To what extent is the artificial friend welcome in the good human life?
Lead Research Organisation:
University of Leeds
Department Name: Sch of Philosophy
Abstract
The world we live in has predominantly chosen to embrace rapid advances in data-driven technological innovation; this has played a fundamental role in shaping the contemporary social landscape. One key aspect of this change can be observed in the way that we interact with others - from formulating and maintaining relationships solely with organic agents, to growing a dependency and appreciation of virtual and intelligent artificial agents. I seek to critically evaluate the extent to which our relationships with artificial agents (AA's) can aid in human flourishing, by means of addressing the capacity for AA's to exhibit (an ancient conception of) the virtue of friendship. By contributing to a field that unites moral and technological intelligence, my research seeks to establish the extent to which an artificial friend is (or should be) welcome in the good human life.
This research thesis will defend and utilise a model that will aid in conceptualising exactly what constitutes an artificial friend. The PGR proposes to adopt the 'Method of Abstraction', or more specifically, epistemological levelism. This methodology involves explicitly specifying observations of a system (the 'object of study'). The finite but non-empty set of observables specified is referred to as the level of abstraction, (loA), and determined in accordance with what set is required for an adequate analysis of that system. For example, in the case of wine, an "olfactory" LoA would incorporate a set of observables such as 'bouquet' 'aroma', and 'citrus' etc., whereas a "purchasing" LoA might include a set of observables such as 'maturity', 'supplier', and 'region' etc. (Floridi, 2008: p.309). For the PGR's thesis, the system the PGR will analyse is 'moral agency'. Floridi and Saunders argue that since human beings are paradigmatic moral agents, the set of observables required to analyse moral agency must be at a human level of abstraction. They argue that this set of observables 'probably' include (Floridi & Saunders, 2004: p. 357-8):
a) Autonomy: The capacity to perform internal transitions - i.e. transitions that change its state without direct response to interaction.
b) Adaptability: The agents interactions/experiences can change the transition rules by which it changes state (e.g., machine learning).
c) Interactivity: The agent and environment can act (take input or yield output) upon each other.
When such properties are observed in artificial agents, it is argued that (at that LoA) AA's qualify as moral agents - meaning it is at least theoretically plausible that such entities can exhibit virtuous acts (Floridi and Saunders, 2004: p.349). The focus of my thesis specifically concerns the AA's capacity to exhibit the virtue of friendship.
To examine the nature of friendship and its relationship to the good life, the PGR will build upon my master's dissertation (concerning the nature of friendship in Plato's Symposium and Lysis) by expanding the PGR's knowledge to explicate how Platonic conceptions of friendship are related to the good life. Furthermore, the PGR will draw upon Aristotle's conception of the virtue of friendship as presented in Nichamonian Ethics books 8 &9.
This research thesis will defend and utilise a model that will aid in conceptualising exactly what constitutes an artificial friend. The PGR proposes to adopt the 'Method of Abstraction', or more specifically, epistemological levelism. This methodology involves explicitly specifying observations of a system (the 'object of study'). The finite but non-empty set of observables specified is referred to as the level of abstraction, (loA), and determined in accordance with what set is required for an adequate analysis of that system. For example, in the case of wine, an "olfactory" LoA would incorporate a set of observables such as 'bouquet' 'aroma', and 'citrus' etc., whereas a "purchasing" LoA might include a set of observables such as 'maturity', 'supplier', and 'region' etc. (Floridi, 2008: p.309). For the PGR's thesis, the system the PGR will analyse is 'moral agency'. Floridi and Saunders argue that since human beings are paradigmatic moral agents, the set of observables required to analyse moral agency must be at a human level of abstraction. They argue that this set of observables 'probably' include (Floridi & Saunders, 2004: p. 357-8):
a) Autonomy: The capacity to perform internal transitions - i.e. transitions that change its state without direct response to interaction.
b) Adaptability: The agents interactions/experiences can change the transition rules by which it changes state (e.g., machine learning).
c) Interactivity: The agent and environment can act (take input or yield output) upon each other.
When such properties are observed in artificial agents, it is argued that (at that LoA) AA's qualify as moral agents - meaning it is at least theoretically plausible that such entities can exhibit virtuous acts (Floridi and Saunders, 2004: p.349). The focus of my thesis specifically concerns the AA's capacity to exhibit the virtue of friendship.
To examine the nature of friendship and its relationship to the good life, the PGR will build upon my master's dissertation (concerning the nature of friendship in Plato's Symposium and Lysis) by expanding the PGR's knowledge to explicate how Platonic conceptions of friendship are related to the good life. Furthermore, the PGR will draw upon Aristotle's conception of the virtue of friendship as presented in Nichamonian Ethics books 8 &9.
Organisations
People |
ORCID iD |
| Chris Megone (Primary Supervisor) | |
| Ruby Hornsby (Student) |