From Explanation to Ethics and Back Again

Moral Philosophy investigates such things as the moral decisions of individuals and organizations, moral education and moral development, moral language, and moral facts. Moral philosophers seek to understand, and to communicate their understanding of, these things.

To do so, they construct moral theories. For example, we may wonder why helping one's elderly neighbour carry her groceries home from the shop is morally right and why cheating on one's taxes is morally wrong. According to one moral theory -- consequentialism -- actions are morally right if they bring about the best possible consequences and morally wrong if they fail to do so. On this view the act of helping one's neighbour is right because it brings about the best consequences and cheating on one's taxes is wrong because it fails to bring about the best consequences.

Likewise, we may wonder why we are typically motivated to do what we judge is morally right. According to the theory of 'expressivism' a moral judgment is an expression of an attitude we have towards the act in question. On this view we are typically motivated to do what we judge is morally right because a judgment of this kind is simply an expression of a favourable attitude towards this act.

Moral theories, like consequentialism and expressivism, are successful if they provide a good explanation of the things with which they are concerned (the rightness/wrongness of actions; the relation between moral judgment and motivation). It is clear, then, that an account of what a good moral explanation consists in is important to moral theorising.

Interestingly, despite the obvious centrality of moral explanation to moral theorising, moral philosophers have paid little attention to the question of the nature of moral explanations. This is especially surprising because the relationship between theory, understanding and explanation is a relationship we find in all areas of intellectual inquiry, and in many of these areas the notion of explanation has received much philosophical attention. For instance, physicists construct scientific theories in order to explain physical phenomena. More generally, a successful scientific theory is one that provides good explanations of the relevant phenomena. And indeed, discussions of the nature of scientific explanation occupy centre stage in the philosophy of science. The thought is that if we are to understand science, we must understand what a scientific explanation consists in.

The underlying motivation for this project -- 'From Explanation to Ethics and Back Again' -- is that the notion of moral explanation is as central to moral theorising as the notion of scientific explanation is to science. The aim of the project is twofold.

First we seek to improve our understanding of morality by investigating the nature of moral explanation. We plan to draw on work on the nature of explanation in other areas (e.g. scientific explanation). While there are many important differences between moral theorising and other intellectual inquiries (e.g. science), we believe that insights on the nature of explanation gleaned from philosophical reflection on these other pursuits will illuminate important features of moral explanation.

Our second aim is to enhance our understanding of the very nature of explanation. Moral explanations have been neglected by those investigating the nature of explanation. Identifying patterns of explanation that are common in moral theorising will, therefore, provide new 'data' for an adequate theory of explanation and may enable us to adjudicate between competing views on the nature of explanation. Alternatively, it may reveal that moral explanations are unique -- different in kind from other types of explanation. Thus proceeding from explanation to ethics and back again promises to enhance our understanding of both ethics and explanation.

This project's main impact potential derives from its ramifications for the practice of moral explanation. Individuals, organisations, policy makers and educators are expected to explain their moral decisions and policies. Which moral explanations are adequate, and indeed, what explanations we may reasonably demand of them, should be determined by what a proper moral explanation consists in.

For example, a conscientious company may worry about the moral status of its investment strategy or its recruitment/redundancy policy. It may be important for this company to make decisions and adopt policies it can explain from a moral perspective. If a proper moral explanation must rely on a moral principle, for example, then a company should only make decisions it can ground in a principle. Alternatively, if a proper moral explanation relies on context-specific features of the situation in which the decision is made, companies may be required to look not to principles, but to the unique interactions of the features of the specific situation at hand.

Another example concerns moral educators - parents, school teachers and teachers of professional ethics - who aspire to impart on their pupils tools that will enable pupils to obtain moral knowledge. One indication that a pupil has acquired the requisite skill is that she can explain her own moral judgments successfully. E.g., in bringing up children and in training students - especially in professional ethics courses for healthcare practitioners or MBA students - we provide them with moral explanations and we expect them to learn how to offer explanations of their own (as Aristotle noted). Our approach to the process of moral training should, therefore, be informed by the correct account of moral explanation. According to a classical psychological model of moral development (Kohlberg's stage model) the highest and final stage of moral development is a stage in which one can explain one's moral judgements by referencing universal ethical principles. Whether this is a norm to which we ought to aspire, and whether this is, in fact, the (normatively) highest level of moral development depends on whether moral explanations must rely on such principles.

A deeper understanding of moral explanation, then, promises to enhance our understanding of the nature and form of moral practice and it may impact on the ways in which organisational principles are drawn up and on the ways in which the wider public form and revise their ethical opinions.

A second kind of impact for this project derives from the intimate link between explanation and understanding. A deeper grasp of the very nature of explanation has the potential to impact on the way theoreticians and the wider public alike seek to understand the world. Moral explanations have been neglected by those investigating the nature of explanation. Identifying patterns of explanation that are common in moral theorising will, therefore, provide new 'data' for an adequate theory of explanation and may enable us to adjudicate between competing views on the nature of explanation. Consequently, a study of moral explanation promises to shed light on the very nature of explanation, which in turn, my impact on our understanding of the standards of success for any intellectual inquiry.