Risk Perception, Climate Change and Public Engagement
Lead Research Organisation:
CARDIFF UNIVERSITY
Department Name: Sch of Psychology
Abstract
Abstracts are not currently available in GtR for all funded research. This is normally because the abstract was not required at the time of proposal submission, but may be because it included sensitive information such as personal details.
Organisations
People |
ORCID iD |
Nicholas Pidgeon (Principal Investigator / Fellow) |
Publications
Lorenzoni I.
(2008)
Turning Down the Heat: The Politics of Climate Policy in Affluent Democracies
Spence A.
(2009)
Climate change - psychology's contribution
in Psychologist
Spence A
(2009)
Psychology, Climate Change & Sustainable Bahaviour
in Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development
Pidgeon N
(2009)
Risk analysis and climate change
in Environmental Politics
Spence A
(2010)
Framing and communicating climate change: The effects of distance and outcome frame manipulations
in Global Environmental Change
Poortinga W
(2011)
Uncertain climate: An investigation into public scepticism about anthropogenic climate change
in Global Environmental Change
Pidgeon N
(2011)
The role of social and decision sciences in communicating uncertain climate risks
in Nature Climate Change
Corner A
(2011)
Nuclear power, climate change and energy security: Exploring British public attitudes
in Energy Policy
Pidgeon N
(2012)
Public understanding of, and attitudes to, climate change: UK and international perspectives and policy
in Climate Policy
Spence A
(2012)
The psychological distance of climate change.
in Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis
Description | The interviews with policy-makers demonstrated that climate uncertainty and risk have become a key concern, with issues of climate adaptation risk also prominent. However, a solely risk decision-making framework may fail to deal with all of the uncertainties involved (Output: Pidgeon and Butler, Environmental Politics, 2009). The work to understand how UK public risk perceptions have been changing yielded several core conclusions (Key Outputs: Pidgeon, Foresight IDCC Paper, 2010; Pidgeon and Fischhoff, Nature Climate Change, 2011; Pidgeon, Climate Policy, 2012; Pidgeon, Risk Analysis, 2012). In particular: • Although belief in anthropogenic global warming remains high in the UK, risk perceptions have gradually decreased in surveys post-2006 (when the IPCC 4th report and the Stern review were published). This is also observed in other developed nations, although not all developing nations. This trend is seen on multiple measures; slightly lower belief in climate change, more climate scepticism, lowered perceptions of risk etc. Very recent evidence (2011 and 2012) suggests a flattening in this trend (Output: Shuckburgh, Robison and Pidgeon, LWEC Report, 2012). Explanations for this decline include: 'climate fatigue', the global economic crisis pushing the environment out of mind, falling media attention, and elite commentators reinforcing climate sceptic claims. • The UEA-CRU e-mail events of 2009/10 created a temporary 'spike' in media reporting. However, impacts on public attitudes were not as severe as some in science policy believed at the time. These events did serve to highlight the issue of trust in climate scientists, although it is not clear whether trust has indeed been seriously damaged. More research is required here. • Core climate discourses adopted by people were relatively stable between 1997 and 2010 (Capstick, linked PhD Thesis, 2012), but with subtle shifts in meaning and emphasis: recent trends include more expressions of climate 'fatigue', and an increased tendency to question the anthropogenic component to climate change. • There is a relationship between climate change scepticism and people's underlying values (Output: Poortinga, Spence and Pidgeon, Global Environmental Change, 2011), while climate change remains 'psychologically distant' for many (Outputs: Spence et al., Risk Analysis, 2012; Pidgeon, Risk Analysis, 2012), and gain/loss framing influences peoples' interpretation of climate risk information (Output: Spence and Pidgeon, Global Environmental Change, 2010) Findings for climate risk communication and policy include: • Guidelines for government when communicating about climate change, include; to move beyond social marketing, treat fear appeals appropriately, be honest about scenarios, and seek to promote pro-environmental social norms (Output: Climate Change Communication Advisory Group, Policy Briefing for DECC, 2010). • The international workshop concluded that a suitable academic knowledge-base exists to support climate change risk communication, but that strategic capacity in both the UK and elsewhere is lacking. A strategic approach would incorporate 'strategic listening' and 'strategic organisation' (Outputs: Pidgeon and Fischhoff, Nature Climate Change, 2011; Pidgeon, Risk Analysis, 2012.) |
Exploitation Route | Major implications for UK climate policy |
Sectors | Energy Environment Government Democracy and Justice |
