistic policies to steer us towards positive epistemic outcomes. A question that arises here is whether and under what sense epistemic 'nudging' (as implied by paternalism) is compatible with retaining epistemic autonomy. Adam video 5-7 minutes Associated Reading McKenna, R. "Persuasion and Epistemic Paternalism"https://robinmckenna.weebly.com/uploads/2/2/4/3/22433260/persuasion_and_paternalism_final.pdf Levy, N. "Nudge, Nudge, Wink Wink" https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0006.010?view=text;rgn=main Grundmann, T. "The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging" https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02691728.2021.1945160 Activity (10 minutes): Watch Kasparov BBC interview "The inevitability of machines exceeding our abilities" https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170616-garry-kasparov-why-the-world-should-embrace-ai Discussion question (5 minutes): Is Kasparov right that machines exceeding our abilities is inevitable? If so, is this true in all areas or only some? Week 2, Section 1.3. Is ChatGPT an epistemic agent? ChatGPT increasingly reasons in ways that are difficult to distinguish from human reasoning, which is one reason that so many cognitive tasks are now offloaded entirely to ChatGPT. But is ChatGPT an epistemic agent, in the sense that is it correct to attribute ChatGPT beliefs and knowledge? Adam video 5-7 minutes Main Reading (30 minutes) Can ChatGPT Replace the Role of a Teacher in a Classroom? Ausat, A. M. A., Massang, B., Efendi, M., Nofirman, N., & Riady, Y. (2023). https://www.jonedu.org/index.php/joe/article/view/2745/2332\ Go further (additional optional reading) Titus, L.M. "Does ChatGPT have Semantic Understanding?" https://tinyurl.com/4k9fw9pf Smith, Barry. ChatGPT: Not Intelligent https://philpapers.org/archive/SMICNI.pdf Week 2, Section 2: Extended Cognition and offloading Week 2, Section 2.1. Is your memory in your phone?? This section introduces students to the idea that the way we offload memory to our smartphones might support the idea (at the heart of extended cognition) that our memory is (literally) partly in our phones. Adam Video 5-7 minutes. Main reading (30 minutes) Clark and Chalmers, "The Extended Mind" Open access: https://web-archive.southampton.ac.uk/cogprints.org/320/1/extended.html Optional background reading: Carter and Kallestrup "Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory" https://philpapers.org/archive/ADAECA-5.pdf The Extended Mind (SEP section) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/#ScopExteMind Gunn, "Does the Mind Extended into the World" http://doc.gold.ac.uk/aisb50/AISB50-S22/AISB50-S22-Gunn-paper.pdf Week 2, Section 2.2. Is some of your knowledge digital? Even if the hypothesis of extended cognition is true, and the memory process is extended, does that mean any of our knowledge is in our phones? Adam Video 5-7 minutes. Associated Reading (30 minutes) Pritchard, Duncan, "Cognitive Ability and Extended Cognition" Open access: https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/8458356/PRITCHARD_2010_Cognitive_ability_and_the_extended_cognition_thesis.pdf Additional background reading: Farkas "Belief May not be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge" https://philpapers.org/archive/FARBMN.pdf Carter, "Digital Knowledge" Ch. 3 Week 2, Section 2.3. Offloading to others: Is any of our knowledge socially extended? If cognition can extend so as to involve artefacts (like phones, etc.) can it also extend into other people? What would it take for a thesis like this to be true? We explore here the idea of how the subject of a knowledge might be a group, and even whether a digital collective subject (like Wikipedia) might have knowledge - and if so, can such groups be epistemically blamed when they fall short? Adam video 5-7 min Associated Reading Socially extended knowledge (Lackey) (30 Minutes) https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phis.12034 (find preprint) Relevant background reading: "When is there a Group that Knows?" Alexander Bird https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299884509_When_Is_There_a_Group_that_Knows Kallestrup "Nonreductive Group Knowledge Revisited" https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/nonreductive-group-knowledge-revisited/4E9296AA0E025E32EC80DBB2F4B73542 Palermos "Responsibility in epistemic collaborations: Is it me, is it the group or are we all to blame?" https://www.sorestispalermos.info/_files/ugd/5f8cfc_b7cf7299d5874e069f42ad24db209705.pdf Discursive element: discussion board question about group knowledge Digital Scepticism (total 2 hours 50 mins) Reading (2 hours) Munro, Daniel (forthcoming). Cults, Conspiracies, and Fantasies of Knowledge. Episteme:1-22. Week 2, section 3. Traditional sceptical scenarios talk about people who are brains in vats, dreaming, or in the Matrix. The victims of these scenarios do their best to find out about the world, constructing a theory that fits their evidence, and yet they end up with radically false beliefs. The position of