Towards the reconciliation of retributivism and rehabilitation in the face of social exclusion

Von Hirsch's retributivism and rehabilitation have moved in the last half decade from conflicting to consistent paradigms. I aim to show that they can also be construed as interconnected. My assumption is simple: although the requirement of
respecting moral agency and autonomy creates, in the abstract, only negative, defensive obligations, in the face of severe social exclusion respect is impossible without attention to offenders' welfare. In the context of a 'high-crime, high-punishment, high-inequality' equilibrium, retributivism can be re-interpreted as incorporating (i) an obligation to rehabilitate and (ii) the necessary sentencing framework and, thereby, construed as integral to efforts of fostering
equilibria of inclusion. Moreover, a reconciliation between retributivism and rehabilitation could provide a normative justification for a conception of 'humanitarian' rehabilitation that has different implications for policy than its widely
accepted consequentialist counterpart. It entails that 'caring' for offenders through rehabilitation is not merely a means for reducing recidivism, nor a mere ideological preference, but a precondition for justified punishment in the face of social
exclusion. There are thus strong normative reasons for preferring the Good Lives Model and desistance paradigm of rehabilitation, as well as for systematically addressing the pains of desistance and the pains of risk-focused rehabilitation.