Description | The main societal value of the project has been to place in the public domain an independent synthesis of UK national and international attitudes and change over time, contributing to increased effectiveness of public debate and evidence-based policy. Three main lines of impact arise: SOCIETAL IMPACT (A): Contribution to UK and international debates on recent changes in, and nature of, British public views on climate change. The project synthesised key evidence on UK public concern, risk perceptions, scepticism and reasons for change. This analysis was extended, as part of my contribution to the Foresight International Dimensions project, to consider how changes in climate attitudes over the coming 10 years might impact government policy. The Foresight review fed into the UK's very first climate change risk assessment, and has also prompted a major House of Commons Science and Technology Committee inquiry into UK climate attitudes and climate communication (announced in March 2013). SOCIETAL IMPACT (B): A contribution to UK methodological capacity in tracking climate change attitudes over time. The project identified several core items which have subsequently been used by science policy and government users in their own subsequent surveys. Arguably none of these studies would have commenced without the intellectual and methodological groundwork of the project. SOCIETAL IMPACT (C): A contribution to the debate about climate (and other) risk communication. The project has contributed to the UK policy debate about the tools and practical guidelines for engaging the public with climate change risks, an issue also explicitly taken up in the new House of Commons inquiry noted above. The arguments presented are generic, and hence in the light of other prominent risk events arising during the period of the project (e.g. the Icelandic ash cloud, the Fukushima nuclear disaster) project insights have garnered a wider policy impact. B Please outline the findings and outputs from your project which have had the economic and societal impact(s) outlined in 2A. [Max 250 words] IMPACT (A): UK and international debate on British public views. Evidence on UK public attitudes were summarised in a major journal review (Pidgeon, Climate Policy, 2012) and the Foresight International Dimensions paper (Pidgeon, 2010). These papers demonstrated how a range of factors underlie climate change risk perceptions, discusses reasons for the decline in concern since 2006, and the fact that concern about climate change had not dropped as far as some had feared at the time of the 'Climategate' controversy in 2009. The work also highlighted the important issue of trust in climate scientists as deserving of further study. IMPACT (B): Methodological capacity. Published outputs from the Fellowship identify core items for measuring concern, risk perception, attribution, impacts, responsibility (see Pidgeon, Climate Policy, 2012; Spence, Poortinga, Pidgeon, Risk Analysis, 2012; Poortinga et al, Global Environmental Change, 2011). IMPACT (C): Debates about risk communication. Here the project concluded that there was a need for a new approach to such communication to meet the challenges of climate change decision making and governance (Pidgeon and Butler, Environmental Politics, 2009; Pidgeon and Fischhoff, Nature Climate Change, 2011; Pidgeon, Risk Analysis, 2012). As noted above, these arguments are generic and as such have also found application in other domains (e.g. radiation protection, public health). C Please outline how these impacts were achieved. [Max 250 words] IMPACT (A): UK and international debate on British public views. Evidence presented to: UK Dept. for Climate Change and Energy (DECC) Ministers Huhne and Hendry, and Chief Scientist; Welsh and Scottish Govt; European Commission; Friends of the Earth; US State Department. The Foresight review and Summary report appear on the Government Office of Science website and were debated within UK policy - e.g. new House of Commons Inquiry onto public attitudes to climate change bases terms of reference closely on findings from my Foresight paper. IMPACT (B): Methodological capacity. Core items and advice used by: (1) LWEC Climate Science and the Media study (March 2011); (2) DECC public attitudes tracker (March 2012); (3) Climate Change Consortium of Wales and Welsh Govt survey (December 2012); (4) British Science Assoc. survey (March 2013). Additional publications arising from (1) and (3). Shuckburgh, Robinson, Pidgeon (2012) Climate Science in the Media: A Public Attitude Study. DECC/DEFRA/MetOffice/LWEC, pp 54. Capstick, Pidgeon, Whitehead (2013) Public Perceptions of Climate Change in Wales. Climate Change Consortium for Wales (C3W) and Welsh Government, pp 75. IMPACT (C): Debates about risk communication. Invited presentations to: Govt Chief Scientist Sir John Beddington; DECC Communications Team and Science Advisory Group; Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Unit; British Medical Association; UK Met Office. DECC and DEFRA officials participated in policy session at the 2010 Cumberland Lodge Workshop. Written and oral evidence presented to, and cited in, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee Inquiry into Energy Risks and The Public (The 'Devils Bargain' report 2012). Guidance note on communication written for DECC in collaboration with WWF-UK, Global Action Plan and other NGOs (Corner et al, Climate Change Communication Advisory Group, 2010; see www.pirc.info/downloads/communicating_climate_mass_audiences.pdf). |
First Year Of Impact | 2009 |
Sector | Energy,Environment,Government, Democracy and Justice |
Impact Types | Societal Policy & public services |
Description | Centre for Climate Change Transformations (C3T) |
Amount | £5,127,383 (GBP) |
Funding ID | ES/S012257/1 |
Organisation | Economic and Social Research Council |
Sector | Public |
Country | United Kingdom |
Start | 04/2019 |
End | 04/2022 |
Description | Understanding UK Perceptions of Climate Risk and Resilience (RESILRISK) |
Amount | £212,954 (GBP) |
Funding ID | NE/S016449/1 |
Organisation | Natural Environment Research Council |
Sector | Public |
Country | United Kingdom |
Start | 02/2019 |
End | 01/2020 |