online conspiracy theorists may seem strikingly similar, constructing a theory that fits the evidence available to them in their online environment, and yet ending up with radically false beliefs. This section explores this parallel. Video 1 (15 mins total): (2 min) introduce the topic - traditional/digital scepticism. Overview. (5 min) traditional sceptical worries - BIVs, matrix, dreaming. Why worry? (5 min) digital sceptical worries - online conspiracy theories and bubbles. (3 min) The problems: What to do about people in digital sceptical scenarios? Could I be in a digital sceptical scenario? Quiz (5 mins) Questions about the prevalence of conspiracy theories online (need statistics for this) Week 2, Section 4. In the last section we encountered two problems: the problem of how to make online conspiracy theorists give up their theories and embrace sensible beliefs, and the problem of how we can know that we are not the victims of epistemic bubbles, as the conspiracy theorists claim. In this section we look at some of the potential solutions to these problems. Video (15 mins) (2 min) Recap of the problems raised in the last video: What to do about people in digital sceptical scenarios? Could I be in a digital sceptical scenario? (5 min) Solutions to the first problem. Rational vs non-rational engagement. Institutional vs individual. Technological. (5 min) Solutions to the second problem. Cultivation of epistemic virtue in a risky digital environment. (3 min) Conclusion: what about the future, with ever better AI/deepfakes? Survey (5 mins) Questions about people's preferred solutions to digital scepticism problems. Discursive element (10 mins) Discussion board question about digital scepticism. WEEK 3) Epistemic Virtues and Epistemic Vices: it introduces learners to the basics of virtue and vice epistemology. In a nutshell, virtue epistemology stresses the importance of information that is acquired by having manifested a good virtue or disposition (e.g., being open minded, gathering evidence). In other words, virtue epistemology focuses on how we obtain some information, as opposed to merely whether we obtain some information. In this section, learners will reflect on epistemic virtues, i.e., character traits that foster knowledge, and epistemic vices, i.e., character traits that obstruct the acquisition of knowledge. Jesper (virtues) and Giada (vices) Section 1. Video: (Giada) (tot. 12-15 min) 5 MIN: Introducing the concept of Aristotelian virtues in the moral domain. Cf with Utilitarianism - importance of virtues - "the good person is not the one who merely brings about good consequences". Compare moral virtues with moral vices. 5 Min: Drawing on the moral examples, introduce virtues and vices in the epistemic domain. Provide examples. 2 Min: Anticipate what will follow in the week's course: looking at virtue epistemology and vices; and why we're doing this: anticipate application of this week's content in the digital domain (Week 4) Section 1.2 - Short activity (15 minutes): aim: get them to identify moral virtues and distinguish them from "merely doing the right thing". All this should be left at a broad intuitive/pre-theoretical level. Vignettes of people doing things - the student has to identify i) which actions are virtuous and which ones aren't. Include cases of someone who does the right thing while not being virtuous in any relevant sense (cases involving luck, or vicious motivations Examples: someone who helps someone only to get a prize; someone who helps someone by accident but wanted to harm someone) Section 1.3. Activity (15 min)) - aim of the activity: get them to identify epistemic virtues and vices (all this at the pre-theoretical level - no theories on virtue or vice epistemology covered here yet) A couple of two or three vignettes in which agents have a conversation, or investigate something that happened. You want to have characters in the vignettes where they exhibit some relevant epistemic virtue and others which manifest some vice (e.g., closemindedness, prejudice, confirmation bias). We could then ask them to: i) select who is exhibiting epistemic vices and who is exhibiting some epistemic virtues (this could be done by asking, e.g. is Subject in vignette 1 exhibiting vice or virtue); ii) identify virtues and vices for these vignettes. Section 2 Video on Virtue Reliabilism 5min. Traditional reliabilism says that knowledge is a true (undefeated) belief that is produced or sustained by a reliable cognitive process. This view struggles to account for certain Gettier cases, and for the distinctive value that knowledge has. A more promising view that doesn't seem to be afflicted by these problems is virtue reliabilism according to which knowledge is belief that is true because of cognitive abilities, where the latter are stable and reliable (truth-conducive) cognitive faculties, such as perception, reasoning, introspection or memory. [Jesper] Section 2.2. Activity (½ hour): quiz on 3.1. [According to Sosa (2007) an apt performance is a performance that is accurate because adroit. Apt performances are achievements, and knowledge is a cognitive achievement. Using archery as a non-cognitive (or mixed) performance: (i) What is the triple-A structure of an achievement in the case of archery? (ii) How might an archery performance be accurate without being adroit? (iii) How might an archery performance be both accurate and adroit without being apt? Relevant reading (about 1 hour each): Turri, J., Alfano, M. & Greco, J. 