Horizontal Inequalities, Conflict Recurrence, and Post-Conflict Peace

Using original data on the level of horizontal inequalities (inequalities between groups in economic, political, or social terms) in post-conflict societies, this study provides one of the first large-N studies to systematically assess whether and how levels of horizontal inequalities (HIs) influence conflict recurrence as well as peace consolidation in post-conflict states. Most research to date suggests that warring parties return to violence because (economic, ethnic, or other) grievances have not been overcome or because the opportunity costs of violence remain low due to structural factors. Taking a game-theoretic approach, this study argues that persistent (or shifted) HIs give the disadvantaged group (or the to-be disadvantaged group) the incentive and capacity needed to restart violent conflict. Incentives are given due to the grievances members of a group perceive, which experiences HIs. Capacity is the ability to overcome collective action problems: HIs reinforce a groups' identity and the ability to mobilize along identity lines. Consequently, decreasing HIs also decreases incentive and capacity for violent conflict and most importantly, makes it more likely that members of different groups will engage with each other in their work and personal space; this fosters an environment of cooperative and pro-social norms. Consequently, the two main hypotheses are that (i) conflict is more likely to recur when HIs persist or shift post-conflict and that (ii) low levels of HIs postconflict increase the likelihood of peace consolidation. In order to analyse conflict recurrence, this study employs a Cox proportional hazards model, where one can account for the time until a certain event takes place (i.e., conflict recurrence). The Cox model assesses the risk that a conflict-dyad will recur in a given year while considering the length of time the conflict-dyad has been at risk along with the independent variables. To study peace consolidation, it employs a logistic regression model to calculate the likelihood that a country-year will experience peace consolidation. Particularly, it uses the Firth's Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation to counter the small-sample bias.

I propose two main arguments: (I) persistent (or shifted) HIs give the disadvantaged group (or the to-be disadvantaged group) the incentive and capacity needed to restart violent conflict. Incentives are given due to the grievances members of a group perceive, which experiences HIs. Capacity is the ability to overcome collective action problems: HIs reinforce a groups' identity and the ability to mobilize along identity lines; (II) severe violence often persists or actually grows worse in some communities following the end of conflict. Addressing horizontal inequalities post-conflict can build the foundations for peace consolidation as it diminishes the incentives and capabilities to revolt and low levels of HIs makes it more likely that members of different groups will engage with each other in their work and personal space, which fosters an environment of cooperative and pro-social norms. The proposed hypotheses concerning conflict recurrence make predictions about (I) the likelihood of conflict recurrence in a conflict-dyad, or (II) the likelihood of post-conflict peace in a country. Consequently, the unit of analysis for examining conflict recurrence is the conflict-dyad-year, while the unit of analysis for examining peace consolidation is the country-year. Hence, I will build two time-series cross-section datasets. In order to analyse conflict recurrence, I use survival analysis and employ a Cox proportional hazards model, where one can account for the time until a certain event takes place (i.e., conflict recurrence). The Cox model assesses the risk that a conflict-dyad will recur in a given year while considering the length of time the conflict-dyad has been at risk along with the independent variables.