Assessing the effects of mental imagery (and its absence) on language and the perception of time. Experimental psycholinguistic research on aphantasia

Cognitive linguistic research suggests that language relies upon many aspects of cognition, rather
than utilising a specific, isolated part of the brain (Langacker 2002). Furthermore, this research has
addressed the variety of ways humans perceive time; finding that culture and language patterns can
affect the way speakers perceive this abstract concept (Boroditsky et al. 2010). These studies have
additionally shown that the human brain is malleable when it comes to cognitive tasks, and that even
language itself can be the catalyst for enacting change.
Mental imagery forms the basis of our visual imaginations, where both automated and cognizant
mental simulations play a huge role in our perception, memory, creativity and reverie; scholars
suggest mental imagery is vital for cognition on the whole (Kosslyn et al. 2006), yet there are still
many unknown aspects to mental imagery and the neurological processes behind it.
Whilst mental imagery and the mind's eye have received attention across fields such as psychology
and the neurosciences, their absence remains an understudied phenomenon. The ability to conjure
mental images is one that many of us take for granted, yet recently the complete inability to produce
mental imagery was finally named as aphantasia (Zeman et al. 2015). Those with aphantasia cannot

willingly or automatically produce mental imagery, and have no visual memory to draw from.
Researching aphantasia should prove to be extremely insightful as to the cognitive importance of
mental images, and how their presence or absence affects our perception.
This interdisciplinary project aims to analyse those with aphantasia using empirically tested
experimental methods, and through comparison to control participants, investigating whether mental
imagery (and its absence) affects the perception of time and the cognitive link to language.