Understanding violence in the aftermath of a popular revolution: Evidence from Burkina Faso

Popular uprisings and revolutions are explosive, violent events in the wake of which governments fall and societies change. While uprisings are often portrayed as the main violent event (Huntington, 1968), afterwards, politics are reorganised, and we often observe new types of violence and the emergence of opposing factions. Burkina Faso witnessed a popular revolution in 2014, which led to its former president's ousting and renewed hope for a more democratic state (Frere and Englebert, 2015). However, the revolution has led to greater instability and an increase in violent actors and events.

Social scientists have yet to understand the motivations and explanations for why new violence emerges and changes even if popular movements succeed. My project aims to address this gap, leveraging evidence from the recent revolution in Burkina Faso to understand how and why violence develops after popular uprisings. My aim is to provide actionable evidence that helps policymakers and stakeholders predict where violence may emerge following uprisings.

By using both advanced quantitative methods (survey data), qualitative interviews by means of extensive fieldwork in Burkina Faso, I ask: How does violence develop and change after a popular revolution?

I tackle the following three sub-questions and dedicate a paper to each in my dissertation:

[RQ1] How did the transition toward a popular revolution affect expectations about governance after the uprising?
In the first paper, tackling RQ1, I investigate the population's expectations before and during the revolution. Using qualitative interviews, I collect nuanced information on whether the government has adequately addressed those expectations, or whether the new leadership has been perceived to ignore these, thus creating space for grievances from the groups that the new government has politically and economically excluded.

[RQ2] How does political discontent with the outcome of the revolution explain the occurrence of political violence?
In the second paper, I study how political discontent and variation in violence are linked (RQ2). I plan to use existing survey data, such as the Afrobarometer, to measure political discontent, and to augment the information with qualitative information collected for my first paper as well as an original survey. The survey will allow me to gather data of sufficient detail which will enable me to link it with violent event data to be collated from public sources. The government has unsuccessfully tried to stop violence from spreading and based on my insights on the popular expectations from paper 1, I hypothesise that depending on the level of discontent with the outcome of the uprising, people will express grievances using different types of violence, e.g., rioting, interethnic violence, or terrorist tactics. I also argue that the violence may increase due to the different ethnic groups arming themselves for defence because they do not believe in the state's protection.

[RQ3] Where does violence originate and how does it spread after a revolution - from urban areas where uprisings are most likely to occur, or from excluded rural areas, where discontent with revolutionary outcomes remains?
In my third paper, using the violent event data, I explore the diffusion of violence and its origins after the revolution (RQ3). I seek to gain a better understanding of whether violence first occurs where the revolutionary uprising was most present (in urban areas) and if it is driven by the discontent of those most active in the uprising, or whether violence stems from the discontent of rural, excluded populations.

My findings promise to inform policy debates about how the forces of a popular revolution structure post-revolutionary politics and violence, and how domestic and international organisations can manage such increases in violence.