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Nontruthful Position Auctions Are More Robust to Misspecification (2024)

First Author: Dütting P

Attributed to: Optimal Impartial Mechanisms funded by EPSRC

Abstract

No abstract provided

Bibliographic Information

Digital Object Identifier: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.2023.1380

Publication URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.2023.1380

Type: Journal Article/Review

Parent Publication: Mathematics of Operations Research

Issue: 2