The thesis proposes to answer the following question: is political liberalism undesirably individualistic?

It will do this by drawing on recent literature on the nature of political community and civic friendship, the way political institutions mould citizens, and state neutrality and perfectionism.
The criticism that liberalism is problematically individualistic is a longstanding one. Yet this criticism has had little traction in the past two decades. I believe the main reason for this is that liberals such as John Rawls (following his political turn) and Will Kymlicka, responding to this criticism, drew the insights from the communitarian critique of liberalism while preserving liberalism's essential characteristics. However, the thesis will seek to argue that even the updated liberalism of political liberalism is indeed undesirably individualistic, but not in the way the communitarian criticisms of the 1980s and 90s alleged.
Focusing on John Rawls - an emblematic contemporary liberal - for the sake of simplicity and clarity, the thesis will first establish whether justice as fairness is individualistic, distinguishing between three kinds of individualism. It will argue that Rawls is committed to 'moral individualism'. It will then argue that his moral individualism leads Rawls to two further types of individualism, which I term 'procedural individualism' and 'sovereign individualism'. The thesis will then press three objections to Rawls' procedural and sovereign individualism using recent work on political liberalism. The three lines of criticism are united by their objection to Rawls' attempt to leave individuals as free as possible to hold their own view of the good and pursue their own projects. The first questions whether the shared commitments of the members of a Rawlsian polity would be strong enough to maintain the social unity and stability Rawls himself emphasises is so important for justice as fairness to succeed. The second suggests that justice as fairness, in seeking to maximise the freedom of individuals to pursue their own interests, would encourage the kind of individualistic dispositions Rawls explicitly tries to avoid. And the third suggests that Rawls' desire to respect individual autonomy, and consequent wariness of state intervention in the lives of individuals, actually disrespects citizens by failing to use the resources of the state in ways that promote their good.