'Virtue Epistemology', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/epistemology-virtue/> Excerpts from Sosa, E. (2007) A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/118/472/1180/1055605?login=true Section 3. Video virtue responsibilism; epistemic virtues as character traits 5m. In contrast to virtue reliabilists which conceive of intellectual virtues in terms of stable and reliable cognitive faculties, virtue responsibilists conceive of such virtues as (good) intellectual character traits, such as attentiveness, diligence, fair- and open-mindedness, intellectual tenacity, humility and courage. Whereas the cognitive abilities are more about nature than nurture, these character traits are more about nurture than nature. Another difference is that the latter traits are less directly relevant to accounts of knowledge, but more to do with how we responsibly conduct our epistemic inquiries, including in social contexts. Section 3.2. Activity Quiz. Dictionaries typically define humility negatively in terms of not thinking you are better than other people, or as having a lowly opinion of oneself. If transposed to an epistemic context, humility would be the quality of having a lowly view of one's cognitive abilities vis-à-vis knowledge, and not regarding them as epistemically better than others' cognitive abilities. (i) Intellectual humility has something to do with proper acknowledgement of the limitations and deficiencies of those cognitive abilities which normally lead to knowledge. Deliberate failure to acknowledge such boundaries and faults betrays an epistemic arrogance that is incompatible with intellectual humility. Still, does such a purely negative conception make intellectual humility a virtue alongside other intellectual virtues? Is there anything virtuous about debasing or degrading one's own abilities, in comparison with others? (ii) Maybe we should combine the negative aspect in which one should recognize the existence of one's cognitive imperfections as well as the limits of one's cognitive merits, with a positive aspect in which one should recognize the genuine breath and depth of one's abilities, i.e. epistemically humble individuals seem not to underrate the role their cognitive abilities actually play in producing or sustaining knowledge. Basically, the idea is to aim for an accurate assessment of one's cognitive abilities, which neither deflates nor inflates them. Does such a dual-aspect account make intellectual humility a virtue? In particular, if the negative aspect didn't suffice on its own, how does adding a positive aspect help? Relevant reading (about 1 hour each): Kallestrup, J. & Pritchard, D. (2016). 'From Epistemic Anti-Individualism to Intellectual Humility', Res Philosophica 93 (3):533-552. https://www.pdcnet.org/resphilosophica/content/resphilosophica_2016_0093_0003_0533_0552 Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard-Synder, D. (2017). 'Intellectual humility: Owning our limitations', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94, 509-539. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.12228 Section 4. Vice epistemology (Giada) Section 4.1. Video on Epistemic Vices and vice epistemology. [tot. 7-10 min] 1 min: Introduce at a very broad level some examples of epistemic vices (cf Zagzbeski 1996: 152); 5 min: Introduce Cassam's view on epistemic vices as what systematically obstruct knowledge-acquisition. + examples of epistemic biases (do they count as vices if they obstruct knowledge?) 1 Min: sum up: even if it's hard to pin Relevant Reading: Cassam, Q. 2016. "Vice Epistemology", in The Monist Tanesini, A. 2018. Epistemic Vice and Motivation Section 4.2. Short Activity: Quiz - questions on Quassam's obstructivist view [15 minutes] Section 4.3 Video on motivational view of epistemic vices [10 min] 2 min: recap Quassam's obstructivist view 3 Min: Introduce Montmarquez "evil demon" objection. 5 min: Compare Cassam's view with Tanesini "motivational" view (vices are as such insofar as they involve bad motivation) Section 4.4 Activity: quiz on Tanesi's motivational view and Montmarquez [15 min] Section 4.5.Short reading (15 min) + Exercise (15 min) (tot 30 min) https://social-epistemology.com/2017/12/05/on-the-nature-of-intellectual-vice-brent-madison/ Reading: Madison, B. J. C. 2017. "On the Nature of Intellectual vice", in Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective Section 5. Discussion board activity around the following questions: Drawing on your own experience, can you give examples of key epistemic virtues that promote inquiry? Drawing on your own experience, can you give examples of key epistemic vices that hinder inquiry? Glossary Epistemic Vice: Epistemic Virtue: Virtue Reliabilism: Virtue Responsibilism: WEEK 4): Towards a Virtue Digital Epistemology: it puts the lessons from Section 3 into practice. Learners will think about how cultivating epistemic virtues and identifying potential epistemic vices can help overcome some of the challenges addressed in Sections 1 and 2. Section 1 1.1. Video: (10 min) 5 min Drawing on the content of the previous weeks, introduce examples of epistemic vices and virtues that we can/should exhibit in the digital domain. 