Essays on Microeconomic Theory

The proposed research builds on my MPhil thesis, where I considered a setting that has received much attention in the literature: auditions in the performing arts. This is an interesting
test case because auditions require objectivity on part of the evaluator if applicants need to submit supplementary information in form of a CV, and performances are not blindfolded. In their seminal
work, Goldin and Rouse (2000) have shown that the move to blind auditions in the 1970s and 1980s fostered impartiality in hiring, and raised the proportion of women in major U.S. symphony orchestras.
This work has led many to argue that blind auditions - a policy counteracting first impression biases - has promoted equal opportunity (Gladwell, 2005). But it is unclear how such policy influences
incentives: an unintended consequence of blind auditions may be an avalanche of auditionees. Thus, blind auditions come at the cost that evaluators loose supplementary information to screen applicants
by ability (Holland, 1981). If so, blind auditions do not necessarily have the claimed beneficial effects, such as the hiring of superior candidates (Gladwell, 2005). Understanding the conditions under which
blind auditions can be beneficial, thus, requires careful modelling. For my MPhil thesis I have developed a simple model to address questions such as: what are the repercussions of an evaluator's bias against
a specific group of applicants? In particular, when, and under which conditions, is it rational to ignore supplementary information, avoiding misleading first impressions? Can a move to blind auditions lead
to more talented candidates being hired? How do effort incentives vary with the form of audition and severity of the bias? While the performing arts serve as motivating example, these questions are pertinent
to a range of applications, including gender- and race-blind hiring, or grant applications in Academia.
While my MPhil research provides a first insight into the trade-off of blind auditions, it does not address
factors such as competition among applicants, the distinction between explicit and subconscious bias, or
volatility in performance quality. In future work, I therefore plan to extend my model in these directions
to discuss welfare implications and inform policy."