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Combinatorial Auctions without Money (2014)

First Author: Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre

Attributed to: Efficient Algorithms for Mechanism Design Without Monetary Transfer funded by EPSRC

Abstract

No abstract provided

Bibliographic Information

Publication URI: http://www.ifaamas.org/Proceedings/aamas2014/starthere.htm

Type: Conference/Paper/Proceeding/Abstract

Volume: Proceedings of 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Parent Publication: 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2014)