Biochemical security 2030 - towards improved science-based multilevel governance

It is increasingly clear that a major security concern in the area of low probability, high-impact events over coming decades will be that advances in life and associated sciences and technologies will enable the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) to sub-state groups as well as to states. Furthermore, such weapons could be of novel types that the intended targets could not be easily defended against (Kelle, Nixdorff and Dando 2012). In response to these challenges the UK has played a leading role in enabling states parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to have specific measures available by which the chemical and biological prohibition regimes may be strengthened in order to reduce the threats form advances in science and technology (S&T) being misused for hostile purposes.

Starting at the multilateral level, the key objective of this project is to help improve the operation of those aspects of the BWC and CWC by focussing on advances in synthetic biology, neuroscience, and nanotechnology, including advanced drug delivery techniques. It will build on longstanding research carried out under funding for example from the Wellcome Trust and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and will address primarily two themes of the research grant specification for proposals:

- "Understanding how perceptions of S&T and its implications for defence and security vary across ... groups" [and]
- "Improving our ability to use S&T to increase co-operation and collaboration as a means of preventing future conflict."

Outputs from the project will feed directly - by means of briefing papers - to delegations in BWC meetings of experts and states parties in Geneva, and to experts and delegations in CWC meetings in The Hague, in 2013 and 2014. These papers plus additional relevant content will be made available to a wider audience on a dedicated project webpage. Analyses and findings of the briefing papers will be expanded upon in journal articles and a co-authored research monograph that will be submitted to a University press for publication.

The primary focus of attention in the project will be to investigate how the work of the BWC and CWC can be improved so that effective action can be taken to more efficiently develop awareness, education and any necessary codes of conduct and oversight systems for biologists, chemists and other associated scientists whose benignly intended work could be subject to misuse by those with malign intent. Such efforts are particularly relevant in parts of the world where regulation may presently be weak such as those identified by the G8 Global Partnership.

As many of the practical measures needed to achieve biochemical security are located at the domestic level, a second focus of the project will be on the establishment of a regional network of public and private research institutions and biotechnology companies active in the areas highlighted above that are located in the Southwest of the UK. The governance of biochemical security cannot rely exclusively on top down measures agreed upon at the international level, but needs to be complemented by efforts to involve those at the forefront at research in biology, chemistry and associated sciences, whose perceptions of S&T and its implications for defence and security can be expected to vary from those in government or academic security studies. This second strand of the project is thus focussing more on the theme of varying perceptions of the interrelation between science and security.

Biochemical security across the different levels of governance will take several years to realise. Assuming a concerted effort towards achieving this goal is undertaken soon, this project views the year 2030 as a realistic target for achieving biochemical security.

As the key goal of the project is to contribute to an improved multilevel governance of biochemical security, the beneficiaries will include a variety of user groups ranging from the multilateral to the domestic UK governance level. The focus on different stakeholders across the different levels provides an excellent opportunity to connect these and thereby add real value. Possible non-academic beneficiaries include:
STATES PARTIES TO THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION: States parties to the BWC gather regularly in Geneva to review operation of the treaty and to take into account S&T developments of relevance but lack either a scientific background to arrive at independent assessments, or the institutional back-up for the analysis of S&T advances, or both. At the 2011 BWC Review Conference S&T reviews have been made a so-called standing agenda item for the annual BWC meetings, but no improved infrastructure or processes have been put in place to facilitate the S&T review at the multilateral level.
STATES PARTIES TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: States parties to the CWC have the comparative advantage that the organisation to oversee implementation of the treaty has a Scientific Advisory Board as subsidiary body. However, this board is responsible to the Director General of the organisation and its recommendations have been ignored by CWC states parties on several occasions.
Thus, states parties to both of these Convention stand to benefit from this project, albeit for different reasons. Yet, in both the CWC and the BWC contexts, the importance of S&T reviews has been long recognised, which can be expected to provide receptive audiences for the research results. This is further supported by the fact that the G8 Global Partnership countries, which are members in both treaty regimes have recently begun to focus on biosecurity as one area of primary concern
GOVERNMENT AUDIENCES: The UK national security community has identified biosecurity concerns triggered by biotechnological developments in recent threat assessments such as the MOD's Global Strategic Trends 2040. Likewise, the horizon scanning activities of the UK government have identified developments in synthetic biology, neuroscience and nanotechnology as S&T areas as having potentially great implications for defence and security. In addition, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has identified the S&T dimension of the BWC inter-sessional process as a key area of interest in its counter-proliferation programme. The FCO will also be the lead department when the UK in 20013 will hold the chair of G8 Global Partnership, including its biosecurity element.
PROFESSIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND LEARNED SOCIETIES: The Royal Society has long shown an interest in the intersection of S&T and security issues. It has recently published the third module of its Brainwaves series in Conflict, Security and the Neurosciences. Learned societies and their members will benefit from this project due to its analysis of some of the practical measures that are being discussed in the CBW prohibition regimes, such as awareness raising and education and outreach on biological and chemical security to the S&T communities. An early awareness of these proposals will enable the scientific community to engage during the formulation of policy measures.
PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY FUNDED RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS: Advances in the life sciences that could become a security concern are widely distributed across publicly and privately funded research institutions. As many of the governance measures discussed in the multilateral context will directly affect such research institutions, they will benefit from the awareness raising elements of this project.
THE GENERAL PUBLIC: This includes those members of the public with an interest in S&T, security issues, or both. Making project results available to the public will enable a wider discussion of S&T and security perceptions and opportunities for cooperation.