Characterizing the A Priori with Epistemic Norms
Lead Research Organisation:
University of St Andrews
Department Name: Philos Anthrop and Film Studies
Abstract
The classic characterization of a priori knowledge is that it is acquired independently of experience. The resilient problem with this has been to say what counts as 'experience', and what it is for the acquisition of knowledge to be 'independent' of it.
This problem has led to a persistent trend towards scepticism and deflationism. Following Casullo (2015), these challenges to the notion of a priority can be organised into four broad categories, holding that the notion is: (i) incoherent [e.g., Quine (1951)] (ii) vacuous [e.g., Benacerraf (1973)]; (iii) insignificant [e.g., Williamson (2007)]; and (iv) in tension with other aspects of the traditional view of the a priori [e.g., Jenkins (2013), Casullo (2012)].
The principal aim will be to develop a novel characterisation of the a priori that avoids these challenges. The principal thesis will be that the a priori is distinguishable from the a posteriori by their being governed by different kinds of epistemic norms.
My research will be organised around the following three topics.
1. Epistemic Normativity and Epistemic Blame.
I will question the assumption that failing to satisfy epistemic norms is epistemically blameworthy (e.g., Boghossian (2001)). In doing so, I will examine whether epistemic norms are non-transparent - i.e., whether one can fail to know that one is in a situation in which the norm applies (Boghossian (2003a)). If so, one might fail to satisfy an epistemic norm because one does not realise that the norm applies, despite proportioning one's belief to the evidence. In such a case, one may violate the norm blamelessly (e.g., Williamson (2000), Lackey (2007)). This would give us a novel way of arguing for the infallibility of a priori justification (part 2), which would then offer a novel way of characterising the a priori (part 3).
2. A Priority and Infallibility.
The familiar counterexamples to the infallibility of a priori justification seem to exhibit false beliefs justified by a priori reasons (the paradigm example is of able mathematicians having believed Euclid's parallel postulate), thus demonstrating the fallibility of a priori justification (BonJour (1998), Casullo (2003)). I will argue that in fact the beliefs in these cases are unjustified. The intuition that these cases involve justification is explained away by arguing that justification is mistaken for blamelessness.
In addition, I will argue in favour of the infallibility of a priori justification, and of the fallibility of a posteriori justification, based on the epistemic norms that govern them. This will form a key part of the research project, as it will provide the fulcrum on which to support a novel analysis of the a priori (part 3)
3. A Priority and Epistemic Norms.
If the epistemic norms governing a priori beliefs are distinct from the epistemic norms governing a posteriori beliefs, then the a priori can be distinguished from the a posteriori with reference to those distinct norms. The third part of my research project will be to explore the resilience of these analyses to the challenges from each of four categories
This problem has led to a persistent trend towards scepticism and deflationism. Following Casullo (2015), these challenges to the notion of a priority can be organised into four broad categories, holding that the notion is: (i) incoherent [e.g., Quine (1951)] (ii) vacuous [e.g., Benacerraf (1973)]; (iii) insignificant [e.g., Williamson (2007)]; and (iv) in tension with other aspects of the traditional view of the a priori [e.g., Jenkins (2013), Casullo (2012)].
The principal aim will be to develop a novel characterisation of the a priori that avoids these challenges. The principal thesis will be that the a priori is distinguishable from the a posteriori by their being governed by different kinds of epistemic norms.
My research will be organised around the following three topics.
1. Epistemic Normativity and Epistemic Blame.
I will question the assumption that failing to satisfy epistemic norms is epistemically blameworthy (e.g., Boghossian (2001)). In doing so, I will examine whether epistemic norms are non-transparent - i.e., whether one can fail to know that one is in a situation in which the norm applies (Boghossian (2003a)). If so, one might fail to satisfy an epistemic norm because one does not realise that the norm applies, despite proportioning one's belief to the evidence. In such a case, one may violate the norm blamelessly (e.g., Williamson (2000), Lackey (2007)). This would give us a novel way of arguing for the infallibility of a priori justification (part 2), which would then offer a novel way of characterising the a priori (part 3).
2. A Priority and Infallibility.
The familiar counterexamples to the infallibility of a priori justification seem to exhibit false beliefs justified by a priori reasons (the paradigm example is of able mathematicians having believed Euclid's parallel postulate), thus demonstrating the fallibility of a priori justification (BonJour (1998), Casullo (2003)). I will argue that in fact the beliefs in these cases are unjustified. The intuition that these cases involve justification is explained away by arguing that justification is mistaken for blamelessness.
In addition, I will argue in favour of the infallibility of a priori justification, and of the fallibility of a posteriori justification, based on the epistemic norms that govern them. This will form a key part of the research project, as it will provide the fulcrum on which to support a novel analysis of the a priori (part 3)
3. A Priority and Epistemic Norms.
If the epistemic norms governing a priori beliefs are distinct from the epistemic norms governing a posteriori beliefs, then the a priori can be distinguished from the a posteriori with reference to those distinct norms. The third part of my research project will be to explore the resilience of these analyses to the challenges from each of four categories
Organisations
People |
ORCID iD |
| Aaron Cotnoir (Primary Supervisor) | |
| Matthew Green (Student) |