5 min some empirical data or examples on how features of the internet/social media exploit some of our biases, e.g., Instagram/design; click bait titles, how news are sensationalised 1.2. Activity (15 min): we could find some clearly misleading news title/short article and ask the participant to individuate what the problem with those titles/articles are. Section 2. Video putting pieces together for the audience: if epistemic vices obstruct the acquisition of knowledge, and the digital domain seems to exploit/amplify the existence of such traits, then we should pay attention to such vices and develop virtues. (10 min) 5 mins: ways in which the digital domain encourages epistemic vice. 5 mins: ways in which the digital domain encourages epistemic virtue. 2.2. Activity: self-reflection moment: ask the students to write down what kinds of epistemic vices they think they are more prone to/with respect to which topic etc (this will not be marked but it may still be possible to count as completed) NO specific time given that this would be similar to an open discussion board. Section 3. Video Does this mean we are facing a new digital disaster area? Nope. (15 min) 5 min: Joe's work on how we should not think that we are facing a new digital disaster area. Present some data. 5: Similar ideas on fake news: Josh Habgoode-Coote's work. 5: sum up the main points and the moral of the story: no need for pessimism. 3.3. Activity: Quiz on data presented in Video Section 3. (15 min) Relevant Readings Littrell, S. et al. (2023). "Who knowingly share false political information online?", Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review Coote (2023) "Deepfakes and the Epistemic Apocalypse" Synthese |
| Start Year | 2024 |
| Description | Invited as a commentator for the youtube series "Philosophers meet Critics" |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A broadcast e.g. TV/radio/film/podcast (other than news/press) |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Public/other audiences |
| Results and Impact | I was one of the commentators to Chris Kelp's book on the nature of Inquiry. This round table was an installment of the youtube Series "Philosophers meet critics". |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2021 |
| URL | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DxxQitPSQN4&t=1965s&ab_channel=FigmentsoftheBrain |
| Description | New Directions in Epistemology |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | Participation in an activity, workshop or similar |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Public/other audiences |
| Results and Impact | 40 students, staff, and visiting researchers and public attended this conference. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2022 |
| Description | Philosophy in Prison Low Moss Prison, Glasgow |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | Local |
| Primary Audience | Other audiences |
| Results and Impact | I co-led two philosophy classes to a group of inmates at the Low Moss Prison. This was part of a project led by Glasgow University, aimed at providing education to prisoners. |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2024 |
| Description | Public Engagement You tube video on Legal Risk |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A broadcast e.g. TV/radio/film/podcast (other than news/press) |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | International |
| Primary Audience | Public/other audiences |
| Results and Impact | 5 minute video summarizing the main results of a published paper for the public audience via a youtube video |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2023 |
| URL | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D8hvkNoYbDE&t=9s&ab_channel=VarietiesofRisk |
| Description | Talk to high school pupils at Fraserburgh Academy |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | Regional |
| Primary Audience | Schools |
| Results and Impact | The purpose was to talk to school pupils about how laypeople may identify reliable experts in a digital age |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2023 |
| Description | Talk to high school pupils at George Watsons College |
| Form Of Engagement Activity | A talk or presentation |
| Part Of Official Scheme? | No |
| Geographic Reach | National |
| Primary Audience | Schools |
| Results and Impact | The purpose was to talk to school pupils about how laypeople may identify reliable experts in a digital age |
| Year(s) Of Engagement Activity | 2024 |