Cyber Warfare and Nuclear Strategy: Challenging the Utility of Nuclear Weapons in Global Security

My proposed research seeks to evaluate the challenge to conventional notions of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy posed by the growth of cyber warfare capabilities. While the relevance and utility of nuclear weapons has been increasingly challenged from other angles - such as through the revival of the 'global zero' movement, new technological advances in conventional weaponry and the rise of assymetric warfare - little thought has been given to how the growth in cyber capabilities may actually be eroding deeply held understandings of deterrence and nuclear weapons as the 'ultimate guarantor' of state security. Consequently, as policymakers begin to rethink defence and national security strategy in light of changing global requirements, financial pressures, and political obligations, it is essential that thought be given to how new cyber capabilities may be altering the dynamics which have proved central to international security since 1945.

The central objective of this research is to investigate how advances in global cyber capabilities might impact nuclear strategy and the utility of nuclear weapons. In abstract terms, one can already identify four potential areas of complication; (1) the real-time nature of a cyber warfare means that defence planners may no longer have time to organise a response to a cyber attack - consequently it is difficult to see how a system of mutual vulnerability could be instigated to control this, or how the threat of nuclear response could remain credible; (2) cyber capabilities and intentions cannot be easily monitored or verified, therefore it is difficult to judge whether someone is planning an attack - indeed, 'trap doors' and 'logic bombs' may have already been placed inside a nations critical infrastructure, meaning that the ability to respond to an attack has already been compromised; (3) it is difficult to produce guidelines that specify when a cyber attack has taken place, and to distinguish when this may be sufficient to induce a kinetic response (i.e. what level of attack might justify a nuclear retaliation); (4) because preparations for cyber attack may go unnoticed, you can never be entirely sure that your nuclear and defensive systems will work in a time of crisis; they may already have been compromised.

The US, UK and NATO all continue to place nuclear weapons and deterrence at the heart of their security strategies; all have recently declared cyber threats to be key security objectives, and all three have been coming under increasing political, economic and normative pressure to rethink their respective nuclear strategies. For each, cyber warfare presents and new and unique security challenge, the implications of which are yet to be fully understood or explored. A key aim of this project is therefore to provide case-specific information about the impact of advances in cyber capabilities for the nuclear weapons postures of each of these governments, and for NATO, while also considering these developments on a more conceptual level. Ultimately therefore the project is designed to be of benefit to national governments and NATO as decisions are made about future resource allocation and security requirements - specifically about the continued role of nuclear weapons - and therefore the role that cyber might play in current debates about nuclear disarmament and 'global nuclear zero' - in addition to driving thinking forward in the informal policy world and in academia.

As a result, the time is ripe for a comprehensive assessment of how cyber capabilities are, and might, impact nuclear strategy, and what these potential conceptual challenges to traditional strategic understandings mean for the future utility of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. In doing this, the project has also been designed to establish a starting point for a global debate about the impact of cyber warfare on the future of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy.

The project will benefit three groups that together not only help formulate and implement policy ideas surrounding cyber strategy, nuclear weapons and national security, but also subject those ideas to critical intellectual scrutiny; (1) policy makers with responsibility for nuclear weapons and cyber security strategy; (2) internationally renowned and internationally active think tanks and professional research institutes seeking to influence the climate of opinion surrounding nuclear and national security strategies; and (3) an interdisciplinary range of social scientists with a concern for understanding the implications of cyber for international security and nuclear strategy. Throughout the project the aim will be to present my research in ways that maximise its potential to serve the interests of these varied user groups, thus ensuring the best possible chance of disseminating research in forms that will be of most use to the major stakeholders. This will avoid the pitfalls that can arise from an overly generic method of communicating findings, and allow me to deepen my links with non-academic users by consciously setting out to bridge the gap between the academic and policy worlds.

Primarily the work will be of benefit to those inside of the formal policy-making system within the UK, US and NATO. The proposed research provides timely analysis of the up-to-date trends in the international security environment and how this might affect national and alliance/ IO thinking, security and strategy. Specifically, it provides the first major study of how new cyber challenges will impact and shape thinking about the continued utility of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence as central tools and as the ultimate 'guarantors' of security. Given the fact that cyber appears as a major component in the strategies of each one of the project's nuclear stakeholders, this work will feed into discussions about how future strategic planning can be balanced with ever-tighter security resource allocation.

A wide range of internationally-orientated and internationally-active think tanks and professional research institutes both in the UK and overseas will also benefit from my proposed research. While these bodies commission and publish research into cyber security and nuclear strategy, these have remained discrete areas of study, leaving the cyber-nuclear nexus largely untouched. By offering rigorous analysis on this issue, and by bridging the gap between cyber and nuclear research, my proposed project adds to the pool of knowledge available to those who are involved in this vital function of ensuring a more rounded climate of ideas. I have already established links with a number of non-academic stakeholders through my close links with the transatlantic CSIS and RUSI Project on Nuclear Issues, and while many of these actors may well be outside of the formal policy-making structure, they are no less important to the overall functioning of the system.

Finally, scholars concerned with the details of nuclear weapons policy and the implications of cyber warfare will also be interested in this research. For those national security scholars interested in UK, US and NATO nuclear and defence strategy in the cyber age, my work provides a timely addition to debates about how best to respond to changing strategic realities. For those studying global security trends, my work contributes to the burgeoning yet nascent literature seeking to conceptualise and understand what cyber means for international security. Finally, for those whose scholarly concern is nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, my work presents an innovative contribution to the literature surrounding nuclear strategy, stability and disarmament. Due to the nature of research, my articles and dissemination strategy are also designed to ensure the widest possible incorporation of my research findings into scholarly networks beyond UK Political Science.